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ABSTRACT
LABOR UNIONS AND REGIME TRANSITION IN ARGENTINA
SEPTEMBER 1988
LINDA CHEN, B.A., QUEENS COLLEGE, CITY UNIVERSITY OF
NEW YORK
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Howard J. Wiarda
Current scholarship on regime transition in the
Southern Cone has concentrated on the internal dynamics
or structural contradictions of the authoritarian regime
as being the fundamental reason leading to its demise.
Undoubtedly, the exit of the military authoritarians in
Argentina from power resulted from their own assessment
that the costs of maintaining power were too high.
However, it would be a mistake to solely emphasize the
internal dynamics of the ruling elites without taking
into consideration the role of popular civilian groups
in destabilizing the authoritarian regime.
This thesis argues that during the last military
authoritarian era (1976-1983), the Argentine labor
movement was one of the few civilian groups capable of
opposing the regime. The Argentine labor movement has a
long tradition of political activism dating back to the
vi i
days of Juan Peron. During the last military
intervention, the military attempted an all-out assault
on labor to de-Peronize and de-politicize it. The
military was initially successful at repressing labor
activism through the use of force and legal statutes.
In the first three years of military rule, the labor
movement was divided and weakened— its political power
was effectively circumscribed, despite efforts by labor
to redress the dire situation.
Labor attempts to reconstitute its political pwoer
base came toward the end of the most repressive period
of military rule. Faced with the threat of
institutional destruction, labor was able to mount a
campaign against regime policy long before any other
civilian group was able to do so. By relying on its
ability to mobilize sectors of the population over bread
and butter issues, its organized bureaucracy, and its
tradition of political activism, labor was able to
resist the regime, although throughout this period, much
dissension existed within the movement. The ability to
utilize issues of economic survival as forums for
criticizing regime policies were constant problems for a
regime whose raison d'etre rested on law and order, and
the ability to ensure a docile labor force. They very
inability of the military to contain labor activism was
an important factor in the transition to democracy in
Argentina in 1983.
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CHAPTER I
THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION IN AN AUTHORITARIAN SETTING
The study of Latin American politics has undergone
several transformations since the World War II era.
From an emphasis on legal-formalism to contemporary
theories of corporatism and dependency, as a field of
analysis Latin American politics has attempted to
manifest itself in the prevailing political reality of
the area. Theory building concerning the whys and
wherefores of political change has sought to describe
and explain the essential characteristics of Latin
American political life in the hope of greater
1
understanding and predictability for the analyst. More
often than not, new trends in theory building have been
precipitated by unforeseen and therefore unexplained
events in Latin America such as a rash of military coups
or the emergence of paramilitary groups. New theory-
building trends necessarily provoke a rethinking of old
theories and models of analysis, leading to the
rejection of some and the revision of others. it is
within this tradition of theory building that an
analysis of Latin American political change will be
si tuated
.
Traditional Theories of Political Development
The point of departure for this study is the period
after World War II for this was the beginning of the
development of theories of modernization for Latin
America and the rest of the Third World. In terms of
political change, the world was seeing the demise of the
British and French empires and the emergence of newly
independent nations in Asia and Africa. Prior to the
1950s, it was the accepted wisdom that these nations
would create democratic political systems along the same
lines as the United States and the countries of Western
Europe, and that this democratic development was the
2
standard in weighing the extent of a country's
modernization. Studies—mainly historical and
descriptive in nature— were made of executives,
legislatures, and constitutions.
While initially, many of the newly independent
nations instituted some form of democratic government,
the study of formal institutions did not seem to get at
the crux of what these new nations were all about. For
one thing, these nations were vastly different from the
nations of Europe and the United States, both culturally
and philosophically. In the interest of creating value-
free and objective criteria for analyzing differing
political systems, many comparative theorists embraced
the field of behaviorism with its emphasis on systems
and functions.
The Politics of the Developing Areas by Gabriel
Almond and James Coleman, published in 1960, attempted
to introduce new conceptual frameworks emphasizing
action and behavior into the study of developing areas.
Almond and Coleman argued for replacing an analysis of
formal legal institutions with an analysis of the
functions performed by political systems. More elastic,
fluid categories of analysis needed to be developed to
promote greater comparability across diverse cultures.
For example, the concept of the state connoted certain
3
legal and institutional models (of European style),
while the political system included a diverse range of
political organizations and activities. A political
system, according to Almond and Coleman, was a system of
interactions which performed the functions of
integration and adaptation by the means of, or threat
of, the use of force. It was valid, therefore, to call
governments of tribal chieftains political systems so as
to facilitate their comparison with other political
systems
.
Almond and Coleman argued that all political systems
performed certain functions. Borrowing from David
Easton, they called these functions inputs and outputs.
Input functions were political socialization and
recruitment, interest articulation, interest
aggregation, and political communication. Output
functions were rule - making, rule application, and rule
adjudication. What separated one system from the other
was the degree of specificity of the structures which
performed these functions. As a general rule, developed
systems were those where specialized structures existed
and where the functions were universally understood.
For example, in modern systems interest articulation
would be diffuse, particularistic, and affective. As a
result, interests were harder to aggregate in developing
4
countries than in modern ones.
Almond and Coleman's desire was to break the notion
that there was a dichotomy between developed and
developing areas. All societies had both modern and
traditional tendencies — they were dual by nature.
Development then, was a process whereby a society moved
from traditionaKparticularist, ascriptive,
hierarchical) toward modern (universal, achievement-
oriented, egalitarian). Societies could be plotted on a
time line with progress representing the increasing pace
toward modernity. Of course, vestiges of tradi tional i ty
existed, but they became subordinate in the political
system rather than dominant as the system moved along
the continuum.^"
Although Almond and Coleman sought to develop a
neutral analytic framework for studying developing
areas, their structural-functional categories had
embedded in them a northern European democratic bias.
The categorization of inputs assumed a system where
demands were made from the bottom up; i.e., the people
made demands upon the government which reacted to these
demands in its outputs. By giving equal weight to
inputs and outputs, Almond and Coleman were assuming a
system with informed citizens and an open government ala
the democratic model. Thus, being developed was equated
5
with being democratic which became the ideal type by
which all other systems were measured. Implicit was a
value judgment concerning which systems were better.
The assumptions of the structural-functional model
were adapted by subsequent analyses of developing areas.
Studies were undertaken to measure the degree of
sophistication of bureaucracies, political parties, and
communications networks, among others, in developing
areas. In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba wrote
Tn e Civic Culture which was an attempt to apply
behaviorist theory to comparative analysis. They sought
to analyze the relationship between structure, attitude,
and behavior. The political culture, that is, the
attitudes toward government, toward the nation, and
toward oneself and fellow citizens, had an important
influence on the types of structures created and on the
behavior of citizens. Survey techniques were used and
systematic empirical correlations were attempted. The
major contributions of this work to understanding the
politics of developing areas were to encourage more
quantitative, statistical and objective studies and to
develop the linkage between political culture (which
could be seen as an elaboration of the political
socialization function) and the structure of government.
6
Critiques of political culture literature and
behaviorist theory in general have argued that there is
an overemphasis on political culture as causing
structure. R. Fagen argued that the government's role
of establishing and inculcating values and beliefs were
overlooked. R. Tucker also viewed the emphasis on
political socialization from below as being biased
toward the western European systems. 3 Here again, the
criticism could be made that The Civic Culture held the
western democratic model as an ideal type rather than a
neutral yardstick for evaluation.
The 1960s witnessed the decline of democratic regimes
in the nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and
the increasing trend toward violence and dictatorial
regimes. David Apter, in The Pol i t i cs of Mode rni zat ion
,
ventured to say that democracy may not work in the
developing stages of a polity so that other means (e.g.,
coercion) for regime consolidation should not be ruled
out. His work set out to develop the relationships
between three analytical frameworks: normative
(questions of right action and moral choice),
structural-functional (changes in political process),
and behavioral (attitudes). By analyzing modernization
from these viewpoints, he sought to delineate various
4
solutions to problems faced by developing nations.
C. E. Black, in The Dynamics of Modernization.
offered a criticism of modernization as having been a
violent process, disrupting total societies. He
cautioned that the loss of traditional ties had not been
replaced by necessarily better forms, but that the
alienation caused by industrialization and urbanization
had caused misery for millions living in modern
societies. He stressed the need to explore different
routes to modernization in the hope of avoiding some of
the problems faced by previous modernization epochs. 5
What the studies of the mid-1960s had in common was
the belief that modernization was the same as
democratization. The transition or the movement toward
modernization might differ from region to region, but
the end-result was always assumed to be the liberal
democratic types of systems found in the United States
and Western Europe. Studies which dealt with the
problems of modernization were implicitly using
pluralist democracy as their point of reference. The
frequency of military coups, the divisiveness of
interest groups, political corruption, and other
patterns were labeled "problems" because they were seen
as "lacking" in cohesive institutions and channels of
communication, for certain governmental functions were
deemed to be non-existent. Those functions, of course,
8
were those associated with the democratic model of
gove rnment
.
In 1968, Samuel Huntington's Political Order in
Changing Societies provided another facet to the
analysis of modernization theory. Huntington
differentiated between modernization and political
development. Modernization involved the social and
economic transformation of the society as a whole;
political development dealt specifically with the
specialization and adaptability of governing
institutions dealing with these social and economic
transformations. The problem with developing societies
was that mass mobilization (i.e., groups formed with
articulate interests) occurred before government
structures were institutionalized to meet these demands.
Because government structures could not adapt to
increasing demands, the result was instability, leading
to violence and the imposition of authoritarian regimes.
The prior emphasis on system inputs, therefore, had been
misguided; what was needed now was analysis of
institution stability.
One of the effects of Huntington's thesis was the
trend toward the study of elite groups such as the
military, business, university students, and civil
servants, among others. For example, rather than assume
9
the existence of military regimes as a sign of
underdevelopment, analysts were now viewing the
prominence of military regimes as a logical and
necessary outcome of transition. This was particularly
true within the field of Latin American politics as the
1960s saw the capitulation of democratic governments to
military men. Rather than proving to be "unmode rni zed ,
"
many of the military regimes of the 1960s displayed
competence at economic planning, foreign policy, and
regime consolidation.
The late 1960s and early 1970s marked a turning point
in the field of Latin American politics. Given that
many of the Latin American nations were not following
the "traditional" path toward modernization and refusing
to accept the idea that Latin America was backward
rather than that something was wrong with the political
development model, analysts in Latin American studies
began to break away from mainstream thinking of
comparative politics and to attempt new explanations for
Latin American political change. In observing the
ascendancy of military regimes in many Latin American
countries, theories were advanced to explain their
emergence and to assess their significance to Latin
American political change.
In conceptualizing change in Latin American politics,
10
contemporary theories focused on the compatibility of
non-democratic regimes with economic development. It
was in explaining the reasons behind this compatibility
that the debate ensued. Several schools of thought,
each with a distinctive argument but sharing some
similarities and assumptions, attempted to explain the
rise of military regimes. The various schools of thought
can be divided into two categories: corporatist and
authoritarian (with bureaucratic-authoritarianism as the
major sub-type). One major school of thought which will
not be addressed directly is dependency theory as many
of the salient features of dependency theory will be
incorporated in the analysis of bureaucratic-
authoritarianism.
Corporat i sm
Although the corporatism/authoritarianism debate in
Latin American politics was a decade ago, the theory of
corporatism still exists today. Corporatism, as defined
by Latin American political theorists, is a political
system whereby power is hierarchically organized and
interests were incorporated vertically in a pyramidal
structure. Power would be centralized among a very
small elite; in 1960s Latin America, it was the military
in many nations which was at the apex of power. Below
11
the military came other powerful organized interests
such as the landed oligarchy, the Roman Catholic Church,
the middle sectors, and labor each sharing some degree
of power and influence. Below these groups would be the
newly organized middle class, below them the skilled
workers, and at the bottom of the pyramid would be
peasants and the urban poor. The key to corporatism is
that it seeks to maintain the power of the traditional
elites while at the same time allowing certain organized
interests into the power structure. For example, labor
had traditionally not been a power sharer in many Latin
American nations but with the increasing growth in
number of workers and strength at the work place,
traditional elites saw the need to somehow incorporate
labor into the ruling structure. This incorporation
would take the form of promoting several labor leaders
into the corporatist structure and delegating them
power, but this power would be conditioned by loyalty to
the status quo. The ruling elites realized the need to
accommodate newly emerging interests in society, but
they were also intent on preserving the hierarchical,
authoritarian system which had favored them for so long.
By using strategies of cooptation and incorporation, the
ruling elites sought to maintain control over the
growing number of demands of a society undergoing rapid
12
social and economic transformation. 7
Corporatism then, is clearly non-democratic and its
hierarchical organization reinforces class distinctions
among groups in society. In Latin America, it was clear
which groups had power and influence and which did not.
Interest articulation was carried out through set,
established channels with control emanating from the top
of the pyramid. It is the group rather than the
individual which takes precedence in this social system
and it is the state which determines and controls the
existence and functions of these groups. That is,
groups were given the right to represent certain
interests by the state and more often than not, the
group's very existence was dependent upon the state's
willingness to grant them benefits and privileges. Each
group was functionally distinct from the other,
representing a prescribed set of interests. In return,
these groups abdicated their autonomy to the state and
agreed to work within established boundaries in their
demand-making. The state ideally represented the
"common interest" and the society was an organic whole
in which group interests were tied together. Problem
solving was carried out through bureaucratic
administrative channels, where they were administered
3
and handled rather than taken care of substantively.
13
The reasons behind why corporatism rather than
pluralist democracy had been the norm rather than
pluralist democracy were varied and in contention. One
school of thought argued that corporatism was a logical
development given the distinctive heritage of Latin
America. Theorists such as H. Wiarda, F. Pike, G.
Dealy, and C. Veliz argued that Latin American
historical development had been rooted in hierarchical,
paternalist, and Catholic social and political
arrangements. Latin American corporatism was a direct
descendant of the Spanish colonial system which was
brought to the New World almost intact by the
conquistadors. The Spanish Crown theoretically
maintained control over its colonies through the
encomienda system whereby the Crown, claiming control
over the indigenous Indian population, granted certain
individuals the right to use Indians in their mining and
agricultural pursuits. The relationship the Crown
sought to enforce was one where power was centralized in
Spain with conquistadors subordinate to the Crown and
Qdependent upon Spain for benefits and privileges.
While the degree of effectiveness of control by the
Crown varied from region to region, the conventions
established by patrimonial Spanish society were adapted
to Spanish America and have perpetuated to this day.
14
The political order was an hierarchical one with one man
rule. What prevented this system from being despotic
was the adherence to Catholic principles. The
conquistador and later in the nineteenth century, the
hacendado had a responsibility over his underlings — to
Christianize and to treat them humanely. According to
Catholic doctrine, society was treated as an organic
whole, each person having a specific function and
enjoying the rights and privileges thereof. Individuals
were subject to higher authority in rank order.
Ideally, the church and its clergy were at the top of
the hierarchy in the temporal life, below them the
hacendados, and below them the masses. In Catholic
tradition, much emphasis was placed on obedience to
authority, based on the assumption that God ordered
temporal life the way he did for good reason. This
notion, coupled with resignation to your lot in life,
made Latin America an inherently conservative and slow-
. .10
changing region.
Centralized non-democratic authoritarian rule based
on traditional Spanish society has remained an integral
characteristic of Latin American political life. Rule
by individual hacendados has given way to rule by
military men or by a small elite of defined groups.
Even during the republican periods of the late
15
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, politics coalesced
around certain populist figures. Present-day
corporatist structures were but reifications of
traditional Spanish Catholic society.
Another interpretation for the reasons behind the
development of corporatism was offered by Alfred Stepan.
Stepan first set out to distinguish between a culture's
guiding philosophy and the way a society attempted to
order itself in concrete structures and policies. Like
Wiarda, Stepan argued that the liberal-pluralist
tradition with its pursuit of individual interests as
producing the best good for society was not a part of
the Latin American heritage. Rather, an "organic-
statist" tradition had prevailed which located the
common good with the existence of a strong statist
community. Organi c-s tat i sm posited that man's nature
could only be fulfilled within a community. To attain
this community, a strong interventionist state was
required. The end of state action was to serve the
common good, and the state had the prerogative to take
autonomous action in promoting radical changes in
society. While public and individual pursuits were
allowed, the state had the legitimate right to bridle
these pursuits as it saw fit. Each component part of a
community had its own proper place and function within
16
the organic whole. 11
Where Stepan differed with the "corporatism as
historical continuity" school was in his assessment of
the origins of corporatism. Stepan argued that
corporatism was first and foremost a set of
institutional arrangements established to order society
and that organic-statism was often the justification for
imposing such corporatist structures. Corporatism was a
means whereby established elite groups dealt with
perceived threats to their power; policies were
therefore consciously adopted. As new groups emerged to
compete for power, groups already in positions of power
felt they were being threatened; when they saw the tide
was irreversible, those in power sought to control the
degree of change which occurred by utilizing the
instruments of the state to corporatize a select number
1
2
of newly organized groups.
In this model, the state directed the process of
incorporating certain groups into the power structure.
Control was located in the state for it was the only
institution which could claim legitimacy in maintaining
control. For the elites who felt their power eroding,
the state and its corporat i zing strategies provided a
means for controlling newly mobilized groups under the
rubric of the "organic-statist" philosophy. By allowing
17
"non-conflictual" and limited modes of participation,
carefully directed by the state and legitimized by it,
elite groups felt they could minimize the erosion of
their power. 13
Stepan further refined his thesis by differentiating
between various sub-types of corporatism — inclusionary
and exclusionary. In attempting to explain the
diversity of political institutions which existed
throughout Latin America, Stepan delineated the
variables he saw as important in the creation of
corporatist regimes. Inclusionary corporatism, as the
name implies, entailed policies which sought to
incorporate "salient working-class" groups into the
power structure. Exclusionary corporatism was policies
which sought the repression and deactivation of salient
working-class groups through coercive means and their
reintegration under conditions which were in accord with
the stated goals of the state.
The conditions under which inclusionary or
exclusionary policies were used varied according to the
politico-socioeconomic conditions prevailing at a given
time. Generally, inclusionary policies were instituted
under conditions of early industrialization and low
political mobilization giving way to the natural demise
of oligarchical forces in the onward march toward
18
mode rni ty
.
Exclusionary policies which were perhaps more the
norm in most Latin American countries were
institutionalized under two conditions. The first was
an environment where political mobilization was high and
ideologically differentiated. The elite assumed control
of the state apparatus and, utilizing coercion, sought
to exclude these highly mobilized groups from the
political arena and to deactivate them. Concurrent with
this deactivation, it would seek to redefine these
excluded groups by creating associat ional organizations
designed and controlled by the state.
The second condition occurred where the elites in
power decided that in the interest of furthering
economic development, the state must take a central role
and impose repression over certain groups (workers)
whose interests were perceived as hindering further
development. Exclusionary policies were enacted with
the aim of later reintegration under conditions of
controlled interest representation by the state."'' 4
These conditions, commonly known as bureaucratic-
authoritarianism, will be analyzed in the next section
of this chapter.
Stepan went on to delineate a series of variables
which could be used to predict or explain the success or
19
failure of corporatist regimes. These variables were
meant to posit causal relationships between prevailing
politico-socioeconomic conditions and the types of
policies instituted and the degree of effectiveness of
these policies. What Stepan was attempting to
demonstrate was that corporatism was a set of
consciously adopted policies on the part of elite
groups seeking to preserve their power in the face of
mounting pressure for change. This being the crux of
his argument, he rejected the "corporatism as historical
continuity" school of thought as not standing up to
empirical proof. However, there was little in Stepan's
argument to refute outright the relevance of history and
culture toward an understanding of corporatism. Where
Wiarda et al, saw history and tradition as primary,
Stepan argued for consciously applied policy choices.
Still, policy choices are not arrived at in a vacuum;
they were and are necessarily guided by the cultural and
philosophical ethos of a society and it is in this
respect that both interpretations of corporatism have
val idi ty
.
Authoritarianism
Perhaps the most burgeoning amount of analysis of
Latin American political change has been done concerning
20
the many facets of authoritarianism. From an analyses
of how the era of caudillismo led to the era of military
regimes to an analyses of international capital and its
requirements for authoritarian political structures,
authoritarianism has been dissected and debated by all
Latin Americanists. In this section, various
interpretations of authoritarianism with specific
attention to bureaucratic-authoritarianism as developed
by Guillermo O'Donnell will be analyzed.
In Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America,
James Malloy set out to explain the rise of
authoritarianism in Latin America during the 1960s and
1970s. Like the theorists on corporatism, Malloy
rejected the standard wisdom of comparative politics
which posited a direct relation between economic
development and the growth of pluralist democracy. He
argued that the nature of economic development in Latin
America lent itself to the emergence of authoritarian
governing structures and that corporatist structures
characterized state-civil relations.
Malloy viewed authoritarianism as a product of two
forces acting in twentieth century Latin American
history -- delayed dependent development and populism.
For most nations of Latin America, economic growth had
been based on the exportation of raw materials to the
21
United States and Western Europe and the importation of
manufactured products to Latin America. As Latin
American nations entered late into the international
capitalist market, their economies became dependent on
international market forces beyond their control. This
system of classic dependency took expression internally
in the creation of a dual society: an urban sphere based
on exports and a traditional agrarian rural sector with
the former exploiting the latter in maintaining
relations with the capitalist center. This system was
held together through what were commonly called patron-
client relations between various unequal groupings which
cut across class, race, and ethnic lines. Through
strategies of vertical integration, groups were
corporatized into the system."1"^
As this system of export-oriented growth carried over
into the twentieth century, state structures emerged to
mediate relations among various groups in society but
their autonomy was limited by the interests of elite
groups and the limited resources at their disposal. The
continuing need to maintain control over the growing
demands of an emergent middle class of professional
white collar public employees required large state
treasuries. With an economy which was oriented outward,
state structures came to depend more and more on
22
external sources of funding.
This state of affairs came to a head with the Great
Depression of 1929. The Depression caused the export-
oriented growth economies of Latin America to come
crashing down. The havoc this caused led to the
emergence of populism, with the collapse of national
economies came a political crisis over the legitimacy of
the ruling elites. Middle-class sectors became
disaffected and sought to wrest power from the
traditional ruling elites but in and of themselves they
did not have the resources to overthrow them. These
middle sectors turned to the lower classes for support
in overthrowing the traditional elites. Under the guise
of promoting substantive economic and social change,
middle sectors sought to mobilize the lower classes
(which in most cases were the urbanized working classes)
and to present a united front in ousting the
oligarchies
.
Populists saw the central problem of Latin America as
economic underdevelopment conditioned by economic
dependence on a capitalist center dominated by the
United States. What's more, this dependency was
perpetuated and reinforced by groups within society
which were characterized as being "anti-nation." In
order to unseat these anti-nation groups, a multi-class
23
movement was necessary. Populists advocated national
independence and the promotion of social justice
reforms. They advocated the development of the economy
in all sectors, and utilizing an implicit "organic-
statist" philosophy, called for the combined efforts of
all classes in the building of an independent
nationalist state. Yet, in their vision of populism,
the middle-class sectors (the main adherents to this
movement), never gave the lower classes an equal
footing in the struggle to overthrow the established
oligarchies. Rather, they assumed that the working
classes and peasants would defer to the middle sectors
in carrying out the reforms of the new society. Middle-
class sectors had an implicit corporatist view of how
social relations were to be organized; it was one which
did not differ radically from the one imposed by the
ruling oligarchies -- only now, the middle classes would
occupy the position the oligarchies had held.
To tie these disparate groups together and to carry
out the program of national development, the state
became the cornerstone of the system. In breaking the
power of the oligarchies, the state had to locate its
legitimacy in the support of the newly mobilized lower
classes. To do so, the state utilized various
strategies in building support: encouraging charismatic
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leadership styles which emphasized nationalism and
increasing welfare expenditures to meet the needs of
these groups. By making the state the primary
distributor of social welfare benefits, populism created
the conditions for future conflict between politically
mobilized civil sectors and a state with limited
resources. As long as the economy kept growing (as it
did during World War II and immediately after due to
import-substitution-industrialization), the state would
be able to meet the demands of these newly mobilized
groups and new power contenders would be absorbed into
the system under a corporatist framework.
But throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the state never
achieved real economic independence from the external
capitalist market. Import substitution policies led the
way to more sophisticated forms of dependency and many
Latin American countries found inflation spiralling out
of control. The populist policies of massive social
expenditures could no longer be sustained but attempts
to cut back were met with popular discontent. It was
under these conditions that the military came to power
in the 1960s. The inability of populist state
structures to cope with the needs of economic
development and the needs of politically mobilized
classes necessitated taking over the reins of the former
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by bridling the power of the latter. in the interest
of, or under the guise of, furthering economic
development, the decision was made to depoliticize the
very groups that populism had mobilized. The middle-
class sectors abdicated the state to the control of the
military and the military instituted policies of
repression against the population. Thus, in the 1960s
and 1970s, authoritarian regimes came to dominate Latin
Ame r i ca
.
In sum, Malloy viewed the development of
authoritarianism as an elite response to the economic
crises of the 1960s. Using in part the Huntingtonian
model, Malloy argued that the need for further economic
development became incompatible with the demands of a
politically mobilized population. Where there once was
room for the incorporation of new groups into the
political system, now there existed a need to exclude
some of these groups from the political arena. As these
groups were unwilling to give up the power and influence
they had enjoyed, repression and violence became common
tools of the political game.
Guillermo O'Donnell pursued this same line of
reasoning by introducing the concept of bureaucratic-
authoritarianism. Specifically, O'Donnell argued that
differing phases of industrialization led to various
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forms of state domination over civilian sectors. The
demise of oligarchical rule which led to the emergence
of populism was brought about due to a nascent
industrialization based on the production of consumer
goods. With the imposition of tariffs and state
subsidies to promote import-substitution-
industrialization, there evolved a domestic industry
concentrated on the production of consumer goods.
During this phase of industrialization, the Latin
American economies were not as integrated into the
international capitalist market and as production was
concentrated inward, there was less need to compete on
the world market. Economic elites had more flexibility
when it came to dealing with working- class demands.
They viewed the incorporation of working-class groups as
beneficial to economic growth so they enacted policies
which increased social welfare spending and allowed
workers to form unions. In return, working class groups
tacitly gave their allegiance to the state which
provided the state with a degree of autonomy from
foreign capital.
Once the market for import-substitution-
industrialization goods was exhausted, as occurred in
the late 1950s, the next phase of industrialization
called for the importation of capital equipment.
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O'Donnell argued that in order to further capitalist
industrial development, i.e., to enter into a phase of
heavy manufacturing, economic elites had to import
technology, expertise, and capital. Latin Americans
decided to turn to outside markets, more specifically to
multinational corporations and to a certain extent, to
foreign aid. To finance this new phase of
industrialization, they turned to international banks
for loans.
To attract the necessary capital to further
industrial development as the means toward achieving
economic growth, elites had to adopt "orthodox" economic
policies which necessitated cutting the consumption
demands of the population. These austerity measures
came into direct conflict with the interests of working-
class groups who saw their economic and political power
base eroding. Unwilling to accept the dictates of the
economic elites, agitation took place by way of strikes.
Meanwhile, the process of industrialization had
created a class of technocrats which carried out the
economic policies of the state. For the most part,
these technocrats were employees of the state
bureaucracy or the military, and they sought further
industrialization by seeking the aid of foreign capital.
They were intolerant of the demands of the popular
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sector and sought authoritarian solutions to popular
unrest. For many, the logical solution to dealing with
popular unrest was to mobilize the forces which excelled
at the business of coercion and repression — the
military.
The military, for its part, came to have the same
views as the economic elites concerning how to promote
economic growth. They too viewed the need to attract
foreign capital as necessary for this economic growth,
and what's more, they linked economic growth to
preserving the national security of the nation. They
viewed all attempts at disrupting the promotion of
industrial development as a threat to the security of
the nation. When they saw that civilian governments
were incapable of dealing with this threat, the military
came in to enforce law and order. It was at this
juncture that the bureaucratic-authoritarian state was
imposed
.
The bureaucratic-authoritarian state in its initial
phase was one which:
1. consisted of an alliance between the military,
sectors of the economic elites (technocrats), and
foreign capital whose interests coalesced around:
2. increasing economic growth via policies of advanced
industrialization concentrated on the production of
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manufactured goods and the pursuit of foreign capital,
and who viewed these interests as being directly
threatened by:
3. the demands of working-class sectors whose very
goals undermined the national development of the
country. To deal with this threat, the military was
brought into power to manage these groups via policies
of coercion and repression. To maintain control, the
military utilized strategies of cooptation to
corporatize certain groups into the system. First, they
excluded already existing mobilized interest groups from
the political arena and destroyed their bases of
support. Then, they selected certain groups or
individuals and allowed them into the system, awarded
them certain rights and privileges, but denied them the
status of representatives of certain interests, and
maintained tight control over them. This was all done
within an environment of clearly authoritarian
structures. 1 ^ The maintenance of this type of regime
will now be discussed.
Pol i t i cal Change Unde r Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism
The maintenance of a bureaucratic-authoritarian
regime was replete with tensions and contradictions.
Because this type of regime was imposed through coercion
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and repression of already existing politically mobilized
groups, the mechanisms for continued control required a
high degree of sophistication. O'Donnell in "Tensions
in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question
of Democracy," set out to delineate the various
pressures that a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime faced
in maintaining its existence.
The bureaucratic-authoritarian state came into power
and justified itself by claiming to represent a greater
logical developmental i st rationality which would cure
the sick body politic of its ills of economic chaos and
social unrest. Echoing the philosophy of organic-
statism, proponents of the bureaucratic-authoritarian
state argued that their policies were guided by a higher
rationality which in the long run would benefit the
general interest. Because the bureaucratic-
authoritarian state claimed to be curing a sick society,
it was also above society — not a part of it— but
superior to it and represented all interests of that
. . 18
society
.
In locating itself above society and not as a part of
it, the bureaucratic-authoritarian state required
mechanisms of legitimating its control over society and
more often than not, for justifying its use of coercion
and repression. Specifically, it needed to create
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consensus among the various interests of society if it
was not to remain or to become a totalitarian state.
For O'Donnell, there were three "mediations" which any
state needed to generate in order to retain its
legitimacy to rule over civilian sectors. The first was
the idea of nationhood which was the recognition of a
collective identity of a people based on a shared
history, language, etc., and which made one people
distinct from another — a "we" versus a "they." The
second mediation involved the idea of citizenship which
involved voting rights and the right to have recourse
against arbitrary acts on the part of state
institutions. The third mediation involved lo popular
or el pueblo which viewed the state as having
responsibility toward the less favored sectors of the
population. Lo popular required that the state be above
the factionalism and antagonisms of civil society, and
that it promote the welfare of all citizens of that
society. Yet, in the bureaucratic-authoritarian state,
these very mediations were repressed, which led to the
unveiling of this type of state as representing certain
interests over others. Because the bureaucratic-
authoritarian state's philosophy was one of attracting
foreign capital to promote capitalist industrialization,
it necessarily required the muting of the we-they
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dichotomy so as to promote the transnationalization of
production. what's more, in promoting foreign capital,
the bureaucratic-authoritarian state tended to align
itself with the least nationalistic sector of the
bourgeoisie which shared the same economic interests as
the bureaucratic-authoritarian technocrats. In
repressing the very mediations which promoted the
legitimacy of its rule, the bureaucratic-authoritarian
state had no recourse but to use naked force in
1
9
maintaining its power.
It was at this point in his analysis that O'Donnell
went on to discuss other structural tensions in the
bureaucratic-authoritarian model, namely the interplay
between various sectors of the bourgeoisie, between the
bourgeoisie and international capital, and between the
bourgeoisie and the military. He argued how the
particular interests of these groups along with external
conditions created pressures on the system which led to
policies which might in the long run destabilize this
type of state. It was an analysis of how the favored
elite groups grappled with power. What was
fundamentally lacking in O'Donnell's thesis was a real
analysis of what the working-class sectors were doing
throughout these periods of bureaucratic-authoritarian
rule. If the bureaucratic-authoritarian state precluded
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any consensual means for maintaining its power, then it
would stand to reason that the repressed popular sectors
would seek means to undermine it, especially given their
previous mobilization in the political system. if the
elite groups which made up the bureaucratic-
authoritarian "alliance" were insecure in how to best
satisfy their interests, then it was possible for
repressed interests to gain some foothold into the
system. The part of O'Donnell's theory which remained
underdeveloped was to what degree the state was
successful in repressing previously mobilized groups in
society. As William Canak observed, O'Donnell assumed
the repression of popular working-class sectors as a
fait accompli. He took their defeat at the hands of the
bureaucratic-authoritarians as a given and proceeded to
analyze how the elites went about imposing their
2 0policies. What required analysis though, was in what
ways and through what means these repressed popular
sectors influenced the policies which were enacted. The
Argentine Cordobazo of 1969 and the return of Peron to
power in 1973 were two glaring examples of how the
bureaucratic-authoritarians failed to impose their will
over working-class sectors. It will be argued that the
return to democracy in 1983 in Argentina signalled
another defeat for bureaucratic-authoritarianism.
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On another point, O'Donnell rejected the notion of
corporatism as being incompatible with bureaucratic-
authoritarian needs. 21 He perhaps rejects this idea out
of hand. in seeking to maintain the bureaucratic-
authoritarian state, resources were not infinite for the
prolongation of physical coercion and repression. It
was in the bureaucratic-authoritarian state's interest
to find other means for controlling the population.
Corporatism as a set of policies linking state and
society would fit well into the bureaucratic-
authoritarian's needs for it would be a means of
controlling the degree of "participation" in a society.
By giving pay-offs to certain groups within the civilian
sector, the bureaucratic-authoritarian state could
mediate the space between its legitimacy as ruler and
the acquiescence of society. Bureaucratic-
authoritarianism and corporatism were not incompatible
in this respect and perhaps the former could lead to the
latter in its attempts at stability.
Transi t ions f rom Authoritarian Rule
The preceding discussion on various ways of
conceptualizing authoritarianism and change within
authoritarian regimes has led to the current
preoccupation with the transition from military
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authoritarian rule to of all things, democratic civilian
rule. While the recent transitions to democratic rule
all require analysis and interpretation, the majority of
published work thus far was written before the
transitions were complete or during their early stages.
Because of this, much of the current literature on
transition to democratic rule remains tentative and
preliminary.
Perhaps the most important work to come out to date,
are the studies commissioned by the Woodrow Wilson
Center for International Affairs under the direction of
O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead. In a collection of
essays by various authors, the themes of transition and
democratization are explored in Southern Europe and
Latin America and compared cross-nationally. Tentative
conclusions are also drawn up attempting to give some
theoretical perspective for studying transitions but no
theory has really been offered as yet. This is mainly
because when the papers were written (1980-81), most of
the transitions were either in their infant stages or
had not yet occurred.
Still, the volumes offer insights into the specific
characteristics of regime change. In Adam Przeworski's
chapter on "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition
to Democracy," he looks at the political space within
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which regime transition should be viewed. On one level,
focus could be placed on macro-oriented forces, i.e.,
the objective conditions prevailing at the time of the
transition which caused the transition to occur. m
this case, emphasis would be on economic, social, and
external factors such as economic growth, class shifts,
increased educational levels, and war as causal to
transition. it would be a study of how the inevitable
march of history determined the process of change. On
another level, focus could be placed on micro-oriented
factors, i.e., the interplay of political actors, their
actions, interests, and perceptions. In this case,
emphasis would be on individuals, decision making,
problem solving, and choice making. These studies
assume that the key to understanding politics lies with
an analysis of key players in any given situation.
Przeworski argues that while macro-oriented factors
are important to an understanding of regime change, all
they really tell us are the constraints under which
regime changes take place. They do not determine the
outcome of such situations, but they delimit the
possibilities inherent in any given historical
situation. What does determine the nature of
liberalization will be the struggles within the ruling
blocs, among group interests, and the strategic postures
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taken by all key groups. In short, it is the micro-
oriented factors which determine the outcome of regime
transitions. This is a conclusion which is pretty much
adhered to by most analysts of regime transition in
South America.
Having established where the focus of attention
should lie, Przeworski goes on to comment on what micro-
oriented factors are causal to regime changes. One
problem he tackles is that of legitimacy. Most studies
on regime stability, particularly authoritarian regime
stability, argue that legitimacy, i.e., the acceptance
by those who are ruled that those who rule have a right
to do so, is necessary for any regime to remain in powe
in the long run. Przeworski argues that this concern i
misplaced. This is especially so of authoritarian
regimes, which by their very definition are regimes
which are in power through the use of force. Rather
than assessing whether a regime has legitimacy or not,
Przeworski argues that of greater importance is whether
or not there exist viable alternatives to the regime in
power. That is to say, a regime can remain in power
even if it is clearly inept, by the fact that the key
players cannot agree on what a viable alternative would
be to the regime at hand.
This leads to a larger point in that Przeworski and
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all the others writing in this volume view that the
impetus for liberalization comes from those within the
ruling blocs rather than from mass upheavals. There
are, of course, a few notable exceptions, but the vast
majority of transitions will come about due to schisms
within ruling bloc groups, so attention on regime
transition needs to be focused there. 24
Alfred Stepan, in his analysis "Paths toward
Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative
Considerations," attempts to categorize the various
routes which transition from authoritarian rule can
take. He delineates about eight typologies, but for the
purposes of this thesis, only those paths which he
labels "redemocratization from within authoritarian
regimes" will be considered. Under this category,
Stepan lists three distinct possibilities for the
impetus for redemocratization:
1) from the military as government;
2) from the military as institution, acting against the
military as government;
3) from the civilianized political leadership.
In the "military as government" scenario, initiation
of liberalization comes from the military in power.
This is usually done only when it is perceived to be in
the interests of the military as a corporate
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institution to leave power, coupled with a strong
societal demand to do so. In this case, the military
will seek to remove itself from power and return to the
barracks. In the case where the "military as
institution acts against the military as government,"
the overriding concern would be to protect the military
as institution. Paradoxically, in this case, the
military comes to believe that their survival depends
on a return to democratic rule. In the "civi 1 iani zed
political leadership" approach, impetus for
democratization would come from newly installed civilian
leaders but with veto power in the hands of the
military, which would remain a threatening force. Here,
the negotiation of pacts would probably be the path
taken toward greater democratization.
In all three cases, the military plays the role of
ultimate arbiter over the course and extent of regime
transition. What becomes the critical factor for the
military is to safeguard its survival as an institution.
Social pressures are important in these scenarios and in
some cases are of critical importance, but they usually
25do not determine the outcome of the transition.
Alain Rouquie, in "Demilitarization and the
Institutionalization of Military-Dominated Politics in
Latin America," provides some clues as to how Latin
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American military regimes are different from the
totalitarian regimes of the past in Europe. He posits
that the dominant ideology of Latin America has alway
been liberal and democratic. Military regimes
really the exception rather than the rule and in thi
lies their precarious existence. Latin American
military regimes have always paid lip service to
democracy because, inherently, a democratic
constitutional order is the only legitimate order in
society's eyes. 26
Another important point Rouquie makes is that
contemporary Latin American military regimes have for
the most part no organized political project with which
to carry out their rule. The existence of a "threat" to
society may enable them to come to power, but it does
not offer them a long-term project in which society is
transformed in one way or another. Rather, these
authoritarian regimes always invoke the promise of
future democratic rule to justify why they must stay in
power now. The notion of legitimacy, therefore, is
important to Rouquie's analysis. 27
In O'Donnell's and Schmitter's conclusion, they
attempt to draw together many of the points discussed by
their contributors. They begin by offering some
definitions followed by a description of some of the key
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variables necessary for a "successful" transition. They
posit parameters of what constitutes a transition to be
the beginning of the dissolution of one regime ending
with the installation of another regime. An indication
that a transition has begun is when the authoritarian
rulers begin to modify their own rules "in the direction
of providing more secure guarantees for the rights of
individuals and groups." 28 This is called
"liberalization" and occurs when there are important
divisions within the ruling bloc itself. No transition
to date has begun without schisms within the ruling bloc
— hardliners versus softliners in general. 29
Once a transition has started, there exist no
guarantees that the initiators will remain in control of
the process. Other important, non-predictable variables
can come into play in a transition and each of these can
help to determine the outcome of the transition. For
example, a dramatic event such as a war or some key
person's untimely death could push a transition in
different directions than those intended. The process
of resurrecting civil society — i.e., remobilizing key
civilian groups — will be critical to the nature of the
transition as will the problem of dealing with the past
abuses of the outgoing regimes.
^
Within this realm of uncertainty though, O'Donnell
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and Schmitter offer some prescriptions as to how a
regime transition can lead to a successful democratic
instauration. First, the perception that a military
regime has resoundingly failed will enable the
transition to get off to a good start toward democracy.
Where the record of an outgoing regime is not so clear
(as in the case of Brazil), the road to democracy will
be more shaky. Pacts which are not characteristic of
recent regime transitions are also important to
transition. O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that pacts
negotiated between the outgoing military and incoming
civilian governments are less stable, given the
military's penchant for retaining control. Rather,
pacts between civilian groups will make the successful
instauration of democracy more likely. In their minds,
when key civilian groups come to some agreement as to
the rules of the game, by negotiating a pact, the road
to democratic instauration will be more certain."^
Along with this, the first elections of a newly
liberalized regime must not allow any one side to win a
resounding majority. Both left-center and right-center
parties must win enough votes to allow each side a
significant say in the new regime. This will promote in
people a greater faith in the system, since it will be
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clear that the results are not predetermined.
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Finally, the entire transition has certain rules and
agreements to which all contending parties must adhere for
democracy to be feasible. The two most important rules,
based on recent transitions, are the protection of the
property rights of the bourgeoisie and the continued
institutional survival of the military. No transition to
democratic rule to date has taken place without such prior
understandings. Two tacit agreements which have also been
significant involve the players in the game of transition.
One is the agreement that all players will seek benefits and
space to compete in the transition but without seeking the
elimination of their opponents. A second agreement or
understanding is that the players in the game do not
necessarily have to have democratic values when they start
the game. In the process, they will come to acquire these
democratic values.
Transi t ions from Authoritarian Rule offers many
provocative avenues for further research on transitions and
redemocratization, especially now that most of the nations of
South America have returned to some form of civilian rule.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the current era
of redemocratization should not be interpreted as a
vindication of the earlier theories concerning modernization
which posited that all nations would eventually move toward
pluralist democratic rule. It is clear from these volumes
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athat the road to redemocratization is quite different from
"stages of economic growth" approach, and it is also far from
certain whether the current wave of democratic regimes will
endure over time. The tentative nature of the concluding
volume speaks to this uncertainty.
While the focus of these volumes have been on transition
rather than democratic instaurat ion , it would have been
helpful if the authors had come up with an initial definition
of what constituted democracy. For Latin America, the mere
existence of democratic forms such as elections, a congress,
and a constitution have been poor indicators of whether a
nation was democratic or to what degree it was democratic.
What Latin American scholars need to do is to define what
democracy is in the Latin American context. Until that is
done, the danger remains of judging Latin American politics
through the prism of U.S. and Western European democratic
norms
.
Another omission from the Transitions series and other
current articles is the role of civilian groups in the
transition process. As with the literature on bureaucratic-
authoritarianism, the current literature on transitions
remains state-centric with only passing reference to the role
key social groups can play in a transition. If we accept the
premise that the initial impetus for transition comes from
within the ruling bloc: what is it that causes differences to
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become schisms? what would constitute a "ruling bloc", what
groups are involved, and under what conditions do the
"softliners" come to dominance? Who influences their
decisions and the actions they take? Could the resistance of
certain civil groups to the authoritarian regime provide and
provoke schisms within the ruling bloc thereby opening the
way to a transition? For any analysis of transition to be
complete, more attention needs to be focused on the role of
civilian groups in this process.
Labor and Regime Transi t ion
The analysis of authoritarianism in Latin America has
traditionally concentrated on the actions of ruling elite
groups. This is due to the fact that the very definition of
authoritarianism assumes centralized control by the regime
over civilian sectors. However, in light of the regime
transitions of the mid-1980s, it behooves political
scientists to come to an understanding of how and why the
experiment with military authoritarianism failed so miserably
in so many countries. The current literature on regime
transition begins to explore the characteristics of these
recent transitions. However, in the literature on both
authoritarianism and regime transition, little light has as
yet been shed on the role key civilian groups played in
undermining authoritarianism and their impact on regime
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transition. To address this gap in the literature, this
thesis attempts to analyze the role of labor in Argentina
from 1976 to 1983.
In general, labor could be viewed as enjoying a special
status in many Latin American nations. During the 1940s,
under programs of import-substitution-industrialization,
labor was incorporated into the political system as a key
player. In Argentina and Brazil, the labor movements were
taken into the political fold and transformed into state-
dominated, hierarchically and vertically structured interest
groups
.
In Argentina, under Juan Per6n, labor enjoyed status and
power, unparalleled in any other Latin American nation. 33
After the demise of Per6n, labor became the special object of
repression. The newly emergent political coalitions of the
late 1950s and 1960s sought to undermine labor's role in the
political game by stripping it of its economic and
institutional power. The exclusionary corporatist strategies
discussed by O'Donnell and Stepan were targeted specifically
at labor. Labor's response to these strategies could
therefore shed light on how effective bureaucratic-
authoritarian policies were.
Most analysts of the recent military authoritarian
experiment in Argentina have argued that the regimes of 1976-
83 also sought to depoliticize labor. Through a combination
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of laws, repression, and the playing off of one facti
against another, the military attempted to destroy the
institutional existence of the labor movement. 34 How
successful the military was at this project and more
importantly what the labor response was will be explored,
analysis of the dynamics of military-labor relations will
create a better understanding of the many facets of
authoritarianism as well as give guidance to the efforts
democratic restructuring.
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CHAPTER II
ARGENTINA AND THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT
The history of Argentina in the twentieth century
provides an example of how traditional modernization
theories have been inappropriate in explaining the
politics and economics of Latin American nations, while
those theories designed to specifically address Latin
America have provided models for understanding that
area. At first glance, Argentina appears to possess all
the prerequisites of a modern industrial society. It
has vast natural resources as yet untapped. Its
population is predominantly white (and proud of it) and
literate. Its major cities are centers of culture with
an huge middle class. Its urban infrastructure looks
much like that of U.S. and European cities, and its
population is one of the best fed in the world. Yet for
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most of the twentieth century Argentina has had
nondemocratic forms of government and an economy which
has suffered severe fluctuations in its fortunes.
Industrialization and urbanization did not bring about
democracy but helped to engender one of the most brutal
regimes in modern history. The predominantly white and
literate urban middle class did not possess the "values"
so necessary to a "civic culture," and the population's
intake of beef made Argentina one of the leading
countries where cholesterol and heart disease are
endemic. Also, the stages of economic growth did not
"take-off," but rather Argentina experienced more than
its share of high inflation and economic turmoil.
On the other hand, theories of corporatism, populism,
and bureaucratic-authoritarianism have proven better
guides than traditional modernization theories in
interpreting the Argentine case. Starting from its
position as a dependent agricultural export producing
nation at the turn of the century, Argentina's twentieth
century growth has been sharply influenced by tne
international economic system. The Depression of 1929
pushed Argentina to begin import-substitution-
industrialization which led to the emergence of populism
and new social forces in society. The resulting
"exhaustion" of this form of industrialization led to
the imposition of military rule. The decision on the
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part of the military and other groups to "deepen"
industrialization led to further repression and the
greater entrenchment of military rule. Throughout,
corporatist strategies were utilized in maintaining
state-civil relations.
This is not to say that Argentina's modern
development was solely the result of inevitable economic
determinants. On the contrary, almost every step along
the way, Argentines made fateful decisions which led to
the events which transpired. The international economic
system and the nation's dependency set the parameters by
which Argentines acted. The nation's particular history
and diverse settlers go toward explaining why they made
the choices they have. Therefore, in order to
understand contemporary events in Argentina, one needs
to begin with the past.
The Making of a Nation
Argentina declared itself independent from Spain in
1810. The move was undertaken by a Buenos Aires-based
coalition of merchants and landowners seeking to expand
their trading markets. The economy was based on
agricultural exports, and this system continued to
predominate throughout the nineteenth century.
The basis of Argentina's agricultural economy was
cattle. Argentina possessed a vast area of extremely
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fertile lands called the pampas, particularly suited to
cattle raising. Early settlers had only to buy up land
and some cows and bulls, to see their fortunes multiply.
Wealth was based on exporting beef to foreign markets,
primarily to Europe. There was little need for labor
and capital expenditures. What little infrastructure
was developed, was created solely for the purpose of
facilitating the transport of beef to the Buenos Aires
port and for collecting the profits from these sales.
Little attention was paid in the nineteenth century to
the needs of the internal market, as Buenos Aires
landowners became increasingly wealthy from the sale of
i
their beef.
Independence from Spain led to disputes concerning
how the nation ought to be governed. One group, made up
of the Buenos Aires merchants, wanted the
nationalization of Buenos Aires. These "uni tarists , " as
they were called, sought to protect their wealth from
the other provinces by keeping Buenos Aires province a
separate autonomous region. Another group, representing
the interior provinces, sought a federalist structure in
which each province would maintain political and
economic autonomy from each other. The interior
provinces had been fairly self-sufficient, and their
economies were geared toward internal consumption. They
feared the dominance of Buenos Aires in forcing them to
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open up their markets to goods from Buenos Aires. A
third group, also calling themselves federalists,
Buenos Aires cattle breeders who sought provincial
autonomy but with Buenos Aires being the dominant
province. Their economic interests called for
protecting their profits from the provinces, while
forcing the provinces to buy goods from Buenos Aires. 2
The struggle over how Buenos Aires would be governed
ended up pitting the provinces against Buenos Aires. in
1829, the cattle breeding federalists triumphed in the
name of Juan Manuel de Rosas who is credited with
unifying the provinces that now make up Argentina. In
1852, Rosas, who ruled as an old-fashioned caudillo
dictator, was overthrown by formerly supportive cattle
breeders and an emergent liberal bourgeois group of
intellectuals. Disputes over the dominance of Buenos
Aires in the nation's affairs did not stop. Only in
1880 was a constitution drawn up which separated the
city of Buenos Aires from the province. The city of
Buenos Aires was redesignated the federal capital.
Nevertheless, Buenos Aires today remains the dominant
center of the nation. All political and economic
decisions are made here, and their effects resonate back
to the provinces. Divisions between Buenos Aires and
the rest of the nation persist as each province seeks to
force Buenos Aires to attend to its needs.
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With the unification of Argentina under the dominance
of Buenos Aires established in 1880, the nation
experienced a period of growth unparalleled in its
history. its economy continued to be based on
agricultural exports but this now included ranching,
sheep herding, and cultivation of grains, flax, and
seeds. Refrigerated railroad cars, dock facilities, and
banks were all expanded to accommodate these export
activities, and the political system (based on a
constitution and liberal democratic rule) ensured that
tariffs and import duties did not hamper the flow of
trade
.
4
The diversification of agricultural export production
led to important transformations in Argentine society.
While the traditional landowning cattle raising and
breeding elites amassed greater amounts of land and grew
wealthier and continued to dominate the state, there
emerged by the 1880s a class of urban middle-class
white- collar workers. These were the people who owned
no land (or very little of it) but who worked in the
service industries which handled the financial aspects
of the agricultural export trade. Also numbered among
them were small shopkeepers in the urban centers. From
this class of people pressure would come to liberalize
the political system dominated by the landed cattle
interests
.
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By far the most important transformation in fche
ninetSenth
"ntUry « ^— e migration 0£ southern
European immigrants to m« „uy the shores of Argentina. The
Creole landed elites saw the need f« .cn to increase the
nation o £ the nation so in the^ ^
attested to promote European mlgratlon( ^
northern Europe and Engl and, with ^ ^ ^
However, the vest maj ority of immigrants came frQm
southern Europe, mainly Italy an(J Spain> ^^ ^
tenant farmers or laborers in the cities. 6
The massive wave of southern European immigration
whioh began in 1880 coincided with an agricultural
export boom and rising land prices. The established
elites had parceled out most of the desirable pampas
farmland by the mid-nineteenth century and were
unwilling to sell their land to newcomers. Instead,
they leased land out to tenant farmers who would oversee
the planting a nd harvesting of crops for export. This
system sustained itself until the end of the nineteenth
century when the mechanization of farming led to the
collapse of the tenant farmer system, and many were
driven into the cities in search of work. 7
Other immigrants came to Argentina in search of
temporary work because of bad economic situations at the
time in their home countries. This worked out well as
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the seasons in the Southern Cone were the reverse of
those in Southern Europe so workers could cross back and
forth for the harvest seasons. These workers garnered
the nickname of ^oj^nd^inas (swallows) because of their
movement back and forth across the oceans and also
because they were predominantly brown-skinned. The
mechanization of agriculture forced many of these
immigrants to return to their homelands permanently, but
some stayed and went to seek work in the cities. 8
Estimates show that between 1890 and 1914, 4 million
immigrants landed on Argentine shores and 2.4 million
took up permanent residence. The initial waves of
immigrants were absorbed by the agricultural needs of
the countryside, but many settled in the cities. After
the economic crisis of 1890-1895, with the collapse of
the land tenure system, the flow of migrants was from
the rural areas to the urban centers. The majority of
immigrants were unskilled so they took up labor as
railroad workers, dock workers, and meat packers. A
small minority of immigrants had entrepreneurial skills,
but they applied them to commercial and speculative
activities rather than in promoting industrialization. 9
By the turn of the century, Argentina was a nation
with a large urban center but little industrial base,
and the landowning elites wanted it to stay that way.
They were committed to an economy based on agricultural
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goods exports, and they used their control over the
state to obstruct attempts at encouraging industrial
development. The little industrialization some did
favor was that which complemented the business of
agricultural export. it should be noted that the
development of what urban infrastructure existed was
financed by British capital. The refrigerated railroad
car, docks, and banks were all run by British funds and
the landed elites funneled their wealth into private
accounts overseas and ostentatious consumerism. Little
thought was given to the development of an internal
market and much less concern was shown toward the growth
of the urban middle and working classes. 10
The political hegemony enjoyed by the landed elites
was challenged by the middle and working classes as
early as the 1880s. Urban middle-class, white-collar
workers (mainly clerks and state bureaucrats), small
shopkeepers, and several small independent farmers
joined the Radical Union (later to be the Radical Civic
Union) in an attempt to lobby for greater political
rights and freedoms. This group sought neither economic
transformations nor economic redistribution per se, but
it wanted a voice in the allegedly democratic political
system. Members of the group, among them Leandro Alem,
Bartolome Mitre, Carlos Pellegrini, and Hipolito
Yrigoyen, sought to force the landed elites to give up
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the practice of fraud in elections. Several coup
attempts were tried but failed. On the part of the
working classes, anarchist and socialist groups sought
to influence the political system but to little avail as
well. yet those groups (of which more will be said in
chapter 3, would pl ay a decisive role in the ruling
elite's decision to liberalize their political system in
1912. 11
The agitation of the middle class in caUing ^
political reform was not rejected by all segments of the
landed elites. Many saw the need for some reform in the
interest of preventing a deluge of demands from flooding
in. in 1910, Rogue Saenz Pena, a reform-minded
landowner, came to power, and in 1912, a new electoral
reform law was implemented which established universal
male suffrage and a secret ballot. This signalled the
end of the landed elites' dominance over politics, but
it was their view that, given the political situation,
some concessions were necessary. At that time, many in
the landed elites feared the spread of anarchist and
particularly communist influence among the working
classes. To deter that influence from growing, it was
thought better to incorporate the Radical Civic Union
into the political ranks so as to appear more liberal
but also to obtain the Radicals' support in fighting
what were deemed to be subversive elements among the
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working classes. 12
The passage of the Saenz Pena Law resulted in the
election of Radical Hipolito Yrigoyen in 1916 to the
presidency, but the conservative landed elites
maintained control over the congress. Yrigoyen, while
espousing democratic principles and freedoms, actually
acted like a strong-arm caudillo within his party and in
government. He attempted little change of the economic
system and only encouraged domestic industrialization
because the war efforts of Europe and the United States
precluded import trade. He did nationalize the oil
industry by creating the state run YPF (Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales) in 1922. 13
Because Yrigoyen's and the Radicals' platform was so
narrowly defined, they had little success in attracting
members from the upper and working classes. The upper
class was suspicious of any hint at social reform and
used the congress to obstruct Yrigoyen's modest
proposals. The working classes saw little benefit from
Yrigoyen's policies and continued to agitate for change
via strikes and work stoppages. In 1919, a series of
labor strikes led to a bloody put-down by government
forces. The Radical Civic Union lost any support labor
had given it, and before Yrigoyen left office, he
greatly increased state spending and enlarged the
government bureaucracy. 14
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was
in 1922, Marcelo T. de Alvear, another Radical
elected to the presidency. During his administration,
the Argentine economy prospered through cereal and meat
exports and the last great wave of immigration took
place. However, dissension soon arose within the Party
over Alvear's attempts to curb the public spending which
had marked the last years of Yrigoyen's first
administration. The majority group repudiated Alvear
and allied behind Yrigoyen. The smaller more
conservative-oriented group organized itself into the
UCR-antipersonalist wing in direct opposition to
Yrigoyen. Yrigoyen, for his part, attempted to promote
a populist image among middle-class sectors, and in 1928
he won re-election to the presidency. 15
However, Yrigoyen's second administration would be
eclipsed by a military coup. The conservative landed
elites had become discouraged with the Radical
democratic experiment, especially with Yrigoyen's brand
of populism. They sought a change and began to agitate
the military to undertake a military coup. The
Depression of 1929 gave them the perfect reason to
foment a coup as they could blame Yrigoyen for the
worsened economic situation. In 1930, Yrigoyen was
1 C
deposed and sent into exile.
The year 1930 heralded in nearly fifty years of
military domination of Argentina's politics. The
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Argentine military by then was a highly professionalized
and European-trained group of men. Created by the
landed elites, the military was supposed to be loyal to
civilian authorities and to eschew the dirty game of
politics. However, throughout the early twentieth
century both landed elites and Radicals sought military
complicity in their political ends, so that by 1930, the
military, particularly the army, had grown accustomed to
playing a role in the affairs of state. 17
General Jose F. Uriburu of the army came to power in
1930 and pursued policies of repression. He sought to
dismantle the constitution and to impose a form of
fascism on Argentina. His extremist views led him to be
replaced by General Agustin P. Justo, a more moderate
legalist who called for constitutional democracy,
although controlled from above. These two men
represented two contending extremes within the military
during the 1930s. One faction, the legalists favored
constitutional government; the other favored
authoritarian corporatist control. Both were initially
tied to landed elite interests but by 1940 many had
become disaffected from this sector. 18
The Depression of 1929 and Justo's policies led to
profound changes in the nation's economy.
Industrialization, which had been opposed by the landed
elites, finally began to take on significance in the
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form of import-substitution-industrialization. Bereft
of markets from which to import manufactured goods,
urban middle-class entrepreneurs began production of
light consumer durables. 19
The landed elites attempted to control the nature of
this industrialization. They only supported it in the
hope that import-substitution-industrialization would be
temporary and in time the internal market would correct
itself and agricultural export products would resume at
high profit levels. The military supported import-
substitution-industrialization as it began to envision
itself as a more modernized sophisticated
establishment
.
20
Much of the initial impetus for import-substitution-
industrialization came from foreign entrepreneurs who
still maintained ties to their native countries. Many
had not even taken up Argentine citizenship, and
therefore, they represented a distinct non-national
class separate from the traditional elites of Argentina.
So too, many of the economic policies promoted by Justo
sought to encourage foreign investment and to deepen the
already dominant role of British capital. The Roca-
Runciman Treaty passed during Justo's regime, gave the
British a monopoly over the beef trade. 21
Justo was succeeded by Roberto Ortiz. Ortiz ruled
for only a short time due to poor health and Ramon
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Castillo succeeded him to power
. World ^ ^^ ^
Europe. Many German-educated army me „ SOU9ht tQ ,Uy
stepped up pressure to Keep Argentina fro™ Joining this
alliance, within the army,
. group o£ mid . level
officers conspired to infant a fascist regime in
Argentina. when elections were called in 1943, this
9rouP under the name of Group o£ United Qff ^
and a pro-United states moderate group would lead an
army revolt against Castillo. In the aftermath of the
coup, these two factions fought over what direction the
new regime would take and which side to take in World
War 11.22 The G0U nationalists managed to come to
power, and an army colonel by the name of Juan Per6n
stepped into the limelight.
The Perftnist Revolution
By 1940, the military, which had traditionally sided
with the landed elites in political matters, was no
longer as supportive of maintaining the status quo.
Rather, many had come to see the need for greater
industrialization and for greater control over the
economy, which was still dominated by foreign interests.
Nationalistic feelings ran high within the army by 1942
as it felt undue pressure from the United States and
Brazil to declare war against Germany. In a climate of
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rising tensions, with Radical support, the army
overthrew Castillo and imposed a military regime. 23
After a period of political wrangling between the
moderates and GOU nationalists for control of the
government, General Edelmiro Farrell was installed in
power in 1944. Juan Peron, who had been active in
pursuing the nationalist cause became his minister of
war. As minister of war, PerOn was responsible for
controlling promotions and the distribution of military
supplies, in this highly influential position, he
appealed to the army and navy as an advocate for
military independence. m 1944, he spearheaded the
creation of an air force. His support among many in the
military grew. 2 ^
While Peron was building up military support, he was
also concerned about winning popular support for the
army's efforts. In 1943, under a government
reshuffling, he took over the National Labor Department
in Buenos Aires and turned it into the Secretariat for
Labor and Social Welfare. Attempts to win the support
of the political parties were to no avail, and in a
short time, Peron turned his attention to the working
classes. He realized the untapped popular base labor
could provide in his vision for reshaping Argentina and
began a concerted effort to win labor's support. 25
From his position as head of the National Labor
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Department, he began to settle disputes in labor's
favor. He doled out wage increases and benefits to
workers in efforts to court union leaders' support. He
reversed longstanding anti-labor legislation and passed
new legislation favorable to labor. To the labor
leaders, such cooperation and support from a government
official was a radical change from years of unfulfilled
demands and repression. Many readily allied behind
him. 26
Throughout his rise to power (he was named vice
president in June 1944), Per6n extolled the virtues of
nationalism and the need for an independent Argentina.
He argued for the need to unite against communism (a
threat from within the labor unions) and against
imperialism. He was particularly effective in
exploiting the fears of the army against an alleged
scheme by Brazil, instigated by the United States, to
invade Argentina in light of the latter's refusal to
openly break with the Axis powers. It was this
particular stance which allowed Peron to carry out labor
reforms without setting off alarms within the military.
Many in the army viewed his gestures toward labor as
defusing a potential rebellion by the masses. 27
One other group Peron managed to gain the support of
was the Catholic Church. In 1943, the GOU had advocated
compulsory religious education in the schools. When
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Perim was running for the presidency in 1945, he
reaffirmed the cogent to impose compulsory religious
education, to the satisfaction of the Catholic church
hierarchy. 28
Per6n's rise to power, however, was not without
opposition. The first group to be alarmed at his
policies were the landed elites and the Argentine Union
of industrialists, a group of export-linked
manufacturers. Both these groups viewed with alarm the
benefits Peron doled out to the working class. Factions
within the military, particularly in the navy were
worried at Per6n's growing acquisition of power and
began to voice dissent against the Farrell regime. A
group called the Fuerzas Vivas, which had come into
existence in 1940 and consisted of free trade advocates
from landed interests, exporters, importers, and foreign
interests, openly declared its opposition to Peron's
social reforms in mid 1945. Peronist sympathizers
openly repudiated this opposition. The stage was set
for confrontation. 2 ^
General Farrell, by mid-1945 realized events were
moving against him and his vice-president. Bowing to
pressure from within the military and from civilian
groups, he dismissed Per6n and had him imprisoned. What
transpired after this has now become the folklore of
Peronist history. Peronist sympathizers lost little
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time in amassing support to force Peron's return fro,
exile. Labor union leaders and Peon's mistress, Eva
Duarte, canvassed working-class neighborhoods in Buenos
Aires to rally support for a demonstration. On October
17, 1945, to the horror of the traditional elites,
thousands of workers rallied to the Government House
(Casa Rosada) demanding the appearance of Peron. He was
quickly brought in from Martin Garcia Island and Farrell
called elections for February 1946. Peron and his
sympathizers had won the first round. 30
in late October 1945, Peron organized the Labor Party
and managed to win the support of a minority faction of
the Radical Party, called the UCR-Junta Renovadora. its
leader, Hortensio Quijano, became Peron's running mate
in the 1946 elections. He had also garnered the support
of many provincial conservative party bosses due to his
nationalist outlook. By election time Peron had the
solid support of the working classes, many in the army,
the Catholic Church, some radicals, and provincial
conservatives. Opponents to Per6n rallied behind the
Democratic Union, but this group was too heterogeneous
to provide real opposition to Peron. in one of the few
fraud-free elections of the twentieth century, Peron won
a solid 54 percent of the vote. 31
Peron's vision of a new Argentina consisted of three
basic goals: (1) to strengthen and extend
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industrialization- IZ\ = *. •on, (2) a certain redistribution of the
wealth of the country; (3 ) to stake out a distinctive
non-aligned position. He had to his advantage a large
state treasury from which to dispense funds for his
economic endeavors. Argentina had ^ ^ ^
-crease during the war years when Europe's economy was
concentrated on the war effort, and Per.n also enjoyed
the initial support of most of the key groups in
society, save for the landed elites. 32
Peron continued to pursue his pro-labor policies by
promulgating laws covering all aspects of workers'
lives. He instituted compensations, procedures, and
created a union bureaucracy to oversee all labor-related
matters. Redistribution of income was accomplished by
transferring funds from the primary export sector.
Workers' wages and benefits were substantially
increased, and for the first time in Argentine history,
the working classes began to see a substantive
improvement in their standard of living. 33
Funds from the agricultural exporting sector were
also transferred to the industrial sector. Here Peron
embarked on a program to purge foreign interests out of
industry. He nationalized the railroads, telephone,
gas, and urban transport. The state took control over
matters concerning external trade as well. Compensation
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for these nationalizations came from state treasury
funds which led to a severe depletion of state funds for
promoting greater industrialization. Pe r 6n emphasized
light consumer durables production over capital
intensive manufactured products. With his goal of
social reform and giving benefits to groups which had
helped him come to power, he spent monies on non-
productive activities such as military expenditures and
housing construction. Little of his industrial programs
created the basis for self-sustained economic growth. 34
in agriculture, Peron did little to force changes in
land tenure practices. He wrested some profits from the
landowning elites to benefit other sectors of the
economy, but overall, this group did not suffer severe
losses, despite their protests to the contrary. Peron
raised rural wages and passed protective legislation for
agricultural tenants, but no structural changes were
forced upon the landowning elites. However, this group
responded by cutting back on agricultural production. 35
The presidential style of Per6n was clearly
personalist and throughout his rule he fostered the
adulation of his followers. With his charismatic wife
Evita at his side, the couple became revered by many,
particularly among the working classes. This image of
benevolent patriarch however, hid from the public eye
some of the less civil policies of Peron. He purged
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from positions of influence those who disagreed with him
whether labor union leaders or newspaper publishers.
Per6n overlooked abuses of power (such as embezzlement
of funds) committed by those who supported him and his
wife. Unquestioning loyalty to the Per6ns was necessary
to anyone who sought government patronage or
influence
.
3 ^
The authoritarian bent of Peron has been
characterized at times as being fascist. Certainly, the
efforts at centralized control spoke to Peron's desire
for personal power at all costs, but at the same time,
his authoritarianism was moderated by a certain degree
of populism. There was repression, censorship, and
outright strong-arm mafioso brutality, but a terror
network never really developed. The degree of control
over society was not all pervasive as in totalitarian
regimes, nor as organized. Rather, as David Rock,
argues, Peronism was a peculiar blend of
authoritarianism, chock full of internal
contradictions
.
The Per6nist experiment at reshaping Argentina began
to fall apart in 1950. Peron's economic policies for
income redistribution and industrialization were all
based on state treasury funds and expropriating profits
from the agrarian export sector. By 1950, state
treasury funds had run out owing to expenditures to the
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massive state sector and to compensation for
nationalizations. j„ the agricultural sector, seve;
drought and a drop in international prices for
agricultural goods led to a fall in production and lower
profits. Per6n had assumed he could rely on this sector
to pay for his reforms, but he was mistaken and
Argentina fell on hard times. 37
The economic crisis of the early 1950s enabled
Peron's opponents to build up opposition to his rule.
While Peron managed to win election under the
Justicialista Party to a second term in 1951, efforts
were already underway to depose him. The landed elites
and middle classes had never been supporters of Peron so
they eagerly awaited his demise. Factions within the
army were upset at his personalist strong-arm tactics
and liked even less what they saw to be the undue
interference of his wife, Evita, in military affairs.
Even the labor unions, while still the most loyal to
Per6n, began to call strikes in protest of the economic
situation. Lastly, Peron had managed to alienate the
Catholic Church with his recognition of certain cults
3 a
and spiritualist groups.
The beginning of the end for Peron came after the
death of Evita in 1952. Gone was the woman who brought
Peron to the masses, and with her death, Peron became
increasingly isolated. He responded to the situation by
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imposing greater repression against his critics and even
had labor strikes squashed. He sought relief from the
economic situation by courting foreign investors,
especially the United States, but this did little to
effect the situation. Army factions felt he had to go.
The Catholic Church was scandalized by his passage of a
divorce law and declared outright opposition to him. By
1955, civil unrest had become endemic with pro-Pe r6ni s ts
and anti-Per6nists fighting each other in the streets,
often at the instigation of Peron. On September 19th,
1955, amidst army revolts in Cordoba and Bahia Blanca,
and with Buenos Aires under blockade by the navy, Per6n
resigned and fled into exile. The first Per6nist
3 qexperiment was over.
The legacy Peron left Argentina in 1955 was expanded
group interests vying for political power. Added to the
landed elites, the army, and the urban middle-class
Radicals was a Peronist Party whose backbone was the
labor unions and working classes. To the state he left
an huge bureaucracy with responsibilities to
nationalized industries and social welfare policies. To
the economy, he left a depleted state treasury and a
shaky industrial base. He neither destroyed the power
of the traditional ruling elites nor did the Peronist
government gain enough strength to check the former's
power. Rather, in the next eighteen years, attempts
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would be made to defeat Per6nism all of k- ub
'
311 which would
fail at high social cost.
The Lib^atins P^voluUon
The military which came to power in 1955 sought to
create law and order once again in civil society
Dominated by the army branch of the military, f irst
General Eduardo Lonardi and then General Pedro Aramburu
took power. with the backing to the landed elites, the
army undertook the denervation of Argentine society
It intervened the CGT (General Confederation of Labor)
and purged all union leaders who were loyal to Perc-n.
Strikes by workers were brutally squashed as well. 40
Aramburu also saw to the purging of Persist symbols
from society. He embarked on a campaign to expose the
excesses and corruption of the Per6ns by displaying the
material goods amassed by Juan and Eva Peron. He was
also responsible for kidnapping Evita's body and having
it sent to Milan, Italy, so as to deny the Peronist
movement of a "sacred" symbol. 41
In the economic sphere, Aramburu reversed the
Peronist policy of transferring funds to the industrial
sector and once again, favored the agricultural export
sectors. He encouraged the export sectors and entered
Argentina into the International Monetary Fund. He also
encouraged foreign investment, thereby worsening
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Argentina's international debt. The economy was not to
recover to pre-1940 levels of prosperity. 42
The efforts at de-Peronization did not succeed in
cleansing Argentine society of Per6nism. The labor
union movement reacted by becoming more fiercely pro-
Peron. Factions within the army were dubious of
Aramburu's efforts to create a Peron-free Argentina, and
from exile Per6n offered words of support to those
still in allegiance to him. Aramburu saw the need to
leave power and called elections for February 1958. 43
From its inception, the "Liberating Revolution" was only
to be a temporary measure to correct chaos and
corruption before civilians could take over again.
After three years of attempting to "liberate" the nation
from Peronism, the army had lost its revolution. So
too, it showed little success in dealing with the
economy
.
The Radicals Return
The elections of 1958 did not include the Per6nists
as the army continued to proscribe the group's
existence. Nor was the army to relinquish all control
over the civilian regime which would come to power. The
army saw to it that in 1958, the Radical Party came back
to power.
By 1958, the Radicals had split into two factions.
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One faction, led by Arturo Frondizi called itself the
UCR-mtransigents and advocated accommodation with the
Perc-nists. The other faction, led by Ricardo Balbin,
called itself the UCR-Pueblo and urged complete
dissociation from Peronism. m order to win the
presidency, Frondizi entered into a secret pact with
Per6n: in return for working-class support Frondizi
promised to re-legalize Per6nism. This strategy worked
in defeating Balbin for the presidency but the political
costs were more than Frondizi could handle. 44
Frondizi's pact with Per6n led to great mistrust on
the part of the conservative elites and the army, and
his administration was subject to several coup attempts.
His campaign promises to Peron were initially fulfilled
but rather than coopting Peronist labor support, the
Peronists demanded more concessions which Frondizi could
not deliver. Frondizi's economic program of
"devlopmentalism" could not support the kinds of social
welfare benefits which Peron had been able to dole out.
At the end of 1958, Frondizi embarked on an economic
project designed to promote price stabilization and to
end a balance of payments deficit. To carry this out,
Frondizi sought foreign assistance by way of a $328
million loan from the International Monetary Fund. In
order to obtain the loan, Frondizi was forced to adopt
policies which hurt his attempts at coopting working
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class support. The lnitial result Qf his ^ ^
fall in real wages of 26%.
The response to Frondizi's program was a series of
strikes by labor, which were violently crushed. The
army, alarmed at the recent revolution in Cuba viewed
labor agitation as part of the international leftist
conspiracy. it pressured Frondizi to take a hard line
against labor discontent.
By late 1961, early 1962, the economic situation,
which had shown some signs of improvement, was again in
crisis. The army was alarmed at Frondizi's foreign
policy forays which many interpreted as attempts to buy
popular support. in 1961, Frondizi sought to mediate
the confrontation between Cuba and the United States.
That same year, he welcomed Che Guevara back to his
nation of birth. with several gube rnatior ial elections
slated for 1961, Frondizi was seeking votes. However,
the army was becoming increasingly impatient with him.
The elections of 1961 were victories for the Radicals
and Frondizi decided to make good on a campaign promise
by allowing the Per6nists to run their candidates in the
1962 gubernatorial elections. Frondizi hoped that a
Radical victory would give him some independence from an
increasingly overbearing army. He lost his gamble as
the Per6nists won a majority of the governorships. The
army pressured Frondizi to annul the electoral results;
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he refused and the army deposed him in a coup.
The period Mediately following the coup witnessed a
power struggle within the army over what form of
government to install. One faction., called the Azules
(Blues), wanted a return to legal constitutional rule
and favored some accommodation to Per 6n
. The other
faction, called the Colorados (Reds), was militantly
anti-Peronist and wanted extended military rule.
Throughout 1962, conflicts and clashes, at times
violent, took place, but eventually the Azules got the
upper hand and called elections for July 1963. 45
in this election, the Peronists were still banned
from participating and UCR-Pueblo candidate Arturo illia
was elected with 25% of the popular vote. The army, as
with Frondizi did not completely retreat from the scene
and continued to exercise its veto option. Uli a
represented the conservative wing of the Radicals and
was only able to maintain the support of the party's
traditional wing. The landed elites had since formed a
coalition with the UIA and called for less state
intervention in the economy. They viewed Illia's
policies of expanding the government bureaucracy and
state spending as inflationary. 46
His fiercest critics though, came from the CGT and
the labor unions. Having been denied the right to run
their candidates in the July elections, few in the
81
working classes saw lll ia as a leg iti mate ruler. when
Illia attempted to divide the labor movement, the
response was a series of strikes and sit-ins which
disrupted the country. From exile, Peron encouraged
efforts to destabilize lllia and even attempted a return
to the country but was stopped in Rio de Janeiro and
sent back to Spain. 47
in September 1965, lllia called congressional
elections with every intention of seeing the democratic
process through, which meant allowing the Peronists to
field candidates. Hoping for a Radical victory, again
the gamble was lost when the Peronists won. Labor
stepped up its military support for a coup. Factions
within the army began working toward a coup. On June
28, 1966, lllia was removed, with hardly a protest from
any group in Argentine society.
The administrations of Frondizi and Illia, while
nominally democratic, were basically army-orchestrated
attempts to have civilians deal with Per6nism. Neither
Frondizi nor Illia were totally free to exercise power
as they pleased, but rather, the army expected the
Radicals to rule without Per6nist support, when they
were unable to do so and began to negotiate with some
factions of the Peronists, the army came in. The army
knew it had forced an impossible task upon the Radicals,
but the other two alternatives seemed unpalatable in
82
1958: they could have allowed Peron to return to
Argentina and negotiated some kind of pact with him -
to most in the army at that time, this was an
unacceptable strategy
- 0 r they could have come to
power themselves, which a faction of the army advocated
and which ultimately, was the solution adopted in 1966.
Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism
The Argentina of 1966 had undergone several
transformations since 1955 when the army ousted Per6n.
The landed elites were still a significant force in
politics and were the principal supporters of de-
Per6nization. in those ten years they had recovered
much of their wealth - which they sent out of the
country
— and many had entered the realms of finance,
commerce, and eventually, industry. The national
industrial bourgeoisie had grown in number, but its
fortunes were languishing due to the inability to deepen
indust rial i zat ion.
This group was rivaled by the entrance of foreign
multinational corporations, primarily from the United
States. Under the Radicals, foreign investment had
increased dramatically and was now a significant player
in the economy. The middle class was divided into
factions. Many who had seen democracy crushed by the
military in the past ten years went in search of an
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alternative to Radicalism and joined up with the
Peronists. The Radicals, ha vin g £ail ed at
,over ning.
fell into disarray and conflict among themselves.
Radical policies o£ favoring foreign capital over
domestic industry also alienated many from the middle
class. The working classes, after ten years of
repression, were as powerful as ever. Successive
policies of de-Peroni.ation had only led to greater
identification with Percnism. so too, in the !960s
there had emerged labor leaders who were less dependent
on Per6n and internal rivalries plagued the labor
movement between Perftn'cF on s loyalists and those who sought
an independent way. 48
Together with this heterogeneous group of contending
social forces was the army which had become
disillusioned at civilian inability to defeat Per6nism
and to attain economic stability. The army of 1966 had
come to adopt the notion of "national security" in its
interpretation of what was wrong with Argentina.
National security broadened the traditional view of
"enemy" to include the enemy from within. Threats such
as communist infiltration and counte r i nsu rgency were
very real, and the military had the responsibility to
weed them out and destroy them. "Warfare" was no longer
limited to fighting an external enemy but expanded to
include the eradication of internal opponents. To many,
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Per6nism and the working classes harbored subversive
elements which needed to be destroyed. what the
civilians could not do, the army would. 49
Another aspect of national security called for
maintaining the traditional values of Argentine society.
Liberation Theology, a radical reexamination of Catholic
doctrine, was spreading its gospel in parts of Latin
America and the Argentine military was worried it would
gain a foothold in Argentina. Therefore, when the
military came to power, their public discourse was
imbued with Christian symbols. The messianic element of
military rule from 1966 to 1982 was a direct response to
reformist trends within the Catholic Church at that
4. • 50t lme
.
Economically, the military was committed to an
industrial program for developing Argentina. with its
goal of making Argentina a modern world power, the
military favored the deepening of industrialization.
Import-substitution-industrialization had been
exhausted. Under General Carlos Ongania, the military
sought an alliance with foreign capital to provide the
needed impetus for expanding industrialization. This
alliance was the first experiment at bureaucratic-
5
1
authoritarianism.
In order to implement his program of attracting
foreign capital, Ongania had to take care of the,
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broadly defined, opposition. Labor
, of cour^ _ ^
Principal target as it posed the most serious threat to
attracting foreign capital, and the repression unleashed
was unprecedented in Argentine history up to that time.
Persist labor leaders were jailed and the principal
labor unions intervened. The severity of the repression
was a direct consequence of the high levels of political
mobilization on the part of labor. Because labor was
accustomed to playing an influential role in the
nation's politics as an opposition force, greater force
was necessary to silence its opposition. 52
Labor was not the only group attacked. University
professors and students, intellectuals, the political
parties, and anyone who appeared to question Ongania's
policies were purged and silenced. To Ongania and the
military, Argentine society had become corrupt and
immoral. No less than an all-out internal war was
necessary to cleanse Argentine society of its sins. 53
Having initially crushed opposition to his rule,
Ongania moved full speed ahead to implement his economic
program. He cut workers' wages and benefits, devalued
the currency, and rationalized various sectors of the
state bureaucracy to create a favorable climate for
investment. The initial results were good as foreign
investment increased dramatically by 1967. However, the
social dislocations were severe and would prove fatal to
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Ongania's plan. Labor of course suffered the brunt of
his policies as massive unemployment and a drastic
reduction in workers- overall well-being occurred. The
national bourgeoisie and owners of small and medium
businesses also suffered as foreign competition led many
to bankruptcy. The traditional elites and the military
were the only domestic groups to view these developments
favorably.
^
Ongania's plan could continue to work so long as he
was successful at keeping a lid on social protest.
Between 1966 and 1969, it appeared that Ongania was in
control of the situation, but this illusion was
dispelled in May 1969 in the city of Cordoba. There, an
auto worker strike, a student protest, and middle-class
support led to massive demonstrations against the
regime. while military forces successfully repressed
the strike, other protests occurred in other cities and
Ongania's days were numbered. 55
Ongania attempted to hold on to power despite the
growing number of voices within his own ranks advising
him to resign. Those in the army who had never really
wanted the military as governors found the opportunity
to force their hand. In 1970, Ongania was deposed in a
military coup.
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The Resurrection of Peron
The army generals who ousted Ongania in 1970 realized
the futility of four years of dealing with social
discontent by force. As a result, under General
Alejandro Lanusse, the military government decided it
had to allow some democratization to take place.
Lanusse embarked on a campaign to popularize his image
in the hope of garnering support from the middle class
and the political parties. He called it the "Grand
National Agreement," but managed to only attract the
support of a few minor parties. Social discontent grew
by leaps and bounds. Along with all the other groups
which make up the Argentine political spectrum, there
emerged in the early 1970s leftist guerrilla groups
which would make efforts at political reconciliation
impossible without Peron. 56
Urban guerrilla groups had come into being mostly
during the early 1960s, but they became significant
players in politics in 1970. In the last days of
Ongania's regime, a group calling itself the Montoneros
kidnapped General Aramburu and executed him. The event
sent shock waves throughout the nation. This was to be
followed by other kidnappings, assassinations, bombings,
and bank robberies. Other urban guerrilla groups, such
as the ERP (People's Revolutionary Army) and the FAP
(Per6nist Armed Forces), had been active in the late
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1960s and were respon S i ble for the assassinations of
several labor union bosses. 57
These urban guerrilla groups predominantly consisted
of middle- and upper-middle-class youths disillusioned
with the Argentine political stalemate. Most, though
not all, were inspired by the l ikes of Che Guevara,
Fidel Castro, and the other giants of Marxist
revolution. Having been raised in the period of
outright and de facto military rule, these groups,
particularly the Montoneros were scandalized at the
degree of repression and social injustice meted out by
the authorities. So too, these groups felt the root
cause of Argentina's problems was in foreign capital
exploitation, and they blamed certain collaborators for
this situation. They accused union leaders of selling
out to the establishment and pushed for popular
revolution. When few in the working classes responded,
they took to the streets themselves. 58
Juan Per6n watched these developments with great
interest from his exile in Spain. He let it be known
that he supported the ideology of these guerrilla
groups, and so, he won many of these leftist groups'
support, especially the Montoneros. Peron's interest,
of course, was in using these groups to his political
advantage. By 1970, the political landscape was in
disarray. Efforts to defeat Per6nism had failed; the
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military was disorganized; guerrilla warfare appeared
endemic. what better time for Per.n to promote himself
as the only one who could reconcile the contending
factions of Argentine society? 59
The military by 1973 was exhausted from failing to
contain urban terrorism and arrest a declining economy.
Many advocated (although reservations existed among
others) allowing Perfin to return to Argentina. The
middle classes had also grown tired of social and
economic upheavals. The Radicals and the military had
failed, and many defected to Perftnism. The working
classes had seen their hopes and needs ignored time and
time again during the past eighteen years. The
possibility of a Peronist resurrection was tantalizing.
The labor union elite was a bit more guarded: they were
used to acting without Per6n and were unsure as to what
his return would do to their influence and power. The
urban guerrilla groups saw Peron's return as aiding in
their cause for social revolution. After some last
minute skirmishing by the army, Per6n returned and he
conquered. He was inaugurated on October 12, 1973, at
seventy-seven years of age. At his side was his third
wife, Isabel. 60
Immediately upon taking office, Peron set about
repressing the militant youth movement he had encouraged
for so long. Repression was unleashed on the guerrilla
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groups and the ideals of f-hoc^ „a i these groups were shattered
However, others refused to accept what was happening and
went underground. Pro, there, they regrouped and would
launch a new wave of political violence. with labor,
Per6n attempted to revive some of the social welfare
policies of forty years earlier, but the economy was in
deep recession. instead, he hammered out a tripartite
agreement between labor, business, and government to
freeze prices and wages until the inflationary spiral
halted.
Social unrest did not abate but escalated. Urban
terrorist groups intensified their activities. Labor,
seeing no improvement in its plight, called strikes.
The army was grumbling and the middle class felt
squeezed. And then Per6n died. On July 1, 1974, after
less than a year in power, Peron was dead, what
followed was a period of chaos and terror, with Isabel
now in power, the political situation deteriorated
rapidly. Policy making was irrational, the economy
continued in disarray, and urban terrorism increased.
Most groups in society mobilized to call for a military
coup. On March 24, 1976, the wish was granted, and once
more, the military took over. 61
Caudillos
,
Radicals, Populists, and the Military
The history of Argentine politics up to 1976
illustrates a path of development distinct from that of
91
0th6r A—
"
«««., nineteenth century
Argentina was dominated by cat-Moa D tle ranchers vying for
economic and political power r nripn „P . Independence from Spain
led to conflicts between the provinces ovec how
Political power should be distributed^ ^
° £ ^ B~ c.ttl. ranchers. Prom the
^-nineteenth century through t0 the beginning q£ ^
twentieth century, political pQwer _ ^the landed elites under the facade of liberal democratic
forms
.
The emergence of the Radicals at the turn of the
century was a result of the growing urbanization of the
nation. The backbone of this group was middle-class
white collar workers engaged in the business and
financial aspects of agro-exporting and small
shopkeepers. Economically, these groups sought tc
maintain the status quo of furthering agricultural
export production, but they wanted political rights and
privileges. The Roque Saenz-Pena electoral reform law
enabled this sector of society to achieve political
power and control over the state apparatus.
in much of the traditional political development
literature, the middle class is considered to be a
democratizing force in society. On the surface, the
Radicals would appear to have fulfilled this function in
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Argentine society, promoting honest elections and
representative government. However, a critical
difference between the Argentine middle class and the
North American middle class was the former's continued
ties to the agricultural exporting sector rather than to
the industrial sector. The Argentina middle class was
but an extension of the agricultural export economy.
This helps to explain why both the Argentine middle
class and landed elites proved intransigent to the
growing demands of an emergent working class. This also
helps to explain why both landed elites and middle-class
groups courted the military at various times to gain
political ends.
This is not to say that the landed elites and the
middle class share the same concerns, for the landed
elites were very suspicious of the Radical's expansion
of the state bureaucracy and attempts at political
reform. After a period of Radical rule, the landed
elites agitated the army to take over and the year 1930
initiated fifty years of military dominance over
Argentine politics.
Initially, the military espoused very limited goals
in coming to power: to clean up chaos and corruption and
call elections. It neither sought long-term rule nor
had a grand vision for Argentina. However, significant
groups within the military were preoccupied with
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politics and sought to promote their interests in the
Political sphere. Despite statements to the contrary,
the Argentine military from 193Q Qn^ g significant
activist role in the nation's politics, even when the
president in the Casa Hosada was a civilian. The nature
of this political intervention would be determined by
economic and social factors.
The 1930s and 1940s were periods of industrial
growth for Argentina under policies of import-
substitution- industrialization. The economic
transformation and the consequent social changes led to
a period of populism under Juan Per6n. An army officer,
Peron rose to power by enfranchising the working classes
and creating a new political force in Argentine
politics. His leadership style was clearly personalist
and his opening up of the political system to the labor
unions did not mean greater democracy for Argentina.
However, his social welfare policies created substantive
improvements for an hitherto repressed sector of
society
.
It was the mobilization of the working classes as a
political force which Peron's successors sought to undo.
After Peron was deposed in a coup, the army spearheaded
a campaign to crush the power of the labor movement and
the working classes. When it failed, the military
resurrected the Radicals and let them have a go at it.
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The ignominious failure of the denervation of
society led to the imposition of a military regime,
different from all of its predecessors.
The Ongania regime of 1966 was markedly different
from previous attempts at military rule. Disillusioned
with civilian incompetence and committed to repressing
Per6nism, the Ongania regime sought to transform
Argentina into an industrial world power by fostering
industrialization through foreign investment. Committed
to a vision of political and economic greatness, Ongania
attempted to manage the economy as well as to promote
social peace. Herein lies another aspect of Argentine
political development different from traditional
modernization theory. The impetus for industrialization
came from the military which was overseeing a
technological bureaucracy in carrying out its economic
program. in Brazil the program was working, but in
Argentina it led to failure. Nevertheless, in the 1960s
when Argentina had become highly urbanized and
industrialized, its politics were highly repressive and
non-democratic. Industrialization was not creating
liberal democracy as modernization theorists had
believed. Rather the opposite was occurring throughout
the continent.
The failure of the first bureaucratic-authoritarian
experiment and the subsequent return of Peron to power
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illustrated how social forces in society had a
significant impact on the policies followed by those in
the Casa Rosada. The Cordobazo of 1969 served notice
that social groups would not sit idly by as they saw
their standard of living eroding. This was a lesson
though, that few in the Argentine military would learn
until some years later. Before that would happen,
Argentina had to enter one of the darkest periods of its
history
.
In sum, Argentine political history up to 1976
followed a path distinctive from that followed by North
America and Western Europe. Even though to most
observers, Argentina resembled a sophisticated and
modern nation, this appearance belied its roots as a
dependent Latin nation. As such, social and economic
forces had differing impacts on the nation's politics.
One such social force which has had a significant effect
on the course of contemporary Argentina is the labor
union movement. Its evolution will be discussed next.
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CHAPTER III
ARGENTINE LABOR
1890-1976
From their early beginnings as loose collections of
immigrant self-help societies, Argentine labor unions
have played active roles in the nation's politics.
Their growth and strength as an economic and political
force has been met with periodic repression, cooptation,
and accommodation on the part of governing authorities
throughout the twentieth century. Under Juan Peron's
three administrations (1946-52, 1952-55, 1973-74),
members of the labor movement elite exercised power and
influence in matters beyond those specific to labor such
as foreign policy. Under military and Radical party
administrations, labor exercised power as a voice of
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opposition to standing regime policies. m all cases,
the labor movement has been subject to cooptation from
the casa Rosada and the labor elite itself has been
characterized by internal divisions. The complex nature
of regime-labor relations and of intra-labor relations
will be explored in the context of Argentine political
development of the past century.
The Birth of the Labor Movement
As will be recalled from chapter 2, the 1880s in
Argentina were characterized by the massive immigration
of Southern Europeans to its shores in search of work.
From among these immigrants emerged the first efforts to
create a labor union movement. Labor activists of this
period brought to the New World such Old World-conceived
ideas as anarchism, socialism, sindicalism, and
communism. These ideas became the bases for collective
identity building among the newly arrived immigrants.
Early attempts at group formation divided along
ethnic lines as newly arrived immigrants were
assimilated into Argentine society by mutual aid
societies. Out of these societies emerged labor unions
whose interests focused on working conditions and wages.
Strike activity early on became an integral part of the
strategies labor unions utilized to make their demands
heard. Government actions to repress this growing labor
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activity was also characteristic of this period. 1
Within the labor movement itself, there raged fierce
debates over how best to organize the movement.
Anarchists eschewed any type of organization and favored
direct action over political participation or
negotiation. Socialists, on the other hand, saw
political action as the best means toward achieving
favorable labor legislation. Sindicalists
, who
represented a minority strain within the labor movement,
sought an apolitical, bread-and-butter issues-oriented
approach to unionism. 2 These three dominant ideological
currents, with diverse political agendas, made attempts
at labor unification difficult. Nevertheless, attempts
were made at organizing unions into associations to
promote labor interests. In 1901, anarchists and
socialists were able to set aside their differences,
albeit temporarily, to form the Worker Federation of
Argentina ( FOA )
.
Unity did not last long, and
subsequently the socialists formed their own
organizations starting with the General Union of Workers
in 1903. 3
As industrial development intensified, coupled with
increased rural to urban migration, labor union
membership accelerated in the first decade of the
twentieth century. Anarchist-oriented unions
predominated at this time within a political order still
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dominated by landed elite interests. The anarchist
strategy of using strikes as a means of political
protest was greeted with government repression by force
and by : e gal statutes. m 1902, in response to a
massive series of strikes by labor unions over working
conditions, the government instituted the Law of
Miidence which gave it the power to deport any alien
considered undesirable. This law was an attempt to
squash the growing militancy of a labor movement
dominated by immigrants from Europe. m 1910, the Law
of Social Defense gave the police the right to imprison
anyone suspected of anarchist affiliations. Throughout
this decade, government authorities harassed labor
militants and periodically imposed states of siege. 4
The repression by the government and the lack of
organization by the anarchists led to their eventual
demise in the second decade of the twentieth century.
The passage of the Saenz-Pena electoral reform law and
the election of the middle-class Radical party to power
in 1916 did not lessen the hostility of government
authorities toward labor militants. The ideological
bent of anarchists for direct, disruptive action only
served to reinforce the resolve of the Radicals to use
force to destroy rather than accommodate the labor
movement. Government repression led to terrorism on the
part of many unionists. Hostilities between labor and
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government culminated in January 1919 with "La Semana
Tragica," a week in which police authorities clashed
violently with labor demonstrators. This signalled the
end of anarchist dominance in the labor movement as the
repression of two decades finally succeeded in weakening
the power of anarchists in the labor movement. 5
As anarchism became less viable, socialism or social-
democracy became attractive to many in the labor
movement by the 1920s and 1930s. The rise of socialist
support coincided with changes in the character of the
industrial worker and in the nature of industrialization
itself. The original appeal of anarchism was to an
artesanal class whose members were being absorbed into
the fold of encroaching industrialization. As
industrialization became the dominant focus of the
Argentine economy by the 1930s under import-
substitution-industrialization, socialists came to
dominate within the labor movement elite. Part of this
trend can be attributed to the strong presence of
socialist politicians during the Radical ruling period
of 1916-30 which had an impact on labor union activists.
Another aspect of socialist popularity lay in its
emphasis on organization and working within the system
to promote change. The increasingly complex nature of
industrialization was expressed in a greater
identification by labor activists with the goals of
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promoting better working conditions and economic
justice, as espoused by the Socialist party. The chief
rival to the socialists were the communists who
dominated in the manufacturing and construction trades. 6
The socialist principle of negotiating with
government authorities did not result in improved
conditions for the working classes. Rather, the
military coup of 1930 brought renewed repression against
the labor movement as well as other sectors of the
population. Military leaders attempting to create a
fascist regime modeled after Mussolini's Italy
disregarded constitutional rules and norms. Their
economic policies favored a return to an emphasis on
agricultural export production and a deepening economic
relationship with Great Britain. Some
industrialization was tolerated as a means of dealing
with the nation's trade deficit and as a source of
employment so as to defuse a potentially volatile social
situation. Despite the accelerated pace of
industrialization by 1935 (promoted mostly by foreign
entrepreneurs), the ruling elites of the period remained
hesitant and suspicious of this trend. However, they
became powerless to reverse it as the 1940s approached. 7
The economic changes of the 1930s led to a profound
social transformation of the laboring classes. The
impetus toward industrialization coupled with the
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declining employment opportunities available in the
rural sector due to the Depression, created a migratory
flow of rural laborers to the cities. No longer a class
of recently arrived immigrants from Europe, the urban
working classes were now characterized by second and
third generation Argentine citizens. As such, they were
unschooled in the debates of their predecessors over the
ideologies of socialism, communism, or sindicalism.
This was in marked contrast to the labor union leaders
who in the 1930s and early 1940s were highly
ideologically oriented and quite elitist. These new
migrants from the interior were much more narrowly
concerned with their ability to earn decent wages and to
work under decent conditions. 8 The inability of the
socialist and communist dominated labor elite to
understand or even to communicate with this new rank and
file led to a political leadership vacuum at the exact
moment when the working classes were at their strongest
numerically. Needless to say, the growing numbers of
urban workers did not translate into access to political
power as the 1930s ruling elites chose to ignore this
significant transformation of Argentine society. It
would be left up to a singular individual with
farsighted vision to understand and to capitalize on
this new social development.
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Peronism - Take I
No other period in Argentine history has had such a
profound effect on labor and on Argentine society as
that of the regime of Juan Domingo Peron. The period
between 1943 and 1955 wrought truly revolutionary
changes in the political life of the nation, opening up
the political game to new players and changing the
nature of state-civil relations. Peron brought labor
into the arena of national decision making and for the
first time in Argentine history, the needs of workers
were a principal concern of the national government.
Between 1937 and 1947, some 750,000 migrants from the
countryside moved into greater Buenos Aires in the hopes
of finding work in the import-substitution-industries.
With an economy which began earnestly to industrialize,
workers, as a class, became critical to the nation's
well-being. with increasing industrialization came
increased membership into labor unions and an increased
number of new unions. In 1936, individual union
affiliations numbered around 370,000. In 1941, that
number had increased to 447,000 and by 1945, the number
stood at 522,000. The number of unions between 1941 and
1945 nearly tripled from 356 to 969. 9
While the older union leadership competed among
themselves for control over the ideological direction of
the labor movement (the early 1940s saw a split between
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. s
the socialists and communists in the CGT)
, other les:
experienced labor leaders began to espouse the cause of
economic nationalism. Understanding their role in an
expanding industrial economy, many labor leaders by the
late 1930s began a call for nationalization of foreign-
owned public services. So too, labor's demands changed
in a significant manner. According to David Rock, labor
demands after 1940 concerned the issue of fringe
benefits rather than wages. Workers' standards of
living were already on the upswing by the early 1940s
when Per6n began his ascendance to power. 10
Per6n began to court the labor movement in mid-1944
by making claims of seeking
- redistributive justice,"
"humanized capital," and a "harmony of classes." Using
his position as the head of the National Department of
Labor, he translated his rhetoric into action by
settling a series of strikes in the union's favor and by
dispensing substantive benefits directly to the workers.
However, Peron's popularity with labor rank and file
cannot only be attributed to economic payoffs. The
principal cause for his staying power can be found in
the fact that he elevated the worker to a level of
dignity and respect hitherto unheard of in the rhetoric
of Argentine politics. 11 With his mistress and later
wife, Eva Duarte, Peron mobilized a generation of
working men and women into a newfound sense of self-
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esteem, precisely at a time when the nature of their
work alienated the. from their identities. The events
of October 17, 1945, when the streets of Buenos Aires
filled with workers demandin, Peron's release from jail,
was a testament to him as the master populist
politician
.
Per6n's ability to gain the support of the labor
elites during his rise to power between 1944 and 1946
was not as facile as winning over labor rank and file.
Part of his success in gaining the upper hand can be
attributed to the factionalism among the labor elites
and also to their isolation from those whom they claimed
to represent. The repression by the military in the
early 1940s, particularly against communist union
leaders, also gave Per6n ample room to maneuver.
Before his electoral victory in 1946, Peron had
already begun to reshape the labor movement to his
purposes. In 1945, he won passage of the Law of
Professional Associations, which established a system of
government registration for all officially recognized
Unions. Under this law, no union could enter into
collective bargaining, go on strike, or appeal to a
labor court without government recognition (personeria
gremial
-legal personhood). what's more, the law called
for one single recognized union per industry and one
national labor confederation. As the General
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Confederation of Labor ( CGT ) was the only national
organization of labor at the time, it became the
dominant labor organization under the control of
Peron. 12
For its part, many in the labor elites saw their
autonomy eroding and fought vigorously against Peron's
centralizing policies. However, their efforts to
maintain their power and to keep the labor movement
independent were futile. Peron had too many resources
at his disposal and he offered substantive power and
influence to those leaders who cooperated with him. For
the first time in Argentine history, labor leaders were
consulted for their ideas and handsomely rewarded when
they did Peron's bidding. Not only did their sphere of
influence encompass labor-specific issues but also
issues of general policy making. Labor leaders who
refused to align with Peron were isolated and shut off
from his pro-labor patronage. Later, many of these
leaders would be forcibly removed from their leadership
1
1
positions
.
Soon after his release from prison, Juan Per6n
organized the Labor party, the vehicle through which he
spearheaded his campaign for the presidency. Many union
leaders joined and offered their support, in the belief
that their political time had come, that labor was
finally an emergent political power. The principal
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supporters of this Labor party were the younger labor
leaders, who had emerged in the previous two years.
Others, from the older unions, felt an independent Labor
party would serve labor's interests in the years to
come. m concert with all the other groups sympathetic
to Peron (military, factions of the Radical party,
industrialists, the Catholic church), their support
elected Per6n to office in February 1946. 14
As president, Per6n continued to enact policies
favorable to labor. At the same time, he successfully
consolidated his control over the labor unions, thereby
eclipsing the old-line of union activists. Under the
Secretariat of Labor and Prevision, Peron created an
extensive bureaucratic network for the administration of
labor affairs. He gradually concentrated matters
concerning organized labor within the General Direction
of Labor and Direct Social Action ( DGTASD ) . This agency
provided a direct link between the unions and Peron for
dealing with matters such as collective bargaining,
labor law enforcement, union registration and dues,
employer-union debates, and work accidents. The CGT was
empowered by the government to intervene in unions to
replace their leadership as a means of dealing with any
dissent over government policies. Peron also abolished
the Labor party and created the Justicialista party
which became known as the Per6nist party. 15
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Through his policies Por Anj-i_j.es
,
e o souqht tn c,,k~ j-y a o subordinate thelabor unions to the needs and requirements of his
- 9 i,e. Throughout his tenure in offioe, no labor
leader came to prominence nor was the substance o £ labor
-tters debated. Poli cies emanated from the DGTASD
, and
Peron directly appealed to the workers for support "
-a Peron was fundamental in fosteri„ g direct links fcQ
the people, with her lower-class background and
charismatic style, she epitomized to many the true
essence of Peron's co ramitment to the working classes.
These populist appeals were successful in solidifying
Per6n's control. 17
After a period of improving workers' rights and
benefits, Per6n's policies began to emphasize the
direction and management of labor affairs. Under his
tutelage, there arose a class of labor leaders whose
orientation centered on Per6n, rather than on
theoretical debates over how best to fight for workers'
interests. Having ousted the old-line labor leaders,
Peron brought into power men who would do his bidding.
These union men usually had obscure union activist
backgrounds and next to no independent working-base
support. As supporters of Peron, these union men
accrued considerable benefits, not only in terms of
political influence but better standards of living as
well. Also, Per6n drafted labor leaders for important
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government positions such as secretary of forei
affairs and minister of the interior. The growing
bureaucratic establishment for the administration of
labor affairs also provided opportunities for upward
mobility on the part of labor union men. 18
The virtual hegemonic support Per6n enjoyed among the
working classes did not translate into passive labor
acquiescence to his economic policies. Throughout his
administration, he faced a number of very severe
strikes. On the one hand, many strikes were instigated
by Peron himself and their "officially sanctioned"
status was to demonstrate the strength of Peron to other
power groups in society. On the other hand, wildcat
strikes took place which were instigated by workers over
the objections of their union leaders. In March 1948, a
strike was called by bank employees directed by an
Inter-bank commission which was not connected to the
legally recognized bank union. As was their usual
tactic, the CGT, at the behest of Per6n broke up the
strike through repression and the dismissal of many
workers. The CGT also replaced the union head with a
leader to their liking. In February 1949, a strike was
called by some graphics workers and here again the CGT
intervened. In December 1950-January 1951, a strike was
called by the railroad workers, headed by a clandestine
Consultative Commission of Emergency. The strike was
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declared illegal, was intervened with the CGT
, and Per6n
went so far as to conscript the workers into military
service. At the time, Argentina was engaged in
hostilities with Chile over the Beagle Channel and the
railroad strike threatened the flow of supplies to the
south. By conscripting the railroad workers, PerOn made
their actions a matter of national security. To back up
his decree, he sent the army in to end the strike.
After the strike ended, Peron conceded to the workers'
demands. in all these cases, workers were striking over
real material issues and did not view their actions as
disloyal to the government. Rather, they explicitly saw
their adversaries to be their employers while at the
same time, they affirmed their loyalty to Per6n. 19
Labor support for Peron, however, began to wane after
1951 as the economic crises loomed and Peron began to
respond to criticism with greater authoritarianism. The
death of Evita in 1952 was a critical blow in his
efforts to maintain the support of labor. Labor strikes
by 1954 were getting alarmingly numerous, and labor
rallies invoked by the Per6nist labor leaders attracted
fewer numbers of supporters. The economic problems of
1952-1955 were multi faceted ; the result of a combination
of mismanagement, embezzlement, and the exhaustion of
the import-substitution-industrialization program for
economic growth, and of severe problems in the
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agricultural sector brought Qn by drought
elite resistance to Per6n's policies. These problems
were addressed by austerity measures which began to eat
into the standard o£ living of workers (as well as other
groups )
.
20
Peron attempted to offset growing labor discontent by
directing its frustrations at other groups and by
continuing to dole out benefits from the Eva Peron
Foundation (a social welfare agency which dispensed
patronage to Peronist supporters). As discontent from
other groups in society began to increase, Peron
mobilized his supporters to seek revenge against his
enemies. In 1953, after a bomb exploded during a
Peronist labor rally, mobs of Per6nists ransacked and
torched the Jockey Club, exclusive domain of the landed
elites. After repeated confrontations with the Catholic
Church, Per6n also encouraged his supporters to oppose
church policies and the result again was a great deal
of violence and destruction in many churches. 21
By 1955, the situation appeared to be getting out of
hand. Civil violence seemed rampant and there were
calls from all sides for Peron to resign. The CGT
elite, a creation of Per6n's, did not openly break with
Peron. The years of partiality to labor and the
symbolic conditioning had gone far in creating a loyal
labor elite. However, this loyalty did not provoke
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labor to come to Pe ro„. s aid ln tfc, coup o£ ^ ^
did Perc-n seek an armed workers' movement fcQ ^
himself ln power
. Rather
, ^ ^ ^
the eiohteen years before his spectacular return to
Power, he attempted to manipulate the labor movement in
his determination to remain a political force in
Argentine politics. 22
The first Peronist regime succeeded in coopting a new
group into the arena of Argentine politics. The old
ruling landed elites and the urban commercial middle
classes were forced to accommodate to the priorities of
the urban working population. The political
mobilization of the working classes was not a new era of
democracy for Argentina, but a classic example of
corporatism under a populist banner. The labor movement
was incorporated into the Per6nist state with its power
circumscribed by Peron. Union leaders, because they
were chosen by Peron, were obligated to him, and
therefore their function was less to represent workers
than to gain worker support for Peronist policies.
Initially, the corpora ti zing efforts were accompanied by
substantive redi st ributive policies, but as the latter
became less frequent, the acceptance of Per6nist
policies reached crisis proportions.
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*&21 *M the Libe_raUn2 Resolution
The military coup of 1^7^ the beginning Qf &
new stage in the history of the labor movement. Pe r 6n
was no longer in the country, but he attempted to
control the labor movement from exile through emissaries
who shuttled back and forth to Argentina. The labor
movement was subjected to repression as the new regime
undertook an all-out assault on Per6nism. This
situation served to mold the nature and strategies of
the labor movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
General Eduardo Lonardi attempted to seek an
accommodation with the labor movement but, his efforts
were eclipsed after three months by a hard-line military
faction led by General Pedro Aramburu. Aramburu sought
to de-Peronize and deinstitutionalize the labor
movement. His strategies included purging union
leadership positions of Persists, installing a military
intervener as head of the CGT
, and outright harassment
of Peronist rank and file. He hoped that by
"housecleaning" the labor movement of Peronist
influence, labor would return to its pre-1945
apolitical status. 23
The repression faced by the labor movement had some
initial consequences for labor's power. with the
absence of Peron the old divisions of the pre-1945 era
reopened and the old-line socialists and communists who
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had been finalized during Peron's regime re-emerged
as contenders for power within the labor m0vement. They
welcomed the coup of 1955 and felt that they would be
able to retake control of the labor movement now that an
anti-Peronist government was in power. This assumption
proved fatal to these old-line unionists for Aramburu's
regime proved not only anti-Pe roni st but also anti-labor
in its policies. with the Peronists in opposition to
the regime, it appeared as though the socialists were
selling out to the military regime. The latter's
credibility with labor rank and file was lost. By 1958,
socialist, communist, and sindicalist elements within
the labor movement were marginalized once again. 24
Peronist labor leaders, facing repression and bereft
of political power scrambled to retain their leadership
roles even though their benefactor was no longer around
to protect them. They well knew that labor rank and
file held its allegiance to Per6n and not to them. Most
also saw the military regime to be uncompromising in its
desire to rid the labor movement of Peronism. Given
this situation, many Peronist labor leaders felt the
best way of remaining a force in politics was to prove
their ability to lead the labor rank and file. To
facilitate this, the Per6nist labor elites used the
return of Perc-n to Argentina as their rallying cry to
unite labor rank and file. Peron, from exile, did not
119
discourage but encouraged such efforts. 25
By using the return of Peron as thp u-° e ultimate goal ofthe labor movement
, labor leaders ^
some status within the labor movement ^ ^ ^ ^
survive the reversals =>„jand repression of Aramburu's
te9lme
-
reP" SSed or discriminatory po licy
«as interpreted as a temporary setback in labor's long-
term struggle for the return of Peron. The drastic
decline in labor's fortunes in the years Mediately
following Peron-
s ouster caused
.any to view the days of
Peron as glory days for Argentina. Uniting under a
Perbnist banner seeded to be the only way of surviving
the attacks by the military regime. 26
The austerity measures imposed by Aramburu kindled
labor militancy against the regime, over the objections
of Perbn, the number of strikes and illegal actions
increased between 1956 and 1958. Out of these
confrontations, a new class of labor leaders emerged
whose success at mobilizing workers accrued to them real
power and influence. Many of these new leaders began to
develop their own social base of support by claiming to
be heirs to Perbn's legacy. 27
Labor Under the Radicals
The elections of 1958 were an army-orchestrated
attempt to pursue civilian rule without the
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participation of the Persist party. Two rival facfcions
of the Radicals competed against each other with Arturo
Frondizi the victor. As will be recalled from chapter
2, Frondizi won the election by entering into a pact
with Per6n to gain Peronist rank and file backing. m
the preliminary provincial elections earlier that year,
Peron had urged supporters to cast dissenting votes by
casting blank ballots. A full 25% of the votes cast
were blank, attesting to Frondizi and everyone else the
popular support Peron still enjoyed. Frondizi, the
master politician that he was, made a deal with Per6n in
which he promised that if elected, he would relegalize
the Per6nist party. Per6n, also a master politician,
thought this would be a good opportunity to begin
machinations for his eventual return to Argentina.
However, Peron in Spain had to convince labor leaders in
Argentina that voting for Frondizi would help labor in
the long run. After all, labor had been on the "front
lines" battling military repression and seeing its
standard of living declining drastically in the past
three years. In order to gain their acquiescence, Per6n
had to get Frondizi to agree to reinsti tuting the Law of
Professional Associations and allowing Peronist labor
leaders to regain control of the CGT. Frondizi did so
and won the elections from his arch rival Ricardo
Balbin. 28
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Once in power, Frondizi made good on his promises by
overturning some ant i-Pe r6ni st legislation, calling for
new union elections, and enacting a law similar to that
of the Law of Professional Associations. However,
Frondizi viewed his pact with Per6n as a political
convenience for winning the elections and after a short
period of time, he began to pursue policies which proved
detrimental to labor's well-being.
Frondizi's economic project, called
"developmentalism," sought to promote advanced
industrialization through capitalization efforts and the
encouragement of foreign investment. Emphasis was
placed on capital-intensive production accompanied by
the freezing of salaries and the contraction of the
labor force. Along with austerity measures imposed by
the IMF, the economic condition of workers continued to
worsen. Real salaries during Frondizi's administration
declined by 30%. 29
Labor was quick to respond to Frondizi's anti-labor
policies by calling a series of strikes during 1958 and
1959; unequaled in militancy up to that time. Frondizi
reacted by sending in the army to repress them. To many
in the labor movement, these actions demonstrated the
intransigence of the Radicals to sympathizing with
labor's needs. Pact or no pact with Peron, labor rank
and file began to act against Frondizi's regime.
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From the very beginning, Fr0ndizi had sought to play
several groups in society off against each other. He
used labor initially to demonstrate to the military,
landed elites, and entrepreneurial class that he could
coopt them. when labor agitation arose over his
policies, Frondizi raised the specter of social chaos if
the military and other elites did not align behind him
in repressing this new wave of labor activism. He
attempted to prove his staying power with labor by
alternating the use of the carrot and the stick.
Concessions to labor would be followed by repression in
his goal to tame the unions. In the end he failed to
satisfy anyone. 30
By late 1961-early 1962, Frondizi was feeling
pressure from all sides. The Cuban Revolution of 1959
had heightened the army's concerns about communist
infiltration and it specifically saw the labor movement
as susceptible to subversion from within. The labor
unions continued in their strike activity, and the
economy was in dire trouble. Gubernatorial elections
were in the offing. Frondizi decided to use the
upcoming elections as a means of shoring up his popular
support. In three provincial gubernatorial elections
held in late 1961, his party had won all three positions
so, he felt confident he would win the major elections
of 1962. So sure was Frondizi of his popular support
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that he allowed the Persist party to field candidates.
The result was a disaster for Frondizi. of fourteen
Provinces, Per6nist candidates won ten. This was more
that the army could accept and in March 1963 Frondizi
was deposed in a coup. 31
The regime of Arturo Illia was ill-equipped to deal
with labor opposition and army pressures to take a hard
line. Labor, again denied the right to field candidates
in the army-orchestrated election which brought Illia to
power, stepped up its opposition. m early 1964, the
CGT declared a "Plan de Lucha" (Battle plan) in which
selective strikes and factory sit-ins were employed to
express labor discontent with the government. These
actions were taken for more than economic reasons: labor
was intent on showing government and business that it
could no longer be ignored when it came to politics.
Despite Ulia's attempts to bypass the labor leadership
and seek the support of rank and file, the labor
movement maintained a stance of opposition throughout
his regime. On another front, labor militancy and
growing political chaos led Juan Peron to believe the
time was ripe for his return to Argentina. Months of
negotiations and rumor-monger ing in Argentina heightened
political tensions. It all came to naught as the army
made sure Peron would not be allowed to end his exile. 32
The first ten years of post-Pe r6ni st rule created
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profound changes in the labor movent. The Frondisi
-d UHa regies proved ineffectual at bridling labor's
power; Peron had clearly manipulated labor to his own
personal needs but had failed to make his promised
comeback in 1964. A new class of labor leaders emerged
during this period, who sought to break with Peron. The
most influential one of t-hic „i ^t his class was Augusto Vandor,
head of the powerful Metalworkers Union. Vandor
interpreted the events of 1955-62 as demonstrating the
need for a change in strategy on the part of the labor
movement. Rather than pursuing militant confrontation,
Vandor sought more pragmatic strategies such as
negotiation with the powers that be. Labor activity
should rely less on mass mobilization and more on
calculated assessments of the kinds of pressure to be
applied in each specific situation. Also, in seeking to
decrease Per6n's influence, Vandor and his followers
attempted after 1964 to marginalize the issue of Peron's
return to Argentina and to concentrate on carving out
some space for labor in the political arena. 33
Peron saw what was happening, and he countered the
independent labor leaders by pitting his allies against
them. Jose Alonso, leader of the Textile workers, was
the most significant of the labor leaders to do Peron's
bidding. The schisms which these two factions of the
labor movement created and nurtured throughout the
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»«o. sun have their lmpact on the iabor move^ t
t°<Jay. what was interesUng abQut i9Ms
between the two tactions was that eaoh claimed to he the
true heir to Peron-s legacy. Mhi le Vandor sought to
distance the labor movement frQm perfin , s ^
and his allies nevertheless saw the need to rely on
Percn-s name to maintain their standing with the ran*
and file. Their public stance was always one of
expressing support for Perils™, while privately seeKing
to separate Percnism from Peron - or more aptly,
Peronism without Per6n.
The ability of the labor movement to disrupt the
regimes of Prondizi and illia gave it a renewed sense of
power, for while repression was certainly used by the
Radicals, it was not near the same levels as had been
suffered during the previous military interlude. Many
in the labor leadership believed their marginalization
from politics to be a thing of the past, and therefore,
the labor movement stepped up its opposition to Illia
(along with every other group in society) while
divisions within the ranks became endemic. in the 1965
congressional elections, Peronists won and the wheels
began to turn for another coup. it came in 1966, and
hardly anyone in Argentina raised any objection.
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Mbor and the First BHreaucratic^uthHi^
Experiment
General Ongania's accession to power inaugurated a
new era for Argentine politics. Unlike his military
predecessors, Ongania very quickly dispensed with the
word
"provisional" to describe this regime. Ongania was
in power to stay, and he sought to capitalize on the
public's discontent with the Radical regimes to
consolidate his power. Labor, under the guidance of
Vandor, adopted a policy of tacit conciliation. 35
It was not long before labor began to feel the brunt
of Ongania's policies, which sought to freeze wages and
to contract the labor force. initial protests by those
unions hit the hardest by his policies were brutally
repressed and these unions faced military intervention.
However, Ongania also required some sectors of labor
support in his goal to deepen industrialization. Toward
this end, he attempted to coopt some unions under his
control
.
36
The strategy of dividing and conquering one's
adversaries is far from unique in the history of
humankind. what is interesting as regards Argentina is
that all governing elites have viewed labor as perhaps
the most threatening factor to their rule. Each
successive regime since 1955 sought to bridle the labor
movement, to assert control over it, and each regime was
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successful up t0 a point
_ Qngania inherited a
-~. which was factionali2ed over what ^^^^^ ^
pursue vis a vis the government. The two main „ ,int; divisions
were those which were willing to cooperate ^ ^
regime and those who argued for outright opposition.
Vandor led the faction calling itself the
"Participationists" which argued for cooperation, but it
was a cooperation predicated on the same strategy he
used under the Radicals. That is, Vandor thought he
could use strikes and confrontations as a stepping-stone
to negotiation. First carry out a policy of
confrontation, then retreat and open up the arena for
negotiations with a government forced to listen under
the threat of greater confrontations. However, while
this strategy worked to a certain degree with the
Radicals, it failed miserably in the face of a military
regime disposed to the use of force. in March 1967, the
CGT held a 48 hour strike demanding better wages and
protesting some of the economic rationalizing schemes of
Minister of the Economy Adalberto Krieger Vasena. The
strike was lifted without any concessions from the
government, but with Vandor expecting to be able to
negotiate. Instead of negotiating, the government
suspended collective bargaining agreements with labor
for two years, thereby effectively annulling the power
of labor to have a voice in determining salaries. 37
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The hard l ine taken by 0nganla as ^ ^
to the formation of two separate CGTs in 1966. The
Vandor-led Participation!^ called themselves the CGT
of Azopardo. The unions which „ere ^
the regime called themselves the CGT of the Argentines
or of the Paseo Colon. This faction was led by the
printer's union head, Raimundo Ongaro. Also in
contention for power was the faction which remained
loyal to Per6n. It called itself the Orthodox wing or
the "62 Unions at Per6n's sidp » tv,^ ^t» ae. This faction was led
by Jose Alonso. 38
m Nay 1969, a strike called by auto workers in
Cordoba erupted into a popular demonstration against
Ongania's policies. The Cordobazo, as it was called,
was the turning point in Ongania's political fortunes.
The province of Cordoba has historically been radical
and suspicious of policies emanating from the federal
capital, usually for good reason as Argentine public
policy has always been discriminatory toward the
provinces. Industrialization occurred later in Cordoba
than in Buenos Aires with the result that labor was
concentrated in smaller unions with greater contact
between the rank and file and its leaders. Unions were
less tied to Peron and Peronism. Because of this, labor
demands and subsequent strategies were more radical and
the union leadership more willing to call strikes and
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confrontations. The eruptions of May 1969 led to a
full- scale rebellion by other sectors of Cordoban
society, including students from the local university
and elements of the middle classes. The demonstrations
were met with repression and violence, and rioting
appeared to rule the day. The failure to promote law
and order spelled the end for Ongania's regime. 39
The rebellions in Cordoba spread to other industrial
cities as well. Violence appeared endemic as a whole
host of forces were unleashed during this time period,
spurred on by the utter failure of Ongania's economic
project and the widespread view that things were getting
worse. A month after the Cordoba uprisings, leftist
terrorists assassinated Augusto Vandor, leaving a huge
gap in the union leadership. a year later, Jose Alonso
was assassinated as well. The alleged reasons for these
assassinations were leftist groups' claims that the
labor leadership had sold out to the authorities. As
leftist terrorism increased, counterattacks came from
the extreme right. By 1972 the country seemed to be at
civil war. Labor strikes were increasing; middle-class
youth-dominated terrorist groups were bombing,
kidnapping, and ransoming their way into supporting
their violent habits; and military factions struggled
over what to do. The nation was at an impasse and the
only solution to many was that Per6n could save the
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day. 40
The eighteen years between Per6nist regimes
illustrates several points about labor and politics.
First, since 1955 every regime, military or radical, had
had its fortunes tied to its effectiveness in dealing
with labor. Their failure as governors was due to their
failure to contain the activities of an highly
politicized labor movement. Second, labor had not
discriminated between nominal democratic or military
regimes. When it saw its economic well-being
threatened, it reacted. Third, every regime had
attempted to divide and conquer labor, which exacerbated
differences among the labor elites. Fourth, while clear
differences existed among labor leaders, labor rank and
file remained staunchly Per6nist. These patterns would
continue into the 1970s.
Juan Peron - Take II
The Argentina Juan Peron returned to in 1973 had
changed much in his eighteen years in exile. The state
of the economy was in disarray with runaway inflation
and few resources to call upon to aid it. Armed leftist
and rightist terrorist groups were assaulting the
general population. Most importantly, the labor
movement which Per6n had centralized and politicized was
now a huge conglomeration of groups, used to being in
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the opposition, sophisticated in political manuevering,
and more than ever, divided over how to play the
political game. 41
The labor leadership for the most part was
apprehensive over how Peron would deal with it,
especially since in the past, Peron had always sought to
undercut its power and influence. Nevertheless, with
the assassinations in 1969 and 1970 of Vandor and
Alonso, respectively, there existed no charismatic labor
leader to rival Peron. Soon after the interim
government of Campora was installed, a "Social Pact" was
promulgated, which was to be the cornerstone of Peron's
economic policy. The social pact was a tripartite
agreement between business (represented by the General
Economic Confederation [ CGE ] ) , labor (represented by the
General Confederation of Labor [ CGT ] ) , and government on
income policy in an attempt to fight inflation. The
agreement called for freezing prices of all goods and
services at existing levels, a one-time 40% across-the-
board increase in family allowances, and an across-the-
board increase of 200 pesos per month. Collective
bargaining conventions would be suspended for two years
as wage negotiations were centralized within the hands
of the government. An agency would be set up — the
National Commission on Prices, Incomes, and Standard of
Living (CONAPRIN) — composed of representatives of the
132
three involved parties, to oversee that the real
purchasing power of wages would not fall below the
levels estimated and to generally monitor business costs
and profits. These economic measures were to be in
effect for two years. 42
Once in power, Per6n enacted a new Law of
Professional Associations which centralized power
relations within the labor movement. Among its
provisions were (1) there would be no more than one
union representing one branch of activity; (2) these
unions had the right to intervene in their affiliates
and annul the mandates of elected delegates, if deemed
necessary; and (3) union leadership terms would be
increased from two to four years. The effects of these
provisions were to centralize power relations within the
labor movement among the top leadership elite, and of
course, to facilitate Peron's control over the labor
movement as a whole. 43
Despite the labor leadership's capitulation to these
measures (which effectively stripped it of power in the
area of wage bargaining and independent action), peace
did not reign during Per6n's tenure in office.
Throughout his administration, many strikes were held to
protest working conditions, unfair dismissals, contract
disputes, etc. These confrontations did not initially
attack Peron. Rather, union infighting was the norm as
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dissident unionists attempted to challenge established
leaders over control of the labor movement. As the
provisions of the social pact began to unravel, wage
disputes began to grow in number and so did the number
of strikes. Per6n attempted to mediate the situation
with wage increases but the economic and social
situation continued to worsen. The situation did not
abate until his death on July 1, 1974. 44
Isabel per6n and Jose Lopez Rega
The death of Peron ushered in a period of economic
crisis and social convulsions which were to culminate in
a military coup. Neither Isabel Peron nor her assorted
advisors, principally Jose Lopez Rega, were equipped to
handle the economic crisis which was gripping the
country. Instead, the policies followed by the Per6n-
Rega team were irrational and lacked any sound basis of
judgment, thereby alienating all sectors of society.
The labor leadership was divided over how to deal with
Mrs. Per6n. One faction argued that the labor movement
was a political arm of the government and therefore
should follow and support Peron unconditionally. The
other wing, represented within the group of "62
Organizations" argued that the labor movement was a
pressure group and therefore its mission was to apply
pressure to any government in power, Per6nist or
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otherwise. This faction though, did go to great
lengths to support Per6n, for it realized that if they
opposed Peron and aided in destabilizing her regime, the
results would be disastrous for labor's political power.
Under the Per6nist regime, labor enjoyed a modicum of
political influence and power, a situation which
benefitted many labor leaders personally. m
confronting Isabel, they attacked those around her,
primarily her minister of economy.
Nevertheless, as the economic situation worsened, the
labor leadership could not ignore the growing demands
from rank and file for action to ameliorate
deteriorating incomes. A period of government
repression, against independent union action, during
1974, while successful at first in containing strike
activity, only made the situation more explosive in
1975. In March 1975, the Ministry of Labor convened the
bargaining committees to discuss wages and working
conditions which would be put into effect in June upon
the expiration of the social pact. Several months of
negotiation followed with increased rank and file labor
agitation and greater obstinance on the part of Mrs.
Peron in negotiating seriously with labor, when Mrs.
Per6n refused to ratify the agreements reached, the CGT
called a forty eight hour work stoppage. The result of
this confrontation was the capitulation of Mrs. Peron to
135
labor demands and the reaffirmation of support by the
central labor movement leadership for her government.
While this particular crisis was resolved in victory
for the labor movement leadership, the events of the
following months were to destroy this resurgence of
labor movement power. The economic situation continued
to worsen with heightened fears on the part of the rank
and file of more layoffs and unemployment - a situation
which continually forced the labor leadership to react
to each new crisis. This along with growing rumors of a
coup and heightened agitation by other sectors of
society made Argentina a pressure cooker by February
1976. As factions in the labor movement continued to
fight over how to deal with Mrs. Peron, political
violence on the part of terrorist groups appeared to
grow rampant, and Mrs. Per6n seemed to be losing control
over the government. The situation cried out for a
means to decompress the pent-up tensions. The solution
came in the form of a military coup on March 24, 1976,
with practically all sectors of society welcoming the
change. The labor movement leadership which had
attempted to remain loyal to Mrs. Peron was in no
condition to protest the coup: after three years of
Peronist government, it found itself alienated from its
rank and file, and therefore unable to assert itself
either way over the political crisis. All debates
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concern, what the labor movement^ ^^ ^
when the military intervened in all the central unions
and many labor leaders were jailed. 45
Conclusion
The historical development of the labor movement in
Argentina has been as unique and complex as that of
Argentine politics itself. unlike labor movements in
other Latin American countries, the path of Argentine
labor development has seen greater integration into the
political arena engendering both special opportunities
and pitfalls.
The early efforts at union organizing coincided with
the great waves of Southern European immigration from
the 1880s to the 1920s. Early labor unions borrowed
from their European counterparts in Italy and Spain both
in ideology and organization. Labor leaders were
predominantly foreign born and sought to replicate the
same strategies they had used in Europe for gaining
labor rights in Argentina. These organizing efforts
were consistently met with repression by the
authorities. Despite the social and economic
transformations of the time, the ruling elites were not
interested in accommodating this new emergent class.
The landed elites were very much against the trend
toward industrialization and so were hostile to labor.
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The urban commercial elites saw labors' demands
unreasonable, so when they wrested power from the
traditional landed elites in 1916, the plight of the
working classes improved little.
Despite the repression suffered by labor in the first
decades of this century, the rapidly industrializing
economy ensured that the labor unions and the labor
movement would continue to grow. By the 1930s, the
sociological make-up of labor had transformed from being
predominantly immigrant to being second and third
generation migrants from the countryside. As a
consequence of this social transformation, many in the
working classes were not partisan to the older
ideological debates of the past. Rather, their goals
centered around wages, working conditions, and employee
benefits
.
This seeming lack of ideological sophistication on
the part of the working classes has been cited as the
principal reason for Peron's ability to coopt them under
his influence. Much of the literature on this period
argues that his charisma and hand-outs to labor were
largely responsible for his success at winning them
over, especially given their lack of political savoir
faire. However, Per6n's charisma and pro-labor policies
do not tell the whole story. It is an undisputed fact
that up till the time Peron came into power, no
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political leader or political party paid much attention
to labor's demands. instead, outright hostility against
labor was characteristic in the pre-1940 period among
Argentina's political and economic elites. Peron won
over labor not just because of fancy rhetoric, good
looks, a pretty wife, or doling out patronage. He
enacted policies and programs which made significant
improvements in the lives of workers. In his political
discourse, he celebrated the worker, imbued him with
dignity, and perhaps more importantly, he reaffirmed
their claim to being true Argentines. Throughout much
of the twentieth century, the working classes have been
viewed as marginal members of society — dark-skinned
people who were a little less Argentine than the fair-
skinned upper and middle classes. Labor support for
Peron was rational given his actions.
Per6n's personal commitment to improving the lot of
the poor and working classes is still under much
dispute. What can be said is that his pro-labor
policies were important to all three administrations
and his wife Evita strongly identified with the
Argentine lower classes. However, the Perons exacted
many sacrifices from the labor movement in return for a
slice of the economic and political pie. As president,
Peron destroyed the independence of the labor movement
and incorporated the labor leadership under his control.
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in bringing labor £rom th, ^ ^ > ^ ^
over the activities of the labor movement. Policies
emanated from the top down and the labor leadership
became messengers of Peron rather than representatives
of the working classes. This was classic corporatism
under a populist banner.
Organizationally, all unions were grouped under one
central labor confederation, the CGT and only unions
officially recognized by the government were legitimate
actors in labor affairs. Peron also ensured that only
loyal union men held positions of power and
responsibility; any and all who deviated from his needs
were systematically purged from union positions. in
dealing with labor rank and file, he made it clear that
he was the individual who fulfilled the demands of
labor. Direct appeals to the people constantly reminded
them that Peron and not their union leaders were
responsible for the benefits they received.
Peron was successful at maintaining labor support so
long as he continued to enact economic policies which
enriched this sector of the population. However, as
economic troubles mounted, his support from labor (as
well as from other groups in society) began to slide.
While his most vocal supporters still came from among
labor during 1953-55, Per6n was unable to prevent the
outbreak of strikes and disruptions from renegade
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unionists. in the end, he had succeeded in mobilizing
labor and corporatizing labor into the political system,
but he failed to exert total control over its actions.
in the years after the 1955 coup, the labor movement
sought to resituate itself within an environment of
anti-Per6nist and anti-labor policies. The political
power and influence which labor had enjoyed under Peron
was replaced by physical and legal forms of attack.
Under the provisional military government of 1955-58,
pro-labor legislation was abolished and labor unions
purged of Peronist supporters. So fierce was the
hostility of the military government that General
Aramburu had Evita's body confiscated from Argentina,
thereby making necrophilia an enduring part of the
Argentine political landscape.
Life under the Radical governments was more bearable
as the repression lessened but only to a degree.
Frondizi's pact with Peron allowed labor to reenter the
political fray but this time the divisions within its
ranks would become more prominent. A new generation of
labor leaders emerged in this period who would seek
independence from Peron. New strategies were tried in
seeking accommodation with the regime, rather than
outright opposition. Nevertheless, the denial of
political participation to the Peronists eventually
intensified the criticisms of the Radicals, helping to
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bring about their downfall and the asoendanoy of a
military regime.
The first bureaucratic-authoritarian experiment
failed to bring prolonged peace to the nation. Instead,
by 1966 it was clear that many competing groups were at
war against each other, each strong enough to disrupt
society but too weak to overwhelm the others. Labor
again was a special target of repression and the
internal divisions over strategy continued to plague its
leadership. Juan Peron maintained a heavy hand in
exacerbating these divisions as he fought to remain the
undisputed leader of the working classes. It would be
in the city of Cordoba that labor would first erupt
against the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. The
Cordobazo laid bare the naked force of Ongania's peace
and it also demonstrated the failure of the fourteen
year effort at de-Pe r6ni zat ion
. The Cordobazo led to
the end of the first bureaucratic-authoritarian
experiment in Argentina.
The spectacular return of Peron in 1973 illustrated
the failure of Argentine elites — military, urban
middle classes, urban industrialists, agriculturalists,
labor — at finding some means of living peacefully
together. Per6n was a throwback to another time when
life was less complicated and the state treasury was
full. The labor elite was cautious about his return,
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but nevertheless saw the opportunity to exercise real
power and influence again. By then, other people had
joined the Persists and the movement was no longer
solely labor but incorporated various sectors of the
intelligentsia and disillusioned middle-class youth.
Perc-n unfortunately could not heal the divisions in
society. Even had he lived, he probably would have
failed, especially since he turned his back on radical
student groups, thereby unleashing a renewed bout of
terrorism on society. Isabel Peron's short tenure at
running the country almost brought the nation to ruin.
Again, the only solution seemed to be a military coup
and on March 24, 1976, that was what precisely happened.
As in 1955, the labor leadership did little to protest
the removal of Peron from power. Rather they, like
every other group in society, awaited a new round of
housecleaning
— some with alarm, most with relief.
Little did anyone anticipate the nightmare to come.
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CHAPTER IV
DIVISION AND DEFEAT
ARGENTINE LABOR 1976-1978
The Development of State Terrorism
In Robert Potash's seminal study of the army and
politics in Argentina from 1898 to 1964, one of his
concluding observations is that every time the military
has taken over the reigns of government, it has done so
with the popular support of the Argentine people. No
doubt, the military takeovers of 1955, 1966, and 1976
faced little substantive opposition from the many
interests — political parties, landed elites, urban
industrialists, labor union leadership — which make up
the Argentine political scene. Yet, to translate this
initial support on the part of some groups into long-
term support for policies enacted by these military
regimes does not necessarily follow, especially as
regards the labor movement. On the contrary, the
widespread use of force and repression against the labor
movement on the part of all three military regimes
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illustrates the lack of legitimacy each military regime
has had in the eyes of some sectors of the labor
movement
.
The relative ease with which the military came to
power in 1966 and 1976 was due to the state of affairs
existing at the time and to a political power vacuum
where no alternative existed save for a military one.
in 1966, the specter of Peron's return was threatening
enough to move the army out of the barracks and into the
Casa Rosada. The ensuing repression and experiment with
a bureaucratic-authoritarian mode of rule only served to
pave the way for Peron's return in 1973. The violence
of the Cordoba riots enabled workers and students to
effectively unhinge the seeming control Ongania held
over the political arena. By 1976, Peron had died but
the previous three years of a Per6nist government just
reaffirmed to many the dangers of Peronism. This along
with an onslaught of urban terrorist attacks and
economic chaos led to the inevitable return of the
mi 1 i tary
.
Initially, the mandate of the military was clear— to
put an end to the guerrilla activity in the streets of
Argentina's cities. Next, to reform the nation's
economy which under Isabel Per6n had come to near
bankruptcy with spiraling inflation and irrational
policies. For the military junta, which consisted of a
148
—ber from each branch Qf ^^ ^
General Jorge Rafael videla of the army as its
P^sident, the tas k of maintaining law and order and of
setting the economy bact on . straight^ ^ ^
-vel one to most Argentines, since 1930, Argentines
had experienced several military coups. Military
dominance over political and economic affairs was to be
expected of those who too, control of the Casa Rosada.
Law and order, of course, is the mainstay of any
military regime, and in Argentina, many held high
expectations that the military junta would deliver
Argentina out of its Per6nist nightmare.
On law and order, the military junta acted swiftly
and soon after taking power, the streets of Buenos Aires
and other cities were quiet. However, the military
junta's goals went beyond the elimination of bomb-
wielding terrorists as it viewed Argentina's political
problems as more severe, necessitating drastic remedies.
The junta sought to reorganize society and it called its
project the "Process of National Reorganization," later
to be called simply "el Proceso." Its ideological bent
combined the Doctrine of National Security with a
messianic Christianity which it perceived as giving it
an ordained right to rule. Protection from communist
infiltration necessitated a heavy hand in weeding out
domestic subversion, and Argentines, with their
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conservative leanings, embraced the anti-communist
stance wholeheartedly. After all, they considered
themselves of the West and were Christians above all
else. The communist conspiracy was neither Western nor
Christian and its alleged expansionist designs in the
western hemisphere posed threats to nations such as
Argentina. The very worst of the Cold War mentality
embraced the notion of an ongoing struggle between East
and West in all political conflicts. The leftist
insurgency in Argentina was interpreted in this light
and so the battle against it was seen as one global
effort in the struggle to defeat the spread of
communi sm
.
Against this ideological backdrop, the military
viewed terrorism as "subversion" of the Argentine way of
life and they struck back mercilessly. Never mind that
the enemies they were fighting were other Argentines.
To the ruling junta, the entire fabric of Argentine life
had been poisoned and diseased by subversion, leading to
a sick society rent with chaos and corruption. The
solution was a concerted campaign to purge Argentina of
those subversive elements and to bring back the real
traditional values of Argentine life. Indeed, one of
the self-proclaimed mottoes of the military junta was
"Tradition, Family, and Property." While further
explanation of what "traditional" Argentine values meant
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was never forthcomi „g, the junta continuously evoked the
-oral r igh tness of its cause, always justifying its
actions through religious principles and Argentine
conservative nationalise The Argentine Catholic church
hierarchy offered little as a counter to the junta's
claims
.
2
The methods used by the military junta are by now
famous. Green Ford falcons with no license plates
chauffeured by nondescript men sped through the streets
of Buenos Aires both day and night, in search of
specific individuals believed to be subversives.
Illegal detention centers were set up all over the
country with sophisticated apparatuses for torture. The
junta created clandestine groups from within the state
and police forces whose jobs were to weed out and
eliminate the subversives within Argentine society.
These groups operated with impunity and were given carte
blanche in their covert activities. while the junta
often did not know the exact nature of these groups'
activities nor who their victims were, it fully approved
and supported their efforts. By distancing themselves
from their work the junta was able to deny that it was
violating human rights. This position allowed the junta
to promote its image as good moral Christian soldiers. 3
The result was a society gripped in fear and
paralyzed by state terror. Thousands upon thousands of
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people were kidnapped, jailed, and tortured without any
recourse but to pray that their lives be spared. The
"lucky" ones were freed after a time in detention and
after being subjected to a full array of torture
techniques. More often than not, the torturers remained
anonymous as the victims were almost always kept
blindfolded during their "interrogation" sessions. Even
if they were freed with all their anatomical parts
intact, the psychological trauma alone was enough to
send most of them fleeing the country. The ones who
were never heard from again most assuredly died in a
violent manner. Today, common graves are continuously
being discovered, filled with skeletons marked by
bashed-in skulls and broken bones. One favorite
recourse used to dispose of bodies was to throw them
into the River Plate in the hope that the bodies would
flow out to sea and be eaten by sharks. One month
several dozen bodies washed ashore on the Uruguay side
of the River Plate. 4
No sector of Argentine society was immune from this
war of subversion; the hardest hit were the working
classes, students, labor movement activists, and urban
professionals. The wandering Ford falcons operated at
all hours of the day and night, and people "were
disappeared" without a trace. Any attempts by friends
and relatives to find out what was going on from the
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authorities only led to the danger of the. being
"disappeared" without a trace. Meanwhile, bahies borne
to »o,e
„ held in captivity were "adopted" by others,
often by military men and even by the torturers
themselves, while the junta maintained strict
censorship over what was happening, the pervasive extent
of this war against subversion, the "dirty war,"
filtered its way into the Argentine consciousness.
Between 1976 and 1979, Argentina was a nation under
siege from within and the junta was at its helm. 5
Tne Economic Imperative
While the junta was waging its dirty war on the
social and political front, it delegated the running of
the economy to Jose Martinez de H02. Martinez de Hoz
came from an old Argentine family and had been active in
the Rural Society which represented large cattle and
wheat interests. He was also an industrialist and
financier. He had served in various capacities during
several military administrations and had a modest
international reputation, when he was called to take
over the helm of the economy, he went to work and lasted
five years as the minister of economy, a record-setting
tenure for an economics minister. The usual norm in the
post-World War II era was eleven and a half months. 6
The economic program of Martinez de Hoz was to force
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Argentina into an economy regulated by free market
forces. m order to curb inflation and restimulate
production and growth, Martinez de Hoz set about
freezing wages and setting up price controls, allowed
the peso to devalue, and attempted to dismantle the
state bureaucracy involved in the regulation of the
economy. Using a standard free- market approach,
Martinez de Hoz attempted to curb public employment and
sell state-run enterprises to public investors. To
stimulate economic growth, he lowered tariffs so as to
encourage international competition. He imposed severe
restrictions over labor union activity in the areas of
wages, collective bargaining, and control over union
benefits. To promote productivity, he instituted
technical rationalizing schemes to stimulate
industrialization
.
7
The results were a disaster. Inflation was curbed
for only a short time and its long-term consequences
were to drastically lower the standard of living of most
Argentines and to allow inflation to spiral out of
control once again. Rather than promoting competition,
the loss of protectionism caused Argentine markets to
become flooded with imports driving Argentine industry
to a state of near bankruptcy. Attempts to curb the
state's role in the economy met with stiff resistance
from the military which had become used to (and very
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wealthy f rom) the control of certain . ndustrus ^
other problem arose over his policies. Martine 2 de „02
would make changes, but these would lead to other
problem. By l979
,
the country ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Positive change in the economic situation and, as things
oontinued to worsen, the tenure of Martine z de Ho, ca.e
to an inauspicious end. 8
The reasons for the failure of Martinez de Ho 2 <s
grand project will be debated for some time to come.
What bears noting at this point is that any strategy for
economic development necessarily requires an appraisal
of social, political, and historical factors. while
people in the Economics Ministry spent their time poring
over graphs and charts and came up with sophisticated
econometric formulas in the name of rationality and
science, they forgot that judgments and values were at
the heart of any economic planning. Given the "cult of
fear" within which Argentina lived throughout the
Proceso, Martinez de Hoz was able to impose policies
over the working classes without much fear of massive
resistance; but this only bottled up their resentment
against the regime to be expressed later on. His
attempts to affect other groups met with greater
resistance, which forced him to abandon or modify many
of his policies. Throughout his tenure, it was
irrelevant to him whether there existed consensus over
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his policies. „ e held . particular visiQn Qf ^
Argentina should be like
, and as ^
acted out its moral crusade under a reign of terror,
Martinez de Hoz carried out his crusade for a free-
market economy without any consideration to social and
political consequences. Vet, it was precisely these
considerations which forced his economic program tc
fail
in sum, the Argentine political and economic
situation between 1976 and 1979 was dismal indeed. Fear
and terror reigned throughout society as almost all
avenues for political expression were repressed. The
usual accoutrements of military rule, such as
censorship, suspension of civil liberties, and illegal
detentions were supplemented with massive
disappearances, deaths through both primitive and
technologically sophisticated forms of torture, and an
ideology of moral uprightness which mangled the meaning
of "Christian behavior". These oppressive policies
along with economic policies which affected the working
classes more adversely than other groups, substantively
effected the political power of the labor movement.
This is the political and economic context within which
I examine the political activities of the labor
movement
.
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The InUial Blows
- BeEression and Intervention
The labor movement at the beginni^TT^ 1976 was
divided over what course of action to follow within the
political arena. Partisans of Mrs. Peron attempted to
hold her shaky government together while critics, at the
behest of rank and file demands, undertook strikes and
refused to accept her policies. Many of these critios
of Mrs. Peron were disposed to a military coup being the
only solution to the problems at hand. Unfortunately,
no one realized the consequences such a coup would
engende r
.
In 1976, the labor movement was overlord of a vast
labor bureaucracy which substantively affected the well-
being of all workers. Due to their growth in the 1960s,
labor unions controlled all social welfare benefits
programs (obras sociales), which covered everything from
health care to paid vacations for workers. Internal
commissions set up within factories by unions oversaw
the enforcement of labor contracts and each union had
its own elected officeholders, who were in turn
represented by a larger federation and ultimately by the
CGT. The CGT coordinated all these groups and
determined the political strategies of the labor
movement. This centralization of labor power, which had
been accomplished by Juan Per6n so as to maintain
control over the movement, was also in later years to
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enable labor mobilization against standing regimes.*
The coup of March 24, 1976, dealt a powerful blow to
the labor movement. while a military takeover was of
little surprise to anyone, the rapidity with which the
junta acted to repress labor "agitators" came as a shock
to most of the labor elite. Several policies aimed at
destabilizing labor's power were enacted from the very
day of the coup. The most prominent leaders were jailed
and in their places were installed military personnel
(interveners) to oversee the running of the bureaucracy
of the unions. The leadership of the CGT was replaced
and so was that of the thirty most important unions,
mainly those involved in heavy industry such as the
metalworkers and construction unions. Leaders who were
jailed were for the most part released after several
months in confinement. Lorenzo Miguel, head of the
Metalworkers Union and leader of the Peronist "62
Organizations" (the political arm of the union movement)
and the most influential of the labor leaders at that
time, was kept in confinement for four years. 10
Over the course of three years, approximately twelve
hundred unions were intervened and their leaders
replaced by military personnel, what this often meant
was the presence of armed soldiers within the factories
ensuring the workers' passivity and compliance. The
military sought the smooth running of the factories, not
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to look after the interests of workers, and as the
military controlled all aspects of work life, including
the dispensing of worker benefits, the obedience of many
workers was ensured. The Ministry of Labor was also put
in the hands of military personnel. General H. T.
Liendo of the army was named the minister of labor and
all the key offices within the labor ministry went to
other military personnel as well. m all, twenty
percent of all labor unions were intervened during the
initial three years of military rule, but this twenty
percent represented eighty-five percent of all workers
covered by collective bargaining agreements. The ruling
junta was highly selective in choosing which unions to
intervene by maximizing effect and minimizing effort. 11
The Weight of the Laws
Not only was threatened physical coercion used to
pacify the labor movement, but the derogation of labor
legislation and the enactment of repressive laws also
served to contain the movement's activism. Among the
first decrees enacted was Decree #9 which suspended
activity in all types of unions, using the justification
of cleaning up disorder, corruption, and subversion.
Decree #10 dissolved the "62 Organizations," which had
in the last Peronist government been closely allied to
Mrs. Peron. The first law enacted, Law 21161, suspended
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the right to strike and of any direct action toward
disrupting production. Law 21356 passed in June 1976,
reaffirmed Decree #9 and outlawed elections, assembl
and conqresses within the unions. Moreover, it
authorized the Ministry of Labor to enforce mandates
handed down by the junta, to carry out interventions,
and to replace union leaders with ones who would do the
military's bidding. The Law of Professional
Associations was suspended as well. 12
Law 21400 passed in December 1976 dealt with
industrial security. This law suspended the right to
strike and any other action which affected production.
It listed penalties ranging from jail terms to cuts in
pay for activities leading to a decrease in production.
Law 21250 was a resurrection of the Law of Residence,
which stated that the executive had the power to expel
any foreigner suspected of threatening national
security. Law 21297 was enacted to curb workers' right
in areas of due process and conflicts with employers.
Employees now had the burden to prove they were being
discriminated against by their employers rather than
simply showing just cause that discrimination existed.
It also established the right of employers to dismiss
workers before guilt was proven over any transgression
or crime.
Law 21576, passed in December 1976, created sweeping
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changes in collective-bargaining agreements between
unions and employers by allowing reform in matters
concerning vacation, compensatory work, and leaves of
absence. it also allowed for government interference in
union affairs, such as the appointment of officers, the
collection of contributions, and the allocation of
funds. This law was used to intervene in the social
welfare (obras sociale s) system of the unions. obras
SOCiales insisted of the running of health facilities
which dispensed services such as in-patient and out-
patient care, dental and diagnostic care, and
pharmacies. Obras sociales also covered hotels, sports
camps, nurseries, old-peoples' homes, and cultural
benefits. The goods and services this produced
accounted for four percent of the gross national product
in 1976. The economic weight of controlling the social
welfare network accrued to labor much economic power
over the rank and file. The military took over
approximately ninety percent of the obras sociales and
installed military personnel as administrators over
1
3
these programs.
While the above-stated laws and decrees were all
enacted within the first year of military rule, the most
sweeping piece of anti-labor legislation, a new Law of
Professional Associations, was not passed for three
years. The Law of Professional Associations, which was
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first enacted during Peron's first regime, is the
premier set of principles delineating state-labor
relations. it set up the structure of all the groups
which "represent" labor, established a system of
judicial oversight of labor matters, and delimited the
power of the state over labor affairs. It was the
original Law of Professional Associations which
established the CGT as the only confederation
representing the labor movement and the system of
personeria gremial. it allowed only state- recogni zed
unions to have legal and representative status.
The enactment of such legislation made the labor
unions organizationally dependent on the government and
many labor leaders had fought against it when Per6n
instituted it. However, after Peron's demise,
successive military and civilian governments attempted
to de-institutionalize the labor movement by doing away
with the Law of Professional Associations and with the
CGT. This caused labor to rally around the CGT and to
argue for the continued legality of this law. The
existence of the CGT and the continued standing of the
Law of Professional Associations statutes have often
been the rallying points for labor in the past thirty
years. Perhaps this centrality of the Law of
Professional Associations for the labor movement caused
the military junta to keep its "reforms," all
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debilitatin 9 to iabor's power, from being enacte(J for
three years.
The "reforms" proposed by the junta oalled for
-
The permanent abolition of the CGT.
-
The prohibition of politioal aotivity on the part of
unions
.
-
The separation of pbras sociales from the unions.
-
The separation of categories of workers within one
union into separate unions (i.e., within one industry,
workers, technicians, and supervisors were often
represented within one union. The new rules would make
intra-industry unionization difficult.)
-
Those running for union office would have to have
clean slates — i.e., no police records, which in effect
meant no one engaged in prior strike activity would be
able to hold office in the union.
- Circumscribed the activity of unions to only the
region from which they came, thereby making it illegal,
for example, for unions in Cordoba to work with unions
in Buenos Aires.
- Modified the system of elections for union delegates
and leaders to effectively prohibit re-elections and to
keep leaders from interacting with the rank and file.
Once elected, leaders would have to answer to a
government agency.
- Encouraged the formation of many unions representing
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comparable types of workers so as to divide the
federative nature of the labor movement. Traditionally,
labor had a centralized system of representing workers,
whereby unions of workers engaged in the same or
comparable activity were grouped into one federation
from which collective bargaining could be done from a
position of strength.
Gave the state power to regulate union elections,
control funds, preside over judicial matters, and to
modify union statutes when it deemed necessary.
-
Allowed for meetings, assemblies, and congresses only
with the knowledge and consent of government
authorities, thereby making illegal any attempts to
organize independent union actions. 14
The military junta promulgated these reforms in the
name of cleaning up the entrenched corruption endemic in
the labor movement. Many non-military sympathizers
favored these reforms, most notably the editors of La
Nacion
,
the influential conservative Argentine
newspaper. True, the labor movement in 1976 suffered
corruption and misuse of power on the part of many who
benefited and profited from union leadership positions.
However, the military's overall goal was to depoliticize
and de-Per6nize the labor movement so as to create a
docile labor force in the economy. Attempts at
decentralization were aimed at destabilizing labor's
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political power and the curtailment of labor activity
was to prevent any opposition to the junta's economic
policies. it was hoped that by passage of such a
sweeping Law of Professional Associations, the labor
movement would finally be put in its place, that is,
removed from effective political participation. 15
The Preliminary Attempts at Labor Unity
While the military junta was busy jailing and
harassing the major labor leaders, other labor leaders
busied themselves with resurrecting or creating a new
agenda for the labor movement. In the period in
question, a group of labor leaders came into prominence,
who were to seek accommodation with the military junta
while at the same time attempting to appear in
opposition to the regime's policies. These leaders were
often heads of unions which were not intervened and
unions which historically had not had much political
clout within the labor movement. In the intervened
unions, there emerged leaders from among the lower-level
union delegates and internal commissions members. All
these new-found power wielders were courted by the
military junta, which to varying degrees was successful
at coopting them into acquiescence to its policies. 16
Labor leaders made various attempts in the first
months of the military regime to stem the tide of
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military repression by opening a dialogue with the
military intervenors. m April 1976, a group of uni
leaders made the first attempt at a union meeting at the
headquarters of the Federation of Sanitation. Their
goal was to set up a "Commission of Liaison" between the
government and labor to discuss labor issues. Colonel
Fabrizzi, the military intervenor of the CGT at the
time, declined to meet with this group and nothing ever
came of its initial meeting.
In August of that year, the "Commission of 10" was
formed which eventually became the "Commission of 12".
This group brought together a number of diverse union
leaders. There were two representatives from two of the
most important intervened unions, Metalworkers and Light
and Power; two representatives from the Group of Eight-
labor leaders who had attended the annual meeting in
June of the International Labor Organization in Geneva,
Switzerland; six members from the working groups of the
CGT; and two representatives from regional CGTs . The
aim of this group was to formulate a set of goals and
programs for the labor movement, and to hold a congress
for discussing which goals to adopt. Due to military
intimidation and internal disagreements, a congress was
not held, but this Commission of 12 continued to meet.
In September 1976, a group of representatives from
non-intervened unions joined together to form a
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delegation to meet with the temporary intervenor of the
CGT, Commandant Julio Cesar Porcille. This group which
later took the name "Commission of 25," appealed to
Porcille for a meeting to discuss the labor situation,
especially concerning the military's suspension of labor
activity. The existence of two commissions was
disquieting to enough leaders in several unions that
they attempted, through the Commission of 5 to unite the
Commissions of 12 and 21. The Commission of 5 consisted
of representatives from intervened and non-intervened
unions and was headed by Oscar Smith, head of the Light
and Power union. During September and October 1976,
this group attempted to hold a meeting to seek common
ground between the Commissions of 12 and 21, but due to
labor conflicts surrounding the Light and Power union,
discussions were terminated. November witnessed another
attempt at creating a dialogue with Commandant Porcille
by a group of union leaders calling themselves the
"Commission of 7." This group did succeed at procuring
an interview with Porcille, but he declined to hold a
meeting to discuss state-labor relations, citing that
the conditions were not appropriate for such a meeting.
The first nine months of military rule saw various
attempts at creating unity and dialogue among the
unions. It should be noted that these meetings were
held in spite of the overt repression taking place where
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union members were being fired, jailed, kidnapped, and
disappeared. m most instances, the desire for unity
was to create one voice in dealing with the government
and to reach agreement over what long-term relationship
would exist between the state and labor. This, of
course, required trade-offs and agreements. If the
various commissions had been successful at this time in
gaining an audience with the junta, they most assuredly
would have acquiesced to the military regimes' demands.
As it was, the junta being in a position of strength,
remained deaf to labor's pleas. 17
The Commi ssion of 25
It was not until March 1977 that there emerged the
first major coalition of labor union groups to which the
military junta eventually gave legal recognition as
representatives of the labor movement. A planned visit
by Otto Kersten, general secretary of the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, gave a group of
unions an excuse to organize a commission to greet him.
Secretary generals from eighteen non-intervened unions
and representatives from the CGT created the "Commission
of 25." The Commission of 25 like all other commissions
before it, was intent on revitalizing the political
activities of labor. To do so, it sought legal
recognition from the junta as a legitimate
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representative of labor. The military junta was not
happy with this group, but after the International Labor
Organization gave recognition to the 25, the junta felt
compelled to do so as well. 18
The Commission of 25 consisted of unions which were
members of the CGT and unions of secondary importance in
terms of historical influence within the labor movement.
Throughout its entire existence, there were many
cleavages and defections within its ranks. In its first
two years, there were five identifiable sectors within
the Commission. The first group were the
"Verticalists." These were supporters from the largest
group of hard-core Per6nist unions. The Verticalists
argued for a resurrection of a closed and hierarchical
labor leadership organization, as was the case under
Per6n's regimes. Power and policy emanated from the top
down and dissent from the lower ranks could not be
tolerated. These unions recognized the leadership of
Lorenzo Miguel, head of the Metalworkers union and of
the 62 Organizations.
The second group called itself the "ex-Combat ives .
"
They were a group of leaders who were also a faction of
the Peronist "62 Organizations" but in the late 1960s
had been members of the CGT of the Argentines (a group
that led the Cordoba rebellions which brought down the
government of General Ongania). A third group was the
169
"anti-Verticalists" or "Group of 6." These were ten
(sic) unions which had broken from the Peronist 62
Organizations in 1969
. They were very anti-Peronist and
collaborated with the military regime of General
Ongania
.
The fourth group were the "Independents". They were
non-Peronist and were former supporters of Augusto
Vandor. The last group were the "Participationists .
"
They were heirs to Vandor's strategy of collaborating
with the military regime under General Ongania. 19
Constant conflicts occurred among these groups and
leaders would change allegiances on a frequent basis.
Alliances were never permanent and each new week would
bring new configurations of who was a member of what
group. Old rivalries from the past continued to play
important roles in how labor leaders dealt with each
other. Other groups would arise to deal with a
particular crisis, but the groups would remain in
existence long after the crisis which engendered its
existence was resolved. Perhaps the major reason for
the intense factionalism lay in personal ambition.
Heading up a splinter group gave unionists opportunities
to climb up the movement ladder. Being leaders of this
or that faction would ensure press attention for their
views. This would open up opportunities for greater
influence
.
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Of course, not all the various factions were a result
of opportunistic maneuvering. Leaders had genuine
differences of opinion concerning how to deal with the
junta. out of the factionalism of the 25, new labor
coalitions formed which would rival the 25 for control
over labor. Before addressing other key groups though,
something needs to be said about the 25's general goals.
The goals or demands of the 25 centered around the
release of jailed unionists, the normalization of
intervened unions, the normalization of the CGT, the
renewed standing of the Law of Professional
Associations, and a host of other measures seeking to
regain labor's previous control over the workplace. 20
The Commission of 25, in most cases wanted to open up a
dialogue with the military junta, so their initial
demands did not call for a return to democracy nor did
it stress its concerns over the kidnappings and
disappearances taking place. Rather, it concentrated on
labor-specific issues such as salaries, collective-
bargaining, and normalization of the labor movement.
The group's dominance of the labor arena lasted until
mid-1978 when another group emerged to rival the 25's
powe r
.
2 ^
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The National Commission of Labor (CNT)
in April 1978, after two years of military rule, the
Ministry of Labor decided that the time was ripe for
improving relations with the labor movement, given that
most labor leaders had been "ideologically de-purified"
or, more accurately, no longer towed the Peronist line.
What the Ministry of Labor was attempting to do was to
prepare the stage for Argentine representation at the
annual June meeting of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and also to court those labor leaders
who appeared most willing to collaborate with the
22regime. Viewing this as a political opening, several
leaders, representing the most powerful intervened and
non-intervened unions, decided to form a separate labor
organization from the dominant Commission of 25. This
new organization was called the Commission of Effort and
Labor. The stated aims of the new Commission were to
improve the salary situation of workers, to appeal for
the normalization of the intervened unions, and to lobby
for the release of detained unionists. The group stated
that it would undertake such efforts without interfering
with the work of the Commission of 25. Although both
had similar stated goals, the Commission of Effort and
Labor viewed the Commission of 25 as too confrontational
and openly stated that it wished to be the "dialogue
wing" of the labor movement. It claimed that it would
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act in the "professional plane," which meant that its
concerns would be strictly labor-oriented, and it would
not interfere in politics. in other words, while the
Commission of 25 maintained some oppositional stance
toward the regime and left itself the prerogative of
making political statements, the Commission of Effort
and Labor was willing to play by the regime's rules. 23
The seeming rivalry between the Commission of Effort
and Labor and the Commission of 25 was disquieting to
several labor leaders who sought to unify both groups
into one coalition. However, attempts at unity failed
for in September 1978, the Commission of 25 itself
split. This is not surprising given the disparate
groups which made up this unstable alliance. The more
moderate faction of the 25— the Independents and anti-
Vert i cal i sts
,
decided to join the Commission of Effort
and Labor. The newly constituted group took the name
the "National Commission of Labor" (CNT). The remaining
groups in the Commission of 25 continued to agitate for
changes in regime policy, and its criticisms of the
regime became more strident. The new CNT utilized the
strategy of collaborating with the government and
confined itself to issues strictly related to labor.
This group openly rejected the Commission of 25's
monopoly over labor representation while at the same
24time claiming to work for the same goals.
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The existence of the CNT was at first disconcerting
to the military junta. it attempted to discourage the
group from forming, mainly through jailing several of
its leaders for a brief time. However, 1978 was a good
year for the junta as it perceived itself as winning the
war against subversion. Despite being criticized by
certain international organizations and the United
States over human rights violations, Argentina's hosting
of the World Cup Soccer Championship games and its
subsequent win of the title enabled the junta and
Argentina to forget about its economic and political
troubles for a while. Besides, having two separate
groups claiming to represent labor would enable the
junta to play one group off the other, thereby ensuring
the labor movement's continued weakness in fostering
real, significant opposition to the regime. 25
The Importance of the International Labor Arena
The strategies pursued by the Commission of 25 in
1977 and 1978 involved attempts to lobby the regime
toward restoring labor's pre-1976 power and influence.
When the CNT was founded in 1978, it openly espoused the
need to promote a dialogue with the powers that be.
Much time was spent on making public declarations
concerning the state of labor and the economy. Much
more time was spent on these two groups of union leaders
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negotiating with each other in attempts to arrive at
consensus over goals and strategies. However, unity
between the two groups was not to be achieved until 1983
when military rule finally came to an end. 26
Of primary importance to labor during 1977 and 1978
was the recognition of the international labor
organizations, specifically that of the ILO and the
international Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Given
that effective action was impossible at home due to
military repression, labor leaders sought contact with
the international labor arena to air their concerns and
criticisms of the domestic labor situation. They felt
that their demands would carry greater weight with the
regime if they had the support of the principal
international organizations of labor. So too, they
viewed the forums of these international organizations
as "safe" situations for criticizing government
policies, and there they promoted themselves as opposed
to the military regime, regardless of whether they were
or not. This appearance of opposition to the regime
enabled many of them to maintain their credibility in
the eyes of the rank and file. It also provided them
with opportunities to form strategy and plan without the
fear of reprisals. 27
The yearly meetings of the ILO were particularly
fertile ground for the type of politicking described
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above. For its annual June meetings in Geneva,
Switzerland, the ILO requires each nation to send a
delegation representing three sectors of society:
representatives of the government, of the labor movement
or principal national labor organizations, and the
entrepreneurial sector. it is assumed that the labor
representatives will be elected from among the ranks of
labor, rather than be appointed by the government.
These requirements proved problematic to the junta. In
many ways their thinking was similar to that of the
labor leaders: the military junta viewed the forum of
the ILO as important to fostering Argentina's
international image. Despite worldwide condemnation for
its repressive policies, the junta always attempted to
make the ILO meetings a showcase for its membership in
the civilized western world. As elsewhere, it sought to
reaffirm its ties to the capitalist, industrialized
West. It also sought to win friends abroad but, of
course, failed.
In 1976, the government and labor delegations to the
ILO meeting did not clash in any way, nor did the ILO
make any statements concerning Argentina. The Argentine
minister of labor made a presentation concerning the
need for foreign investment to generate greater
employment, and the labor delegation made a mild
statement concerning the desire to see the normalization
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of the labor movement. Both groups were very cordial;
the meeting went well and without incident. Upon
returning f r0m Geneva, the labor delegation began
negotiations to form a representative labor body. It
was these discussions which eventually led to the
formation of the Commission of 25 in 1977.
The year 1977 proved markedly different from 1976.
The Commission of 25 had been formed in March and the
regime was further entrenched in power. The labor
situation wasn't improving; rather it was getting worse
and attempts by labor to gain an audience with the junta
fell on deaf ears. Preparations by the government to
form a delegation to the ILO meeting were attempted.
Labor reneged on appointing representatives to the
meeting and a delegation from Argentina therefore did
not attend. The minister of labor had attempted to
dictate to the labor leadership how it should select
delegates to the ILO meeting, but labor was unwilling to
go along and so refused to appoint representatives. 28
The year 1978 saw competition between the Commission
of 25 and the Commission of Effort and Labor over
sending delegates to the ILO meeting. By this time the
Commission of 25 had received recognition from the ILO
as the official legitimate representative of the
Argentine labor movement. Despite the protests of the
Commission of Effort and Labor, the 25 succeeded in
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gaining control of the delegation to the ILO.
Argentina was represented at the 1978 meeting by this
delegation along with the minister of labor. Members of
the labor delegation made several critical presentations
concerning the Argentine situation. Criticism was
levelled at the economy, which was causing the loss of
jobs and the decreased purchasing power of workers'
salaries; at the laws in force prohibiting labor
activity; and over the status of jailed unionists.
Critical statements by the labor delegation embarrassed
the minister of labor. In its annual report, the ILO
cited Argentina for violations in the labor sphere. All
this was important in affirming the legitimacy of the
Commission of 25 as speaking for the movement. Also,
this international recognition made the Commission less
vulnerable to repression by the government at home. 29
Argentine labor activism in international labor
organizations was not new to the labor movement in the
late 1970s. Since the 1960s, Argentina had always
participated in the ILO, and several labor leaders held
key positions on its committees. It was during periods
of government repression, though, that membership took
on added significance in that it provided the movement
with a forum to voice its criticisms and to gain
international support. The only means of gaining
attention from the military junta during 1977 and 1978
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was when the junta began to look into forming a
delegation to the June ILO meetings. it was the period
between April and June of each year which saw greater
activity between the junta and the labor movement, as
each group attempted to gain political leverage over the
other. The domestic battles were then played out in
Geneva, with labor attaining the upper hand. This,
along with periodic visits by labor delegations from
other international labor organizations-all of which
condemned the repressive policies of the junta-gave the
labor leadership a certain degree of power and
legitimacy within a climate of repression.
Strike Activity 1976-78
It would stand to reason that during this most brutal
period of repression against labor, there would have
been a paucity of strikes in both the public and private
sectors. Yet, there were several significant strikes
during these (almost) three years, always undertaken in
a climate of fear and threatened violence. The first
labor conflicts under the military regime occurred in
September 1976. In that month, strikes took place at
the General Motors, Ford, Fiat, Peugeot, and Chrysler
plants in Greater Buenos Aires province. The issue
concerned salaries, and the situation was aggravated by
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management's harassment of the shop-floor union
representatives. General Liendo, the minister of labor,
attempted to resolve the crisis by going to the General
Motors plant to hear their concerns from the union
representatives themselves. This action was preceded by
the installment of armed officers in the factories, so
that discussions were held basically at gunpoint. The
conflict was resolved through jailing the protagonists
of the strike and the threatened use of force against
others. 30
A more serious labor conflict took place in October
1976, lasting until February 1977. In October, the
military undertook a review of the legislation
concerning the handling of collective bargaining
agreements with unions representing public utilities.
It made several changes which effected working hours,
ability to negotiate over wages, working conditions, and
vacations. In response to proposed government policies,
the Light and Power union, headed by Oscar Smith, a
hard-line Per6nist, decided to mobilize against the
changes. Workers undertook a series of work stoppages
which seriously effected the prevision of electricity to
the population of Buenos Aires. The electric company,
SEGBA, whose head was a military admiral, reacted by
dismissing the leaders of the union, among them Oscar
Smith, and threatening physical retaliation against the
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striking workers. This only served to aggravate the
situation. The military junta, rather than the minister
of labor, made a public statement intimating its
willingness to use force to end the conflict. it also
accused Light and Power of being infiltrated by
subversives. Fifteen days after the start of the
conflict, electricity was returned to almost normal
levels, although no concessions were won by the union.
It instead had succeeded in making the government enter
into discussions and negotiations over collective
bargaining issues. The rest of the year witnessed
periodic slow-downs and stoppages by Light and Power
3
1
workers
.
Despite negotiations, in December the junta enacted
Law 21576 which put into effect revisions in collective
bargaining procedures. January witnessed a renewed
outbreak of labor stoppages not only by Light and Power
but by other public utilities (such as Water and Energy)
as well. Conflicts also occurred in cities other than
Buenos Aires including Rosario, Cordoba, and Corrientes.
Thousands of workers took to the streets on January 26,
1977, to voice their dissatisfaction over the labor
situation; energy outages became common. The state
responded by dismissing labor "agitators," jailing
others, "disappearing" a few of the more radical union
representatives, and sending police troops into the
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plants to force workers back on the job. 32
The solution to the conflict was formulated by Oscar
Smith at the beginning of February 1977. However, his
disappearance several days later made the immediate
solution to the conflict insignificant as all sides were
shocked at his kidnapping. Labor union leaders demanded
a full investigation of the affair and called for
Smith's release from captivity. The government claimed
it knew nothing of his whereabouts. What is known was
that on the early morning of February 11th, Smith's car
was intercepted by two green Ford Falcons driven by non-
descript men and that Smith was whisked away in one of
the Fords.
The disappearance of Smith was not the first
disappearance of a labor leader, but it was the first
one of a major leader of a major union during the
military regime. Because the Light and Power union is
one of the most powerful unions in Argentina, its
leaders carry great political clout in the labor
movement. The state had historically not harassed Light
and Power's leaders as much as leaders of less important
unions or shop-floor labor representatives, mainly
because major labor leaders have been more willing to
negotiate than agitate. Because of this, it is not
clear whether the state ordered the disappearance of
Smith, especially since he had succeeded in ameliorating
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the labor conflict. Evidence does point to the security
forces as having played some role, considering the cars
which intercepted Smith were Ford Falcons, a trademark
of the junta's security forces. Whoever is to blame
(and to this day, Smith's disappearance has not been
explained), his disappearance became a cause celebre for
the labor movement and made him a martyr representing
the sufferings of labor under the military junta.
The rest of 1977 was punctuated by a series of "shows
of force" by telephone workers, railroad workers, and
petrochemical workers. This involved work stoppages
which caused inconveniences in the provision of
services. The government's response was to utilize two
strategies: threatening to use force against the workers
supplemented by detentions and jailings, and maintaining
a dialogue with the unions in question to give the
appearance of real concern over the labor situation.
The concerns of these unions revolved around the
reformed collective bargaining agreements and the salary
situation. Minister of the Economy Martinez de Hoz
refused to negotiate changes but Minister of Labor
Liendo took a much more flexible stand. By the end of
1977, a genuine reappraisal was begun over the salary
situation of public sector employees. Negotiations
continued into 1978 as some genuine dialogue between
labor and the Ministry of Labor seemed to take hold 34
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In 1978, more strike activity occurred within private
sector industry than in the public sector. The
recession was accompanied by more layoffs and
dismissals, and the worsening salary situation caused
strikes in the mechanics, textiles, and garment
industries, among others. All these strikes centered
around specific labor issues, such as wages and
conditions in the workplace, and were pretty much
limited to the specific unions in question. Strikes
during 1978 did not cause the political problems those
in the public sector had the year before.
Public sector strikes of significance were held by
the railroad workers union over dissatisfaction with
wage increases. In March, the railroad workers
promulgated work stoppages, which effectively disrupted
rail service in Greater Buenos Aires. An all-out strike
was attempted, but the promoters of the strike were
jailed and no strike occurred. In December 1978 the
railroad workers union threatened another strike. This
was a critical time for the junta for it was engaged in
a dispute with Chile over rights to the Beagle Channel
Islands. Tensions had reached a high point and
Argentina was preparing to mobilize military forces in
the south. The running of the railroads would be
critical to this venture. After negotiations between
the government and labor leaders, the union decided not
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to strike and impede the Beagle channel dispute, mainly
out of fear of appearing unpatriotic to the Argentine
cause .
35
In all, the strikes of 1976, 1977, and 1978 which
occurred among rank and file revolved around labor
specific issues and were not designed to criticize the
legitimacy of the ruling military junta. Yet, these
strikes were problematic for the regime, because their
very existence pointed to a lack of consensus by the
working class over the regime's economic policies. The
very fact that many rank and file union members were
willing to risk their jobs, and many their lives, by
striking over labor issues illustrates the inherent
destabilizing power of the labor movement sector of
society. The critical underpinnings of the Argentine
junta were to maintain law and order and to oversee the
recovery of the economy. These critical goals were
undermined every time there was a strike called,
regardless of whether or not the strike leaders had as
one of their motives to criticize the regime as their
legitimate governors. While the strikes were resolved
more or less to the regime's benefit, they nevertheless
hindered the regime from enacting all of its economic
and social policies with impunity. No other sector of
Argentine society during this period put forth any
public show of disapproval to the regime's policies.
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An Assessment of the First Three Years
The period from March 1976 through 1978 saw a
concerted attack by the military junta against the
political and economic power of the labor movement.
Through the use of repression, threatened violence, and
legal statutes, the junta effectively stripped the labor
movement of a central base from which to protest state
policies. The jailing of the most important labor
leaders effectively removed any initial opposition to
the regime. The kidnapping and disappearance of other
labor leaders and unionists served notice to many others
that the junta was willing to use all means to liquidate
dissension. The derogation of labor laws replaced by
the enactment of proscriptive labor legislation served
to make legal the de-politicization of the labor
movement as a whole.
The very harshness with which the military junta
acted against labor illustrates one of the
characteristics of the O'Donnell paradigm of
bureaucratic-authoritarianism. The system imposed in
1976 was one of "exclusionary bureaucratic-
authoritarianism," i.e., it required such harsh measures
because it was dealing with a sector of society that was
highly organized and politicized. Along with the
perceived threat to society posed by urban terrorists,
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the regime opted to use extreme force for it was
attempting to de-politicize already politicized
sectors of society.
The reactions of the labor movement to the regime's
repressive policies were twofold. On the one hand,
certain sectors of the labor movement attempted to
negotiate and accommodate labor to the new regime. On
the other hand, the persistence of strikes over these
almost three years posed constant worries to the regime
and inherently effected its legitimacy as governor. The
overall impact of these three years, however, was
labor's preoccupation with reconstituting itself and
redefining its goals as a movement.
The labor leaders who owed their power to the regime
were undoubtedly more accommodating to the regime than
others. Generally, leaders of non-intervened unions,
leaders from unions outside of Buenos Aires, and labor
activists who had been marginalized from the previous
Peronist regime, were anxious to open a dialogue with
the regime. These unions made up the initial nucleus of
the Commission of 25 when it was formed in 1977. The
other major nucleus of the Commission of 25 consisted of
small unions which, historically, had not been powerful
within the labor movement, labor activists allied to the
last Peronist regime, and a number of radical labor
groups. With the eventual release of the major labor
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leaders, there is growing divergence within the
Commission of 25 over who should determine policy
di rection
.
The formation of the CNT in 1978 represented a major
schism which was to divide the labor movement until
1983. The CNT represented almost exclusively those
unions which were not intervened. A sector of the
Commission of 25 joined CNT, and by the end of 1978, the
25 found itself in crisis. During 1978, both the CNT
and the Commission of 25 espoused the same goals, but
they each claimed to represent different strategies in
reaching these goals. The Commission of 25 claimed it
was working toward a dialogue with the regime, but it
reserved for itself the prerogative of making political
statements. The CNT claimed to want nothing but a
dialogue with the regime over questions in the labor
sphere. In actuality, both groups during this time
eschewed political statements for the climate then
existent in Argentina precluded any real dissension
against the regime. Rather, in a climate of
powerlessness
, the labor movement was reduced to
internal infighting, often encouraged by the regime
itself.
One exception to the collaborationist tone put forth
by labor was in the annual meetings of the ILO. The
critical statements made by the labor delegation in 1978
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illustrated the fact that labor was not wholeheartedly
endorsing the regime. Rather, the labor leadership used
these meetings to attempt to wrest concessions from the
regime and to give notice that it was not working hand
in glove with it. So too, the labor leadership was
seeking to show the rank and file that it was fighting
for labor's interests.
For its part, the rank and file continued to strike
over labor-specific issues, but this did not at the time
serve to seriously undermine the regime. However, the
very existence of labor strikes during this period was
another illustration of how the regime was not totally
successful at imposing its will over labor. In order to
end most of the strikes, it threatened force and in many
cases actually used force, thereby laying bare its
inherently violent nature.
In summary, the first three years of its rule saw the
military successful at preventing significant opposition
from the labor movement. The ferocity of the repression
against labor precluded any dissension from its
leadership. Yet the ensuing three years saw the labor
leadership factionalized over what to do. Throughout
this period, there existed an undercurrent of criticism
against regime policy, although not against the
legitimacy of the regime itself. By the end of 1978,
the regime seemed to be fully in control.
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CHAPTER V
LABOR COMES OF AGE
1979-1983
Th e Political and Economic Setting, 1979-1983
At the beginning of 1979, the Videla regime appeared
to be winning its war against subversion. The
repression had succeeded in attaining law and order, but
to many outsiders, Argentina had gone beyond the brink
of no return, spiraling toward self-destruction. The
junta, after three years, seemed satisfied with the
state of affairs, and with the economic policies of
Martinez de Hoz still taking shape, in general little
dissension occurred among the military. However, the
complacency of 1979 quickly disappeared as the year 1980
began with the collapse of Argentina's most important
banks. This most dramatic failure of a part of Martinez
de Hoz's economic policies fostered public disagreements
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ove r
between factions of the military over the course of
Argentina's economic future. Fo r the first time, the
heads of the navy and the air force voiced concern
the economic situation. As capital began to flow out of
Argentina once again, Martinez de Hoz and his staff were
called on the carpet more than once to explain their
strategies to the armed forces. Despite this downturn
in the economy and despite mounting disagreements from
factions of the military over Martinez de Hoz's
strategies, General videla stood firm in supporting his
minister of the economy. 1
However, the worsening economic situation complicated
Videla's plan for an orderly transition of power. in
1976, Videla had agreed to serve for only a four-year
term and in mid-1980, he sought his successor. Martinez
de Hoz tried to get Videla to extend his tenure so that
he could continue his economic policies. Videla
declined and chose his long-time friend and colleague
General Roberto Viola to succeed him. viola was not the
clear-cut choice of the armed forces. The navy was very
much against him because they worried about his
intentions to pursue a greater political and economic
opening. However, the army and air force were behind
Viola so Videla's will prevailed. On March 29, 1981,
Viola assumed the presidency, but right away opposition
surfaced against his policies. 2
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The program set forth by viola in his first public
statements appeared to open up the possibility of an
eventual return to civilian rule. Among his proposals
were to create a dialogue with the opposition and the
gradual normalization of certain groups such as unions
and political parties. indeed, the Viola regime was
marked by a decline in the kidnappings and
disappearances which had characterized Videla's regime.
As for the economic program of Martinez de Hoz, Viola
was dubious of his measures to shore up the economic
situation and refused to lend support to Martinez de
Hoz's more drastic measures. 3
The political opening hinted at by Viola had several
consequences. it mobilized certain factions of the
military, who were suspicious of Viola's "democratic"
posture to begin plotting for his overthrow.
Disagreements within the junta became public with
General Leopoldo Galtieri taking a lead role in
undermining Viola's authority. Galtieri made public
statements concerning the regime without even consulting
Viola. The apparent schisms within the junta enabled
opposition groups to speak more vocally against the
regime. The labor movement leadership became
increasingly more militant during this period and the
major political parties formed a coalition called the
Mul tipartidaria and began to lobby for a return to
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democracy. 4
The emergence of a multiparty coalition on the
political scene was quite disturbing to many of the
hardliners in the regime who felt the "political
opening" advocated by viola was at best premature and at
worst antithetical to the regime's interests. Given
that Viola's power was shaky to begin with, it took
little for Galtieri to depose him in December 1981, less
than nine months after Viola came to power. Once again,
Argentina had failed to provide for an orderly transfer
tr
of power.
Galtieri inherited a f ac t i onal i zed military and
continuing economic problems. While he made references
to a return to democracy at some point, he was really
interested in having himself "elected" to the office of
the presidency. As a result of this, he pursued erratic
policies which alienated him from many within the
military. Galtieri began to court sectors of the
civilian population such as Peronists and political
party leaders, and he purportedly met secretly with
several Peronists to gain their support for his
continued rule in return for a relaxation of union
restrictions. It quickly became clear among those who
had supported him that he was seeking his own personal
gain above that of preserving the political hegemony of
the military. Dissension among the military ranks grew,
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which encouraged civilian groups ^ ^ ^ ^
•"lMt ^ The— on Galt ieri chose was to
«.t«ct the nation from its poUtical wQes fay going ^
war
.
The Malvinas/Falklands war succeeded in unifying all
sectors of the population in support of the military,
albeit for a brief time. Censorship of the press by
government authorities made it appear that Argentina was
actually winning. The opposite, of course, was true.
The fact was the war was mismanaged from the start. To
initiate a conflict in the South Atlantic at the
beginning of winter was an error; to send eighteen-year-
old conscripts (Argentina requires two years of military
service from all males, starting at age eighteen)
without adequate training, supplies, or clothing was
abominable; and to send battalions into battle without
commanding officers was unconscionable. Rather than
being a shining victory for the armed forces, the
Malvinas/Falklands fiasco laid bare the corrupt and
inept nature of the Argentine military. That the
military failed at its premier function, its reason for
being, was a fault no Argentine could forgive. When it
finally had to be made known to the public in June 1982
that Argentina had been defeated, the popular reaction
was swift and violent. 7
Galtieri was quickly replaced and General Reynaldo
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B^none put in power for the purpose of preparing
Argentina for elections. The initial date was set for
1984 but as popular dissension became more vocal and
younger officers voiced their desire to hasten the
transition, the date was moved up to December 1983 and
finally up to October 30, 1983.
While military bickering undermined the power of the
regime, the economy was going from bad to worse. The
liberal economic program of Martinez de Hoz produced
drastic consequences for Argentine society. Short-term
modest successes led to long-term disasters in regard to
inflation, production, deficits, and the standard of
living of most Argentines. In an effort to quell
inflation, Martinez de Hoz instituted a plan called the
"tablita" whereby he allowed the devaluation rate of the
peso to trail behind the domestic rate of inflation.
His theory was to attract cheap imports due to an
overvalued currency and eventually to "induce
convergence" between domestic and international prices.
He also maintained free interest rates. Neither policy
worked to stem the tide of inflation. what occurred was
the basic deindustrialization of the Argentine economy.
The attraction of cheap imports drove much Argentine
industry out of business. The free-floating interest
rates encouraged speculation of all kinds, bringing ruin
to Argentina's financial sector. The overvalued peso
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enabled hordes of Argentina's mi ddle classes to g o
abroad, as suddenly, the dollar was cheap compared to
the peso. 8
inflation reached over 200% in 1982, the Gross
Domestic Product declined by 12% between 1980 and 1983,
and industrial production fell 25% between 1976 and
1980. Average salaries between 1975 and 1978 were
reduced in real terms by half. The downturn in
industrial production resulted in massive dismissals of
workers. The hardest hit was manufacturing whose share
of Gross Domestic Product shrank from 38.1% in 1974 to
35% by 1979. Production in textiles contracted by 50%.
Many small and medium firms went out of business. 9
Despite the worsening economic situation and despite
the growing dissension by civilian groups (even
agriculturalists were unhappy with the economy),
Martinez de Hoz pursued his course. in 1980, he
attempted without success to convince Videla to remain
in power so as to continue the economic program. By
then, Videla was beset by discontent within the military
over Martinez de Hoz's policies and so he followed
through on handing over the reigns of power to Viola.
Martinez de Hoz was replaced by the end of 1981 but the
following two years proved to be no better for the
Argentine economy. The Malvinas/Falklands War and the
subsequent elections gained center stage as inflation
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proceeded to spiral out of control once again. *°
^^jiu^taj^
The year 1979 witnessed the first strike action by a
leading faction of the labor movement leadership. Owing
to the worsening salary situation and to the imminent
passage of the new Law of Professional Associations,
labor militancy against the regime made its first
appearance since the start of military rule.
At the beginning of January, the government released
its plans for wage increases in which over an eight
month period there would be fixed monthly adjustments of
4%. The wage increase for employees in the public
sector would be fixed at 40%. Almost immediately, the
two leading factions of the labor movement, the
Commission of 25 and the CNT issued statements
denouncing the government's salary policy. The CNT
issued a statement saying that such an economic policy
was leading "inexorably" to a confrontation among the
Argentines. The Commission of 25 issued a statement
calling for a state of emergency on the part of all
sectors of labor in regard to the economic situation. A
few days into February, the government released a report
on the cost of living index which showed a rise of 12.8%
for the month of January. This news was not received
well by labor, and both the CNT and the Commission of 25
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.en
.ons
calculated that the buylng power Qf workers ^ ^
^ 8.8% in one month alone
_ Demands ^^^^^
the salary increases became yocai
_ ^^^^^ ^the Commission of 25 which becoming ^
its criticism of the regime. 11
Two other events in Feb ruary serve(J fc<) ^
mcreasingly tense labo r situation, one was the release
of Lorenzo Miguel
,
head of the 62 Organizations and
displaced reader of the Metalworkers union, from prison
tc house arrest, and the other was a change in the
Minister of labor with General Liendo leaving to be
replaced by a General Reston. The release of Lorenzo
"iguel, the most powerful and influential of Peronist
labor leaders, enabled him to start recouping his power
after almost four years in jail. He would attempt to
reign in the various factions of the labor movement
under a Perinist banner. 12
The departure of General Liendo from the Ministry of
Labor signified a hardening stance on the part of the
regime toward labor. As will be recalled from chapter
4, General Liendo had pursued a more moderate line with
labor throughout his tenure as labor minister. in his
dealings with Economics Minister Martinez de Hoz, Liendo
usually lobbied for greater wage increases and for
liberalizing some restrictions on labor activity. in
his last meeting with leaders of the Commission of 25
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-ving toward normalization of the labor movement and
for a reinitiation of labor activity. His successor
thought otherwise. General Reston began his tenure by
declaring that the government would in no way modify its
salary policy. Both the Commission of 25 and the CNT
continued to call for adjustments to salary increases. 13
in March 1979, the government decided to enact the
new Law of Professional Associations, which the labor
movement had lobbied hard against for the past three
years. Recall that this new law, f irst proposed in
1976, called for the abolition of the CGT
, prohibition
of union activism in political matters, and the
proscription of labor control over internal economic and
organizational matters. Final passage would not take
place until November 1979. The CNT reacted to this news
by seeking audiences with the heads of the navy and air
force. They hoped that they could convince the navy and
air force to appeal to the army-dominated regime for
modifications in the law. This effort failed. 14
On the 27th of March, the CNT and Commission of 25
held a meeting in which "programmatic unity" was reached
by various members of both groups. At this meeting,
both groups established a list of concerns each had in
common: salary situation, union freedom, freedom for
detained unionists, investigation of the disappeared
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unionists, and the defense o£
interests. Negotiations followed with the ostensible
goal of fostering unity between the two groups, but
after several days, negotiations were broken off by the
emission of 25 over what they viewed to be the lack of
"positive results" offered by the CNT. 15
The Commission of 25 deoided to call a general strike
for April 27, the first political strike oalled by the
labor movement leadership sinoe the advent of military
rule in March 1976. The strike called "The Journey of
Protest" was called to seek the following:
1. Salary increases to keep pace with cost of living
increases
.
2. Opposition to reform of the old Law of Professional
Associations
.
3. Opposition to the newly enacted repressive labor
legislation
.
4. Normalization of union activity.
5. Liberty for detained unionists.
6. Expediency in investigating the cases of disappeared
unioni sts
.
7. Defense of the economy, production, and national
industry
.
From the very start, plans in preparation for the
strike were beset by serious obstacles. The CNT opted
not to participate in the strike on the grounds that the
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decision to strike was taken unilaterally by the
Mission of 25, out it stated support for the
Mission of 25
-s demand s. The most serious obstacle
ca,ne from the military authorities who were not disposed
to any forn, of public protest at that time. Their
solution was to Jail all the principal leaders of the
strike several days before the strike was to occur.
Liberty for the detained leaders was not gained until
July of that year and in the case of six leaders, not
until March of the following year. 17
On the day of the strike, activity appeared normal in
downtown Buenos Aires and other cities, where the
effects of the strike were most noticeable were in the
industrial sectors just outside of Buenos Aires. There,
industrial activity was almost at a standstill. So too,
railroad service in Buenos Aires was severely limited as
the railworkers' union adhered to the strike call
despite the jailing of many union leaders and despite
the illegality of the strike. The military-censored
press played down the strike and portrayed life as
normal in Buenos Aires. Several reports from foreign
presses, in Mexico and Spain tor instance saw the strike
as the first significant display of opposition to the
1
8
regime. in hindsight, union leaders from the
Commission of 25 viewed the strike with mixed feelings.
On the one hand, the turnout was small and the strike
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«« not succeed at paralyzing the economic ^
tne nation, on the other hand
, the strike was , cleaf _
cut states that labor was unhappy wlth the economic
situation and that protest would continue despite
threats of military reprisal. 19
in great numbers for the stride. The fact that the CNT
-ne ged on participating in the strike and the detention
of the strike's planners can be attributed in large part
to this lack of response. However, despite these
obstacles, the strike did occur and did have some
noticeable impact on daily routine in Buenos Aires. The
most important aspect of this strike was that it was the
first political action taken by a sector of the labor
movement leadership in three years of military rule.
The years of attempting to achieve a dialogue with the
military regime over salaries and labor legislation
proved unsuccessful as the events of early 1979 showed
the economic and political situation to be getting worse
rather than better. The decision to call a strike was
all the more daring because in 1979 the power of videla
and Martinez de Hoz appeared stable and secure. No
other sector of Argentine society up till then had
voiced opposition to the regime. The strike of April
27, 1979, was a watershed in Argentine labor history,
taking place as the political situation began to unravel
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•albeit slowly at this point)/and ^ iabQc ^
began to take more militant stands.
^°iiMnuin3_ImEo^^
Arena
As it had in the three years prior to 1979, in 1979
through 1982 the annual June meeting of the
international Labor Organization enabled labor to voice
criticism of the regime in an international setting
without fear of reprisals by the military authorities.
Far away from Argentina, labor leaders could condemn the
iabor situation in their country and appear to be in the
vanguard of the opposition. This strategy helped the*,
to make friends abroad and demonstrated to the rank and
file that the leadership was truly working for its
interests. The situation in 1979 and subsequent years
was a bit different in that the existence of two rival
groups jockeying for control of the labor movement made
preparations for the ILO meetings all the more heated.
On the heels of the April 27th strike, preparations
were begun to form a delegation to the ILO meeting in
Geneva, within the Commission of 25, disagreement arose
over whether or not to attend the meeting. Members from
the Verticalist faction of the 25 argued that labor
should refuse to send a delegation as protest over the
labor leaders still in jail for the April 27th strike.
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The other groups of the 25n disagreed, and after some
negotiations with the CNT a a i«i , delegation was chosen to
attend the June meetlng with jQrge ^ ^ ^CNT being appointed the leader of ^ 2fl
-Y- before the group's departure
, Minister q£^
Reston, announced that he would not be attending the
-eting. IB his stead would go ^^^^ Genecai
Daher. Reston . s stated reasons Eor not attending
the many matters he had to attend to at home, but the
real reason was to avoid being criticized by the ILO for
labor violations. m early Hay
, the IL0 had named
Argentina as one of twenty-three countries in violation
of labor rights and Reston knew he would be criticized
at the meeting. To offset this criticism, he decided
not to appear, thereby marginalizing the importance of
the conference to the regime. 21
in a speech delivered before the ILO, Jorge Triaca
issued a stinging criticism against the Argentine
regime's economic policies. He used the term "economic
terrorism" to describe the regime's policies in
destroying the fabric of the labor movement, and he
constantly brought up the names of disappeared labor
leaders to illustrate the severe repression the labor
movement had suffered under the military regime. 22
The harshness of Triaca's words resonated back to
Buenos Aires where General Reston was attempting to
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minlmiZe
^ imP°— •« the IM
.eetina. General
"*•»«. as representative of the government, mad e no
to Triaca . s speech but ^ retucn ^ Buenos
Aires, he remarked that Trisn, su*ac
^ did not represent the
majority feeling of workers. 23
in 1980, the Commission of 25 and the CNT again
fought over representation to the ILO meeting,
initially, the Commission of 25 stated it would not be
attending; the CNT formed a delegation, again to be
headed by Jorge Triaca. Several weeks before the
meeting, the government decided not to send the usual
tripartite delegation; because, it claimed, the labor
delegation only represented one faction of the labor
movement. The real reason for not sending an official
delegation was the government's fear of another stinging
rebuke for labor's rights violations. Despite the fact
that the government would not be represented at the
meeting, the CNT decided to go to Geneva. At the last
minute, the Commission of 25 also decided to send a
delegation so that two contending groups of labor
delegates appeared in Geneva. Again as in the previous
year, Triaca delivered a stinging critique of
government policies toward labor. other labor leaders
called for sanctions against the Argentine government
for violation of labor rights. The government was so
incensed over the situation that it seriously considered
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Pulling out of membership in the ILO. 24
m 1981, the government formed a labor delegation to
the ilo meeting (made up solely of members of the CNT
)
and the Commission of 25 (now using the name General
Confederation of Labor) sent its own group of delegates
Thxs meeting was not as tumultuous as by then General
Viola had come to power and there was respite from the
repression of the Videla era. The year 1982 was
different as Argentina was engaged in the
Malvinas/Falklands conflict against Great Britain, and
the ILO convention witnessed several skirmishes between
the Argentines and the British and U.S. delegations.
The main item of this meeting was the Argentine labor
delegation's calling for support of Argentina's claims
to the Malvinas. in both 1981 and 1982, the two rival
labor factions were less harsh in their criticisms of
the government. However, this is in direct contrast to
their actions at home. By 1982 they had become more
vocal against the regime's policies. 25
The years 1979-1982 once again showed how labor used
the international labor setting to serve its goals vis a
vis the standing regime. As 1979 and 1980 were years of
continued repression by the Videla regime, and as
Martinez de Hoz's policies were making the labor
situation increasingly worse, labor leaders found it
necessary to criticize the regime, at least from outside
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the county so as t0 app
_ as £f ^ ^
S0Mthi
"'
ab°Ut the
-""tic. The brief poatieal
°Peni„g proffered by fch,^^ ^ ^ ^ ^
»alvinas/Fal kl ands conflict in 1982 made labor appear
less critical o£ the regime. In all these cases
_ ^
politicking at the IL0 meetings was geared toward
domestic consumption to win the hearts and minds o£
labor rank and file. This was particularly i mpo rtant at
the time as the labor movement was divided into two
contending factions.
^-J^!i^d_Attejrip^^
Meetings of the ILO witnessed repeated negotiations
between labor leaders concerning strategies to deal with
the situation at home. m 1979, Commission of 25 and
CNT leaders held negotiations to bring about the
unification of the two rival sectors of the labor
movement. The imminent passage of the new Law of
Professional Associations made negotiations all the more
urgent as the year wore on. Also, the re-emergence of
Lorenzo Miguel, who was a persistent advocate of
unification, prodded both groups into finding common
ground
.
On September 11, 1979, the CNT and the Verticalist
and Orthodox factions of the Commission of 25 agreed to
form the "Unified Drive for Argentine Workers" (CUTA).
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However, as with every other labor coalition, each group
» this alliance retained their separate identities
(e.g., the CNT remained the CNT although it had agreed
to be a part of CUTA)
. The other factions of the
Commission of 25 -the Participationists
, the
independents, and the Group of 8-decided to form their
own separate coalition. They took the name "Commission
of 20" and argued that the newly formed CUTA represented
"pernicious extremes" of suicidal sindicalism and
"domesticated and complacent" sindicalism. what the
Commission of 20 claimed to represent was a middle way
in finding solutions to labor problems. 26
The first activity undertaken by CUTA was to gain an
audience with the Organization of American States'
Commission on Human Rights which was in Argentina
investigating alleged violations. In its meeting, the
CUTA representatives stated their concerns over the fate
of detained and disappeared unionists and the economic
situation. in a document published a little later
(October 1979), CUTA stated its aims to be:
1. The immediate relaxation of military control over
intervened unions.
2. The immediate release of detained unionists.
3. An investigation into the cases of the disappeared.
4. The derogation of the proposed new Law of
Professional Associations which was about to be passed.
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With respect to the latter
, CUTA argued ^ ^ _ ^
°f Professional Associations would
-.to-l... the labor
m0V6ment W°Uld ^ 1 "e achievements it had made in
labor rights. I£ passed
, CUTft warned; there wouid ^
confrontations with the government. 27
On November 16 i q 7 q +.v„
°' y 9
'
the new Law of Professional
Associations was passed. CUTA issued a condemnation of
the new law and began to approach the political parties
and the Episcopacy to gain support against the new law.
It also proclaimed a "National Program of Action" to
lobby for the unconstitutionality of the law. The
strategies for this National Program of Action were to
be the point of contention within CUTA. in meetings
held at the beginning of 1980 to formalize strategies
for combatting the new Law of Professional Associations,
divisions emerged concerning whether one or two
plenaries should be held. Those who argued for two
separate plenaries represented the former unions of the
CNT; those who argued for one plenary represented the
former unions of the Commission of 25. It would appear
that the CNT unions were attempting to stake out their
own territory again as they were not pleased at the
hardening stances of the Commission of 25 unions. The
CNT unions won out in holding a separate plenary from
that of the Commission of 25 unions, but divisions
between the two groups became more pronounced as the
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year progressed. 28
Conflicts within cuta over l abor
^presentation to
the ILO and ICPTU meetings revitalized ^ di££erences
between the CNT anH t-v,^ ^d the Commission of 25 unions. On Nay
1st, in honor of International Workers' Day, two
documents were made public by the two separate grQups>
One document signed solely by membe rs of the CNT unions
called on the armed forces to discontinue their economic
Policies which had led to speculation and economic ruin.
The other document, signed by members of the Commission
of 25 was more aggressive in condemning the economic
situation. At the June ILO meetings, two separate
delegations of labor leaders attended and each attempted
to be more critical of the government than the other. 29
On August 15, 1980, a new Law of Obras Sociales was
passed which effectively annulled union control over
monies collected for social welfare benefits. The
result was another flurry of labor activity against this
newest defeat of labor. Several union leaders, all from
the CNT faction of CUTA met with Minister of Interior
Harguindeguy to express their concerns over the
increasingly worsening situation. while a statement
issued by the labor leaders, among them Jorge Triaca,
again stated criticism over the handling of the economy
and of labor in particular, the very fact of the meeting
caused tensions to explode. The Per6nist party, Partido
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-sticialista, at that time expcessly^
««« en 9 ag in g in any ulfci ^ ^ ^
and his COl lea gUes were severely rebuked for
-eting with Harguindeguy, at which point openiy
espoused his belief i„ dialogue wlt„ the ^
stance caused several members of the CNT to break with
the group. The Mission of 25 unions decided also to
discontinue attempts to reconcile with the CNT g roup of
unions. On November 24 lgan n, a nJ.you, the Commission of 25,
with several other unions, decided to form a new General
Confederation of Labor in open defiance of the Law of
Professional Associations which banned such a group.
The CU-TA alliance was ended permanently, and once a gain,
the labor scene was dominated by two rival labor
factions
.
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The urgency for labor unity brought about by the
imminent passage of the new Law of Professional
Associations and by Lorenzo Miguel's prodding resulted
for a short time in a singular voice for the labor
movement. it is interesting to note that in pushing for
labor unity, Miguel convinced the hardliners of the
Commission of 25 to agree to a compromise with the
moderate CNT. Given that the CNT curried more favor
with the standing regime, Miguel probably felt that if
any pressure could be brought to bear on modifying the
soon to be enacted new Law of Professional Associations,
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it would lie with the CNT rather than with the
Commission of 25 m-25. to Mrguel, a divided labor movement
served little purpose, save to enafcle ^^ ^
manipulate the contendin g tactions to its interests.
Only through a unified effort ™,,ih i >urr c, could labor promote any
substantive change.
The fragile unity created with CUTA however, could
not ameliorate the long-standing differences between the
various factions of the labor movement. CNT and
Commission of 25 unity did not prevent or delay the
passage of the new Law of Professional Associations so
that the desire to remain in alliance was no longer of
urgent concern. The CNT faction of CUTA pursued
independent actions on its own, much of which could be
interpreted as "collaborationist" as it argued that
dialogue was the only way to promote labor's interests.
The Commission of 25 faction consistently followed a
more critical position regarding the regime's policies
and, given the worsening labor situation, it finally saw
the need to split from CUTA and to found a new CGT.
A CGT and Renewed Labor Militancy
From the time of the newly created CGT in November
1980 through 1981, an increased militancy on the part of
all the labor movement factions developed. The creation
of a new CGT in direct defiance of the newly passed law
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served notirp t-^to the regime that labor was no longer
disposed to negotiation. Months of lohh Iu n bbying against the
new law had achieved nothing. Thus thP ry- in , e Commission of
25 faction, rejecting the moderate line of the CNT
faction of CUTA, decided on a more confrontational
stance. At an end of ^ ^ ^ ^
sympathizers, Saul ubaldini, elected head of the new
CGT, severely criticized the state of affairs in
Argentina. He called for a return to the rule of law
in the nation and spoke of the kidnapped and
disappeared. On the other hand, the CNT and Commission
of 20 factions of the labor movement refused to
recognize the new CGT as representative of labor as a
whole. m response to the CGT, these two groups decided
to form the "Intersectorial CNT-20."
The Intersectorial argued for a strategy of
"concertation and social truce." it viewed the
ascendancy of General Viola as an opportunity to curry
favor with the regime. The belief that the new regime
would be more susceptible to labor's demands was not
totally misguided on the part of the Intersectorial. At
the time of Videla's departure from government, the
major waves of repression and disappearances had ended.
General Viola, in his short tenure, attempted to
decompress the political situation somewhat by holding
talks with political parties, among them the Peronist
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P-ty. „. also demonstrated gcegter
fay
- = o9 n izing the need tQ Qpen a diaiogue ^
other groups in society. 31
No doubt, the leaders of the Inte rsector ial viewed
the re gime change as an opening to pursue their own
Personal actions. Keener, the groups which made up
the intersectorial could be called the moderate wing of
the labor movement in that they consistently pursued a
strategy of seeking dialogue with the regime in power.
These leaders assessed the political situation in 1981
as one where negotiations with the government would
produce fruitful results for the labor unions they
represented and for themselves personally. However,
their assessment of the political situation proved wrong
and this group began to distance itself more from the
regime as the year wore on.
The CGT, made up of the Commission of 25 and various
other factions of labor groups pursued a more
confrontational stance. The departure of Martinez de
Hoz from the Ministry of Economics and his replacement
by Lorenzo Sigaut did not result in any improvement of
the labor situation. The CGT decided to call a national
strike for July 22nd to protest the salary and
industrial situations. The political opening proffered
by Viola certainly played a part as labor leaders felt
it "safer" to express opposition to the regime. The
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s
economic situation in iqai1981 witnessed the dire fruits of
Martinez de Ho Z , s po i icies
. Facfcory^
dosing up shop, leaving thousands unemployed Xt 4
estimated that the industrial workforce shrank by 30%
^ring the Proceso. The hardest hit was ^
manufacturing sectors. where there was an estimated
1,030,000 manufacturing workers in 1976, the number had
fallen to 790,000 by 1980.32 Inflafcion
_ ^^
out of control and salaries were not keeping pace.
According to a government survey, only 40% of the
population was engaged in productive labor, and strikes
by rank and file continued unabated. 33
A week after the not-too-successful national strike,
the intersectorial held a meeting with the Argentine
Union of industry (UIA) and Minister of Labor Porcille
to negotiate a social truce between labor and industry
over the economic situation. with their rivals of the
CGT in jail and the partial failure of the national
strike which the Intersectorial had boycotted, the
leaders of this group hoped to gain the upper hand in
the rivalry over control of the labor movement. Again,
their attempt at wresting concessions from the regime
failed. 34
Factions within the Intersectorial became
increasingly disillusioned with their lack of success
and several leaders decided to negotiate with the CGT
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about a possible accomodation between the two groups
The CGT leadership declined these overtures, most
probably because they mistrusted the intentions of the
intersectorial and perhaps because they were still
recovering from the latest bout or government
repression. 35
Bear in mind that while the CGT and the
intersectorial CNT-20 represented the two dominant
factions in the labor movement, there existed a
multiplicity of lesser factions within these groups as
well as outside of these groups. a labor leader's power
is always unstable for he must seek both government and
rank and file recognition in order to maintain his
status as leader. Complicating the matter are the
existence of others, always waiting in the wings to
replace him if he proves ineffective at walking the
tight rope, balancing rank and file demands with the
political situation at hand.
Undoubtedly, the rivalry between the CGT and the
Intersectorial CNT-20 impeded the efforts to create a
united labor front. However, the public schisms within
the military junta provided both groups with
opportunities to pursue their own separate goals. That
the junta continued to remain deaf to labor's problems
forced the more moderate elements of the Intersectorial
to recast their strategies. Open confrontation with the
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regime was still rejected but the public discourse of
the group took on a harsher tone against the regi rae
.
Coupled with the continuing militancy of the CGT, the
situation began to heat up by mid-year 1981.
in July 1981, five political parties (Radicals and
Peronists being the dominant ones) formed a coalition
called the »Mul tipar tidar ia . » Taking advantage of
Viola's political opening this coalition sought to lobby
for a return to democratic rule. Their appearance on
the political scene gave the labor movement more allies
with which to build a larger opposition. Both wings of
the labor movement sought the support of this group.
For the next year, labor and the coalition would often
work together or give support to each others'
activities
.
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At the beginning of November 1981, the CGT called for
a national demonstration organized under the theme of
"peace, bread, and work". The march garnered the
support of human rights groups, the Multipartidaria
, and
most importantly the Catholic Church. Over 15,000
people, mostly from labor marched through the streets
chanting anti-government slogans. The march culminated
in a mass at the Church of San Cayetano in which the
plight of labor was among the topics highlighted in the
37
se rmon
.
The demonstrations of November were the first time
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that several groups in opposition to the regime had
coordinated efforts to make a public statement. The
political parties, as mentioned, only resurfaced on the
political scene in July of 1981; the Catholic Church had
for the most part refrained from criticizing the
regime's excesses; the human rights groups had suffered
severe repression and their ranks were constantly
decimated by disappearances. The coordinating efforts
were successful at this time as General Viola appeared
to be losing control. Disputes between him and General
Galtieri were becoming increasingly more public,
enabling opposition forces to take greater strides in
criticizing the regime. 38
The political situation became volatile when two days
after the demonstration, General Viola fell ill and
entered the hospital. Amid rumors that he had cancer,
General Galtieri began his machinations to take over.
In December, he formally ousted Viola and proclaimed his
intention to remain in power for the long term. The
Multipartidaria renewed calls for a democratic
liberalization. The CGT, in an end of the year
statement, called for social and economic changes, among
them the need for elections. The language of democracy
began to filter into the public discourse of the CGT. 39
The events of the latter part of 1980 and of 1981
illustrate the labor movement's increased militancy.
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The creation of the CGT in November 1980 signaled a
hardening tone by the Commission of 25 faction of the
labor movement in its defiance of the new Law of
Professional Associations. From the 1940s on, the CGT
was the central organ of labor and the principal
spokesman for labor's interest* <=„,.s. Successive military
regimes had banned the CGT from meeting, but Videla
actually outlawed its existence. m defiance of the
regime, the new CGT was created, expressly to agitate
for labors' rights. CGT promotion of national
demonstrations throughout 1981 signalled the end of
conciliatory attitudes by this faction of the labor
movement
.
The machinations of the Intersectorial faction also
took a turn toward greater confrontation, albeit at a
much slower pace. The Intersectorial viewed the viola
government opening as an opportunity to pursue
substantive negotiations with the regime over the labor
situation. in their rivalry with the CGT, leaders of
the Intersectorial calculated that a strategy of
dialogue and negotiation would garner more concessions
from the regime than one of open confrontation. They
hoped that if their gamble worked, they would be able to
wrest control of the labor movement from the CGT.
However, after several attempts at dialogue with the
regime failed, leaders of the Intersectorial called for
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a more confrontational stance. It continued to eschew
any sort of massive demonstration against the regime,
but its public tone took on a harsher character as the
year wore on. it began to move away from just labor-
specific concerns and began to voice criticism over the
regime's repression.
The lack of consensus between the two rival labor
factions no doubt hindered labor's effectiveness in
influencing regime policy, but on one level, these
divisions encouraged greater militancy. The rivalry
between the two factions in seeking to be the sole voice
of labor was played out in a setting where massive
dismissals, eroding salaries, and repression was taking
place. Rank and file put constant pressure on their
leadership to take action in ameliorating the situation.
In order to gain adherents to its side, the CGT felt
compelled to act more militantly, not only because the
labor situation was so dire, but also to undercut the
support of the Intersectorial
.
Labor and the Malvinas
The first three months of 1982 were quite busy for
both factions of the labor movement, each heading toward
confrontation with Galtieri's regime. The first
significant labor action took place with the
Intersectorial. Leaders of this group held another
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round of discussions with the minister of Labor, with
"ttl. result. A second round of discussions in early
"arch was accompanied by 250 labor activists who
congregated outside the Labor Ministry with banners.
This was the first quasi-public protest undertaken by
the Intersectorial
.
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Relations between the CGT and the regime turned
violent at the end of March. The CGT decided to call a
national day of protest for the 30th of March, without
the support of the Intersectorial (although words of
support were proffered by this group). The purpose of
the strike was to call for an end to the "Proceso" which
the CGT claimed had caused the destruction of the fabric
of Argentine life. On March 30th, protests were held
all over the country denouncing the military regime.
Police brought out to break up the demonstrations
engaged in bloody battles with the protesters. An
estimated 1,000 people were detained and scores were
injured. it appeared that labor was no longer willing
to remain acquiescent to the regime's policies and it
showed the growing lack of control Galtieri had over the
domestic situation. The leaders of the strike were
jailed and the Intersectorial began plans to call
another national strike. They condemned the authorities
for jailing the strike leaders. However, Galtieri still
had one more card to play. 41
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Two days after the bloody clashes of March 30th, the
Argentine armed forces invaded the Malvinas/Falklands
islands. Ml political activity against the regime
stopped as everyone mobilized for the war effort. The
heightened confrontational tone of the previous two days
was quickly turned into a popular outpouring of
patriotism. The labor movement leadership, especially
the intersectorial, called rallies in support of the
Malvinas invasion. The Mul tipartidar ia and the Catholic
Church also did the same. when the leaders of the CGT
were let out of jail, they too promoted support for the
regime's actions, although they countenanced their
support of the Malvinas takeover with continued concern
over the domestic economic and political situation. 42
When the Argentine government established itself on
the islands, both Saul Ubaldini of the CGT and Jorge
Triaca of the Intersectorial were there to witness the
swearing in of the governor. At international labor
meetings in April and May, labor leaders expounded on
Argentina's right to the islands. As during the World
Soccer Championships held in Argentina in 1978,
Argentines used the Malvinas as a means of forgetting
their problems. Being highly nationalistic and laboring
under the misconception that Argentina had a history of
losing land, Argentines embraced the invasion as a
reassertion of national pride. This, of course, was
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P-cisely what Galtieri had intended would happen «
" would be Misleading to say that the invasion of
the Halvinas was undertaken solely fot the purpose of
appeasing growing do.estic strife. Negotiations with
Great Britain over thp ieiar,^.. une slands had been going on for
decades, with Great Britain remaining more or less
intransigent to Argentina's claims. The plans for
invading the Halvinas had been on the drawing board
since early 1 977 when videla tooR ^ ^ ^
air force were particularly partisan to an invasion as
each sought to demonstrate the particular prowess of
their weapons. Galtieri came to power with the backing
of navy General Anaya on the condition that there would
be a retaking of the islands. 44
Due to a great deal of misjudgment by the military
concerning Great Britain's reactions and U.S. loyalty,
the military actually believed that the Malvinas
operation would be swift, short, and successful. That it
underestimated the historic and symbolic importance of
the islands to Great Britain and the historic ties
between the U.S. and Great Britain, illustrates how
misguided Argentina's view is of itself as a member
nation of the industrialized West.
While the desire to retake the Malvinas was a
traditional foreign policy goal, the decision to invade
on April 2nd was based purely on domestic concerns. The
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regirae was very much alarmed by ^ demonst rafcions Qf
^rch 30th and with subsequent threats by labor of more
demonstrations. Coupled with increased dissatisfaction
by some rail itary factions Qver dQmestic situatio^
Galtieri launched an invasion. He gambled on quelling
the clamoring voices of a dissenting public and in this
he succeeded. However, wars are not won on popular
support and when the British reacted to the aggression,
Galtieri's gamble was lost. 45
Throughout most of the three-month-long war, the
regime maintained strict censorship so ordinary
Argentines were deluded over the military situation. To
labor's credit, the CGT attempted to separate support
for the Malvinas from outright support for the regime.
As such, when the defeat was made known on June 14th,
labor was swift to change from a conciliatory tone to
outright opposition.
The System Unravels
The period from June 15, 1982, up to the elections of
October 30, 1983, was turbulent indeed for Argentina.
The day of the announced defeat, violent acts occurred
in the streets of the cities. Soon afterward, Galtieri
was deposed and General Bignone put in his place to
ostensibly prepare the country for elections. General
Hector Villaveiran became the minister of labor.
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As ever, the labor movement continued to be divided
by two principal factions: the CGT and the
mtersectorial, which during the height of the Malvinas
conflict in Hay had decided to form a rival CGT, named
CGT-Azopardo. The first CGT took the name CGT-Brasil.
Unity would not be achieved until October 1983 . 46
A week after the ascension of the new regime, the
CGT-Brasil issued a statement claiming the "Proceso" was
finished and the time had come for a return to the rule
of law. m mid-August, General Bignone held talks with
leaders from both factions of the labor movement in an
effort to defuse some of the hostility being generated
by that sector. Little was resolved. 47
In September, the CGT-Brasil called a national strike
in protest of the salary and labor situation for the
22nd of the month. CGT-Azopardo also called for a
national strike (its first one during the military
regime) in protest of the salary increases offered by
the government. The government, upon hearing of these
plans, attempted to head off the strikes by offering
higher salary increases, a raise in the minimum wage,
and a promise to lift the ban on trade union activity in
sixty days. The CGT-Brasil rejected these proposals and
on the 22nd, between 20,000 and 30,000 workers
demonstrated in front of the Casa Rosada under the
banner of "bread, peace, and work." 48
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CGT-Azopardo, for the most part, viewed the
government's proposals as good faith efforts to
negotiate so they called off the strike. However,
several leaders were very unhappy with the decision not
to strike. Jorge Triaca felt CGT-Azopardo abstention
from striking would work to the CGT-Brasil's advantage.
He was right. The success of the strike even without
CGT-Azopardo support strengthened the hand of Saul
Ubaldini
.
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A month later, in October, a massive mobilization
took place in the province of San Juan. More than
25,000 people gathered in the capital city and thousands
of tractors surrounded the central plaza, all demanding
an end to military rule. At the end of the protest,
demonstrators spilt 5,000 liters of wine around the
plaza. 50
The end of the year also witnessed more
demonstrations against the regime. Jorge Triaca managed
to convince his CGT-Azopardo colleagues to call a strike
for December 6th. The strategy of seeking concessions
from the military had failed and CGT-Azopardo was losing
support among the rank and file. It was hoped that the
strike would stem the tide of defections. CGT-Brasil,
not to be outdone, supported the strike of December 6th
and over 90% of the productive activity in the country
was paralyzed. On December 16th, the Mul tipartidaria
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cailed a "March for Democracy" at which CGT-Brasil sent
over 5,000 workers, over 100,000 people marched on the
Plaza de Mayo demanding the end of military rule. At
Christmastime, fearing another strike, the government
issued salary increases in both the public and private
CI
sectors
.
Aside from the wrangling between the two CGTs, in the
latter half of 1982, another important player emerged on
the labor scene—Lorenzo Miguel, leader of the 62
Peronist Organizations. Miguel represented the
verticalist wing of the labor movement which advocated
loyalty to Isabel PerOn and to the closed hierarchical
structure of organization. He had been very close to
the Perons from 1973-76 and was labor's premier leader
then. Because of this, he was one of the first leaders
jailed after the military coup. He was later put under
house arrest.
In assessing the political situation at the end of
1982, Miguel sought to regain control over the labor
movement. He was particularly concerned about the rise
of a more militant group of union leaders who advocated
greater openness and democracy within the movement. He
was also very much an accommodationi st to the regime.
In September 1982, he was reported to have held talks
with General Nicolaides, commander-in-chief of the army,
about a possible rapprochement between labor and the
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military government. The government at that time
Pushing for "conception" talks with labor. Uba i dini
,
head of CGT-Brasil rejected the overture. Miguel, on
the other hand, expressed public support for the armed
forces at a 17th of October Persist rally. His words
caused much violence amongst the crowd." The message
was loud and clear- Miguel's tactics were not
appreciated by the rank and file. However, Miguel would
continue to play an important role in 1983.
The year 1983 began with a shift of alliances. CGT-
Brasil had been negotiating with a group of unions
called the "non-aligned." The "non-aligned" group
wanted to join forces with the CGT-Brasil and after many
drawn-out negotiations, it was incorporated as part of
the CGT-Brasil. CGT-Brasil thereupon changed its name
to CGT-Republica Argentina. strike activity continued
unabated with varying degrees of effectiveness. CGT-
Azopardo called a national strike for March 28th which
was followed two days later by a strike called by CGT-
Republica Argentina. 53
Several significant events occurred in the first part
of 1983 which led to the final demise of the military.
The most important of course was the establishment of a
date for national elections. October 30th was chosen
and the political parties galvanized into action. The
second important event was the slow but steady
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relaxation of mi l itacy control Qver ^^
which would spark a scramble for power a.ong many i„ the
labor leadership. 54
in March, the government drew up draft amendments to
its restrictive trade union legislation. it indicated
that it would allow unions to organize on the
confederation level and allow them some control over
social security. it also said it would repeal the ban
on strike activity. This meant that the CGT would be
legal again. m April, the government indicated that it
would be starting the process of "normalizing unions."
This meant it would return union leadership positions to
unionists as the military personnel would be pulling
out. To facilitate this process, the military set about
creating normalization committees to oversee the
transition back to civilian control. 55
These actions set off a flurry of activity among
labor leaders. Union leaders who had been relieved of
their duties in the last military regimes sought to
regain control. Leaders who had emerged to fill the
vacuum attempted to stay in power. The military used
the normalizing committees as carrots to gain
cooperation from the labor elite. General Nicolaides
held negotiations with the CGT-Azopardo but they
stalled, so he reinitiated talks with Lorenzo Miguel. 56
What Nicolaides wanted from Miguel was an
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understanding. In return f„ Nicolaides , s ^
Persists to retake control of their unions (most of the
displaced leaders were hard-line Pe roni s t s )
-and
therefore be assured of winning the presidential
elections-the Peronists would not investigate the
military for human rights abuses committed in the past
seven years. The logic of this was flawed. Nicolaides
assumed that the Peronists would win the elections. As
labor was the backbone of Per6nist support, he thought
he could enter into a pact with the most conservative
wing of the Per6nist labor movement. Miguel saw this as
an opportunity to re-assert his control over labor. 57
This attempt at an alleged "mill tary-sindical » pact
backfired for both of them, but it hurt the Per6nists
the most. Saul Ubaldini condemned these actions and so
did Perimist party leaders. Already strife-ridden as to
who to nominate for their presidential candidate, the
Per6nists did not need this behind-the-scenes conspiracy
to further taint their reputation. Miguel denied any
such negotiations had taken place. (It is still unclear
whether such negotiations ever occurred). 58
What was happening on the political scene mirrored
much of what was happening within the labor movement.
Factional infighting was endemic as the Per6nist party
attempted to organize for the elections. In general,
the main factions were those of the ultra-hardliners,
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hardliners, and the moderates. The ultra-hardliners
wanted Isabel Per6n to take up the leadership role of
the party. The hardliners were intent on exorcising the
leftist elements out of the party and advocated the
candidacy of old-time Peronist Italo Luder. The
moderates wanted greater internal democracy, less
identification with Peron, and were partial to Antonio
Robledo. The key figure here again was Lorenzo Miguel.
He counseled the party to wait and see what Isabel Peron
wanted to do, although by April he was favoring Luder's
nomination. when several months passed without any sign
from Peron, Miguel threw his lot in with Luder who
became the nominee. 59
Meanwhile, on the labor front, repressive labor
legislation was being repealed. Military interveners
were leaving unions and the CGT building once again was
placed under the control of labor. By July, the two
factions of the CGT were negotiating the possibility of
uniting once again. In late July, both CGTs came out in
support of a Plan of Emergency which appealed to the
military authorities to do something about the worsening
economic situation. On October 4th, both CGTs held a
labor strike over the salary situation. Finally, on
October 14th, the two factions united into one CGT. 60
On the traditional 17th of October rally held in
honor of Peron, Lorenzo Miguel was booed off the stage.
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Ubaldini was given a standing ovation. 61 The verdict
was clear. Labor rank and £ilf _ ^ ^
way of doing things. L0 ren 20 Miguel was past his prime;
^ was of a generation which ran things by fiat and by
bowing to the powers that be, even if it meant selUng
out labor's interests. ubaldini represented the new
generation, being muc h mo re open and having proved
himself in leading the hardline faction of labor against
the regime. Unfortunately, the candidacy of Italo Luder
represented Miguel's generation of Persists, and so,
the rank and file defected from their party, not so much
out of support to Alfonsin but in repudiation of the
excesses of Peronism.
The last fifteen months of military rule bore witness
to a level of social protest unprecedented in Argentine
history. Riding on the defeat of the Malvinas/Falklands
War, labor and other groups embarked on concerted
campaigns to force the military out of power. strikes
by individual unions coupled with national
demonstrations gave notice that Argentines were no
longer willing to put up with military rule. Attempts
by the military to exacerbate differences among labor
failed as the leaders who were negotiating a military-
sindical pact were severely rebuked for their actions.
The scheduling of elections and the normalization of
unions provided opportunities for all sectors of society
235
to exercise newly recaptured freedom. The divisiveness
in the Persist party cost the party the erections. The
divisiveness in the labor movement was eventually
resolved, as two weeks before the election, both
factions of the CGT united into one.
in the last months of military rule, Lorenzo Miguel
and the moderate CGT-Azopardo finally jumped on the
bandwagon of democracy. Their efforts at negotiating
with the military had failed and had cost them rank and
file support. Before it was too late, they joined their
CGT-Republica Argentina colleagues in clamoring for a
return to civilian rule.
Conclusion
The years 1979-83 saw the decline of military rule,
punctuated by increasing social protest and a needlessly
destructive war with Great Britain. After a period of
prolonged repression, which served as the regime's
raison d'etre, the greater task of governing and
managing the economy seemed to be eluding the regime.
The policies of Martinez de Hoz were failing to provide
long-term stability in the economy and instead were
causing the de-industrialization of the industrial
sector and rampant speculation in the financial sector.
The issue of presidential succession arose in 1980 as
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-dela chitted himself to an orderly transfer ^^
after four years in office. That nis chosen
illustrated the growing schisms within the military over
the course of Argentine politics. while an eventual
return to civilian rule was hinted at by viola, m0 st of
the armed forces were still dead set against it. This
and the desire of General Galtieri to become president
made the political situation volatile by the end of 1981
when Galtieri succeeded in ousting viola from power.
From the very beginning, Galtieri's rule was tenuous
as he was intent on aggrandizing his power, thereby
alienating factions of the military. The growing civil
strife perpetrated by the labor movement, the political
parties, and others made the situation intolerable. His
solution was to launch a campaign for retaking the
Malvinas on the assumption, of course, that Argentina
would win. His failure to obtain victory all but sealed
the fate of the military. After a year of intense
domestic opposition, the military called elections and
Argentina returned to civilian rule.
Given this backdrop of palace intrigue, the labor
movement sought to capitalize on the seeming dissension
in the ranks of the military. However, it too was
racked by continuous conflict which expressed itself in
the existence of two dominant competing factions. One
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faction consistently took a more confrontational stance
toward the re g i me and the other took a more conciliatory
tone. The first political action taken by the hard-line
Commission of 25 was the national strike of April 27,
1979, which was partially successful in paralyzing the
nation. This strike was the first public display of
opposition to regime policy since the inception of the
regime and was held in response to the proposed passage
of the new Law of Professional Associations.
This strike paved the way to a short-lived
reconciliation between the two labor factions but as the
regime enacted the new Law of Professional Associations
anyway, reconciliation led to outright opposition with
both groups claiming the other was trying to exploit the
labor situation to its own gain. Not soon after the
final passage of this new law in November 1979, a new
CGT was formed in direct defiance of its ban. From this
coalition of labor groups emerged the demonstrations and
confrontations of 1980 and 1981 culminating in the
bloody battles of March 30, 1982.
The more conciliatory wing of the labor movement
coalesced into the Intersects ial and pursued
negotiation with the military regime. However, as the
regime remained more or less intransigent to this
group's demands, it too began to take a more
confrontational posture and began to call for national
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demonstrations. At meetings of the ilo and ICFTU,
leaders of the Intersectorial voiced harsh criticism
against the regime in efforts to appear to be working
for labor's interests, rather than to appear
collaborationist. This was important given that
throughout this period, labor rank and file continued to
hold strikes against the economic situation.
Up through 1979, both factions of the labor movement
concentrated on labor specific issues in their dealings
with the regime. issues such as salaries, dismissals,
COntro1
° f ^M_^iales, and union freedoms were
always at the top of labor's concerns. Starting in
1980, the hardline faction began to emphasize particular
"political" concerns. Words such as "elections", "rule
of law", and "justice" became prominent in labor's
public discourse. The plight of jailed unionists and
the disappeared also became more prominent and labor
leaders' characterization of regime policies took on a
condemnatory tone. In the period after the Malvinas
defeat, the weakened regime began to capitulate to long-
standing labor demands. The CGT was relegalized, strike
activity and union elections permitted again, and
intervened unions became free of military control.
The months before the elections continued to be
plagued with divisions among labor and the Per6nist
party. Lorenzo Miguel, long-time Per6nist union leader
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apparently attempted a behind the scenes milit.ry-
sindical pact with General Nicolaides. This severely
hurt the Persist effort in the eyes of labor rank and
file. The two dominant labor factions distanced
themselves from him and were able to bridge their
differences to form a unified CGT right before the
elections. A new generation of labor leaders had come
of age.
The activities of labor from 1979 to 1983 illustrate
the difficulty of maintaining a bureaucratic-
authoritarian order. Once the use of repression had
been exhausted and the "threat" which brought the
military to power had been dealt with, the next order of
business was to maintain order. Another essential part
of the military's goals was to de-politicize the labor
movement. This attempt at "exclusion" became difficult
to accomplish as consensus within the regime began to
break down giving labor an opportunity to repel the
assault
.
Schisms within the ruling elite were exploited by
labor and other groups in their attempts to regain some
political footing. The discontent of labor became so
severe and problematic to the regime that it went to war
to quell the domestic situation. when that failed, the
military attempted to play divide and conquer by
conspiring with certain elements of the labor movement
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in negating a military-sindical pact. The majority
of the labor leadership condemned such actions and stood
firm in calling for a return to democracy. In the end,
labor turned a deaf ear to the military and civilian
rule triumphed. The experiment with exclusionary
bureaucratic-authoritarianism was over.
241
ENDNOTES
Argenunf/i^^";,
"all 5*
MiUt«* *u le in
2. Ibid., 62.
3. Ibid., 64.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 66-67.
MUit^v- End qof
6
' :
A
f?entina: the Departure of the
Episode?"~?n?o J.
Pol Jtical Cycle or just anotherSO international Affairs (1983): 580-81.
and p2 C ° rradi ' ThJLJ^tfiil_^^ Society
198b), 130-33
Pion-Berlin, 59.
9. David Rock, Argentina 1515-1987
, (Berkeley-University of California Press, 198 7): 369
10. Pion-Berlin, 61-63.
dl'pTrn^irJ^'^^ 1^' Diez anos de sindicalismo.e Peron al Proceso (Buenos Aires: Co rregidor, 1984), i l3.
12. Wenceslao Bunge, Report on Argentine Labor,
unpublished study of Argentine labor between 1976 -1981, chap. 4.
13. Senen-Gonzalez
, 114.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 115-116.
16. Bunge report, Ch. 4.
17. Alvaro Abos, Las organi zaciones sindicales y elpoder militar (1976-1983)
,
(Buenos Aires: Centro Editor
de America Latina, 1984), 54-55.
Bunge report, chap. 4.
242
Senen-Gonzalez
, 116-117.
18. Abos, 54.
cu^ren ^df^orcia^^ 0 ' tht C*-*"ion of 25 and
author Feb^Ly^^^^^r^r' ^
Organ^a
S
tions
nf
In^
° f the 3
'
2 democratic
BuenSs Aires!'
i t6rVlew b
* au thor, February 1986,
^^Ronaldo Munck, et al. Aj^entina__fr^^
(London: Zed Books, 1987), 216.
20. Bunge report, chap. 4.
21. Abos, 56.
Senen-Gonzalez, 119.
J
Jriace, "Discurso Pronunciado por el DeleqadoTrabajador Argentino ante la 65a Conferencia Anual de laOrganizacion Internacional del Trabajo," JnLrnaUonal
aune^l^r
12^ 1011 meeting
<
G*™™> ^"er^and,
23. Senen-Gonzalez, 120-21.
24. Ibid., 134-35.
25. Ibid.
, 153 and 168.
26. Ibid.
Munck, 219.
27. Bunge report, chap. 4.
28. Abos, 60-62.
29. Senen-Gonzalez, 133.
30. Bunge report, chap. 4.
Senen-Gonzalez, 140-42.
31. Senen-Gonzalez, 143.
32. Munck, 208.
33. Munck, 220.
Abos, 78-9.
Senen-Gonzalez, 155.
243
31 July 1981.
34. Senen-Gonzalez, 155.
35. Ibid.
^^L^Regirne Transit?™ ' f i? ^orita^iansand
Pittsburgh Press, 1987j 27
ttsburgh
:
University of
ATTe^rcWsTHW^^ ~
37 ^^^^ 6 November 1981.
38. Ibid.
39. ibid.
40. Senen-Gonzalez, 163.
41. Abos, 85.
Senen-Gonzalez, 164.
Vacs, 28.
Senen-Gonzalez, 165.
43. Senen-Gonzalez, 168+
Bel gran^°aune
SC
S:984.
HiSt0" an
'
leCtUre at ™v.r.it, of
44. Corradi, 139-45.
45
*
Latin American Weekly Report 2 April 1982.
vacs, z8.
Rouquie, 38.
Pion-Berlin, 70.
46. Abos, 89.
47
'
Latin Ame rican Weekly Report
, 24 September 1982.
48
-
Latin American Weekly Report
, 1 October 1982.
49. Ibid.
50. Senen-Gonzalez, 181.
244
51
* 10 December 1982
.
52
' ^^^^ 5 November lg82>
3\\a7f™nFAi^^ 18 Feb—Y 1983 and
54
' 31 March 1983
.
55. Ibid.
±^-*™J^^ 15 April 1983.
56. Ibid.
57. Vacs, 30-31.
Rock, 388-89.
York.
G
»
r
T
Wynia
',
hl313tina Illusions and Reality (New: Holmes and Meier, 19 86 ): 139-40 y ,(
Latin^merican Weekly Report^ 15 April 1983.
59
'
^in_Amerj^an_^^ 16 September 1983 .
^q«.
^inAm^rican Weekly Reports. 1 July 1983
, 23 July1983, / uctober 1983, 28 October 1983. Y
61, Lati n American Weekly Report, 28 October 1983.
245
CHAPTER VI
T^ E
-J^MT_FOUR_A^_^^
CIVILIAN RULE 1983-1988
The election results of October 30, 1983, were a
surprise to everyone, both to those inside Argentina and
to outside observers. what was assumed to be an easy
Peronist victory turned out to be the party's first
defeat in an open and free election. Instead, a nearly
100-year-old party, the Radical Civic Union (UCR) won
52% of the vote and achieved its first fair victory
against the Peronist party since the latter's founding
in the mid-1940s. (Previous Radical presidents Frondizi
and Illia came into office under conditions where the
Peronist party was outlawed, thereby tainting the
legitimacy of these Radicals as governors.)
The man at the helm of the Radical victory was Raul
Alfonsln, a member of the lef t-of-center wing of this
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broad-based middle-class party. A son of immigrants
Spain, Alfonsln was born and ^ chascQmus
(fam°US f ° r US dulce d * leche), a small town seventy
*iles southwest of Buenos Aires. A lawyer by training,
Mfonsin had always been a politician, active in the
reformist wing of the Radical party and in local
regional politics. Building a reputation on his gift
for fiery oratory, Alfonsin was a party maverick,
continuously doing battle with the Radical Party old-
guard, when elections were called by the military junta
in Narch for October 30th, Alfonsln managed to recruit
thousands of newcomers to the party, mainly from among
the young urban middle classes. In the party primary,
he successfully won the right to run for president under
the party banner, thereby bringing into dominance the
lef t-of-center wing of the party. 1
The party platform which brought him to victory
consisted of several key issues which touched the core
of Argentine life. Of foremost concern was the issue of
human rights violations committed by the outgoing
military junta. Alfonsln promised an investigation into
the thousands of disappeared, kidnapped, tortured, and
murdered. He also promised that there would be no
sty for those responsible for the atrocities of the
ilitary's "dirty war." Of course, in 1983 with the
ilitary in disarray, all political parties claimed that
amne
mi
mi
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an investigation into human rights violations would be
ordered, but for Mfonsin, the concern with human rights
long preceded the democratic opening. He was a co-
founder of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights and
he attempted to publicize the cases of families of those
who had disappeared. He spent some time in jail for
such activities, but he came away with a solid
reputation for honesty and commitment to justice. 2
A second key issue was to highlight the failure of
both military and Peronist rule. Throughout his
campaign, he constantly played on Argentines' memories
of the turbulent days of Isabel PerOn and the terror of
the military regime. He stressed the corruption,
ineptitude, and moral bankruptcy of these past regimes
and he sought to link them together. 3 when reports
surfaced at the end of March concerning a military-
sindical pact, Alfonsin was quick to condemn this all
too familiar aspect of Argentine political life.
Alfonsin used the specter of a military- sindical pact
to point to the corruptness of certain sectors of labor,
but he did not condemn the labor movement as a whole.
Rather, he called on labor to reject such a pact, in
repudiation of the military regime and to build anew a
democratic labor movement. 4
Finally, not any less important in a nation where
personality has always dominated politics, was the fact
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^at of all the major candidates, Mfonsin, was a new
and untried politician. xtalo Luder, the Persist
candidate, had been closely associated with the last
disastrous Peronist regime so he fared badly trying to
Prove that the Persists represented change and
innovation. Mvaro Alsogaray
, fche candidate ^ ^
small but significant Christian Democratic party, had
been associated with past military regimes and was
therefore suspect for his military sympathies and his
rabid anti-Peronism. Mfonsin, although a Radical, was
not from the "old guard" of the party but represented
the reformist, more popular wing. His ascendancy to the
national political scene represented to most Argentines
a break from the past, although not with tradition. 5
Upon taking office on December 10, 1983, Alfonsin
immediately called for the former leaders of the
military junta to be arrested. Alfonsin asked the
military courts to investigate human rights abuses but
they came up with nothing. Alfonsin thereupon decided
to have the former leaders tried in civilian courts.
The trials began in June 1985 and lasted almost nine
months with the result that former presidents Videla and
Viola, along with Admiral Massera of the navy, were
convicted of human rights crimes during the "dirty war."
This was and remains the only case of a South American
nation where former military rulers were tried and
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convicted for their excesses. 6
On another front, Alfonsin attempted to reform
relations with the Pe
r
6ni st-dominated labor movement
Unlike his Radical predecessors, Alfonsin had little
desire to destroy the political power of the Persist
labor movement, but he was intent on reforming its most
authoritarian proclivities. He sought neither tactical
accommodation nor all-out war, but rather a middle way
fraught with periods of tension and resolution. Early
in 1984, Alfonsin introduced a bill to congress which
would mandate court-controlled union elections and
guaranteed minority representation. This ambitious bill
sought to enforce new elections without the time-honored
practice of union oversight, but it was soundly rejected
by the Per6nist-controlled senate. However, a milder
bill was passed which allowed the standing union
leadership to organize elections based on existing
constitutions. 7 m this instance, each side gave in a
little: the Peronist union bosses realized the need to
call elections to legitimize their positions in the new
democracy, and Alfonsin mediated his initial zeal for
massive reform of the labor movement.
It was in keeping with the tenor of the times that
the labor movement, as a whole, lent initial tacit
support to the Alfonsin government. Although the labor
union bosses in the newly united CGT of 1983 had
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suppose, the Persist Italo Ludgr fQr^ ^ ^
at the polls due to working-class rank-and-file
defections forced the movement leadership to reassess
its role in Argentine political life. indeed, the
factionalism which had existed within the labor movement
throughout the past military regime resurfaced soon
after the elections were over.
Without a doubt, the biggest beneficiaries of the
Radical victory were those unionists who had
consistently agitated against the military regime,
namely those allied with the CGT-Brasil headed by Saul
Ubaldini. Ubaldini emerged into prominence in the
winter of 1978 when, as press secretary of the Brewery
union, he was called upon to deliver a scathing speech
condemning military rule at an end-of- the-yea r dinner
for the Commission of 25 faction of the labor movement.
Other more prestigious union leaders declined to give
the speech for fear of persecution by the authorities.
Ubaldini, however, was willing to read the speech, even
though policemen were outside the entrance, waiting to
arrest them all. The incident catapulted Ubaldini to
union fame and enabled him to come to power outside of
the more traditional channels of union mobility. Being
the head of the Brewery union, a minor union, Ubaldini
was not a CGT insider, nor was he as dogmatic a Peronist
as many of his peers. His strategy of confrontation
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with the „iutary authorities paid off when democracy
returned.
After the end of military rule, ubaldini inherited a
labor movement that was once again f act ional
i
2ed
internally and weakened politically and economically
The military's concerted campaign to de-industrialize
the economy and to de-politicize the labor movement had
caused drastic results for labor socially, economically,
and politically. Alon g with a drastic reduction in
wages, real income, and working hours, the size of the
overall urban labor population was reduced. m
manufacturing, where there were 1,165,000 employed in
1975, in 1982 the numbers had decreased to 740,000.
Industrial output as percentage of GNP declined from 29%
in 1975 to 25% in 1980. This decline in the sheer size
of the industrial labor sectors and in the power of
workers constituted a challenge for Ubaldini in
recouping labor's political power in the new democratic
9regime
.
Complicating the process of labor consolidation was
the resurfacing of old rivalries and contending
interests within the labor elite. in the initial
aftermath of the October 1983 elections, the four major
factions of the labor movement attempted to create a
coalition to run the CGT. Ubaldini, the only one to
have popular Per6nist support allied with the 62
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Organizations, the political a, of the labor movement.
He was clearly the most vocal union critic of the past
-litary regime. Jorge Triaca, head of the Plastics
-ion, is considered the businessman's unionist. He was
one of the leaders of the "dialogue" wing of the labor
movement during the military junta. Osvaldo Borda,
secretary-general of the rubber industry, represents the
Commission of 25 group of unions. Ramon Baldassini,
secretary-general of the postal clerks' federation
represents non-aligned unions. 10
Ubaldini claims to be seeking a new reformed meaning
to Peronism in which people's voices are heard. He
considers himself a worker's unionist and, by all
accounts, lives an austere life-style. His goal of more
reform within the labor movement has alienated him from
Lorenzo Miguel, who represents the old guard of the
labor movement. The Commission of 25 is considered the
"renovationist" wing of the labor movement. They claim
to truly represent the workers and dispute Ubaldini's
stance as the worker's unionist. The non-aligned or
independent unions are a small but significant group of
unions which are non-Peronist and which seek to carve
out a role for themselves in the labor elite. Jorge
Triaca's faction is considered the most accommodating to
the new government. Espousing a familiar tune, Triaca's
faction has sought dialogue with the Alfonsin
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government
.
11
Clearly, with such contending interests> ^
for labor movement consolidation has been fraught with
conflict. In October 1985, ubaldini succeeded in being
naaed the sole leader of the COT. To many analysts,
this signalled that his faction had attained dominance
over all the other interests within the CGT . ubaldini
-
s
election represented a significant move away from the
older conservative Peronist labor leaders, while still
olearly identifying with Peronism, ubaldini was of a new
generation of labor leaders, less tied to dogmatism and
to the strong-arm tactics used by his predecessors. He
was not implicated in the alleged military-sindical pact
negotiations and he had a clear record of criticizing
the past military junta. His ascendancy to the
presidency of the CGT in 1985 represented change,
although still within the traditional Persist
framework
.
Relations between Ubaldini and the Radical government
have oscillated between cordial and confrontational.
The imposition of a state of siege in October 1985 in
the wake of several right-wing sponsored bombings was
supported by Ubaldini. in the November 1985
congressional elections, Ubaldini stayed apart from
partisan politics. While he of course supported the
Peronist party candidates, he did little electioneering
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on the party's behalf. The Radicals won a comfortable
ma jori ty
.
The year 1986 however, proved to be less cordial and
more confrontational. m February, ubaldini called a
general strike to protest the lack of progress in the
economy under the Austral Plan. This general strike
which effectively shut down the country (it was called
for a Friday in the middle of a summer heat wave) served
two purposes. One was to demonstrate to all the seeming
control Ubaldini held over the labor movement. The
ability to rally massive public support is critical to
the credibility of any labor leader. The second was to
serve notice to Alfonsin that the economic situation
needed to get better. Not only did labor feel that the
country had somehow stalled, but nearly all sectors of
society felt the same way. Every political party (with
the exception of the Radicals) and every major business
and social group in Argentina voiced their support for
this general strike. it should be noted that this
strike in no way called for the removal of the Radicals,
but rather, it called for Alfonsin to take greater
strides in improving the economic welfare of the
12
nation
.
At the end of May, Ubaldini decided to pull the CGT
out of "concertation" talks between the government and
business groups. In 1985, Alfonsin had created the
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Economic and Social Conference ( CES ) which was designed
to bring together labor, business, and the relevant
state agencies to discuss economic and social problems.
The ostensible purpose of the CES was to create a
tripartite pact between government, labor, and business
which would work toward incorporating the latter two
sectors into policy-making and
-implementing matters,
issues which were immediately put on the table were
wages, collective bargaining, and social welfare
programs. Alfonsln hoped the CES would be a vehicle
whereby he could win labor support for his policies. By
holding these concertation talks, he hoped to
demonstrate to labor his sincere commitment to dealing
with their concerns while at the same time attempting to
moderate their growing militancy.
After a stormy year of negotiations, the CGT pulled
out of the talks claiming bad faith on the part of the
government in continuing a dialogue. while the reasons
for the walkout are still unclear, it happened after a
salary adjustment policy had already been hammered out
by the three sectors. Without formal CGT acceptance,
the salary adjustment was decreed into law. it appears
that the Alfonsln government calculated the divisiveness
within the labor movement would enable it to negotiate
directly with more accommodating unions apart from the
CGT.
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It. calculations proved correct as many unions opted
to negotiate with the government directly, the most
-portent of which was the Metalworkers <U0M> headed by
Lorenzo Miguel, unhappy with Obaldini's increasingly
confrontational stance toward the government, Miguel had
followed his own strategy of dealing directly with the
government over wage increases for his union. The
importance for the government of garnering UOM support
cannot be underestimated as this powerful union
maintains a leadership role in affecting how other
unions determine their strategies for dealing with the
government
.
Other fallout from Ubaldini's growing militancy was
to reignite the factionalism still endemic in the labor
movement. Jorge Triaca ran for congress and is now a
deputy. He retained leadership of the Plastics Union
and argued for greater collaboration with the Radical
government. The Commission of 25 and the independent
unions have continued their pressure to reform the labor
movement and have argued that Ubaldini is too
personalistic. Indeed, by 1986 a new group emerged
called the Ubaldini stas
, once again testifying to the
importance of personality in Argentine politics.
The year 1987 began with a general strike called by
the CGT. On January 26th the CGT struck over a series
of demands which they argued the Radical government had
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not taken adequate action to redress. These included an
-crease in the minimum monthly wage, revision of
collective contract agreements, a target date for a
return to collective wage bargaining, and a return of
c
-trol of obra^ociales funds to the unions. The
strike appeared to be 85% successful in industrial
areas. ubaldini stressed that the strike was over
policy and not for the overthrow of the government.
The strike had little impact on government policy,
with the Radicals continuing to deal with unions on an
individual basis. Ubaldini's power appeared to be
weakened, and in March, a new group formed to rival his
control of the labor movement. The "Commission of 15"
(although encompassing about 50 unions), led by Jorge
Triaca, among others, declared it would seek an
alternative to Ubaldini's confrontational strategies.
Claiming not to rival the CGT for power, the Commission
of 15 began independent talks with the government. The
Radical government seized upon the opportunity and
opened its doors to negotiation.
At about the same time (March 1987), Miguel's UOM
successfully negotiated with the government for a wage
increase which was above the ceiling the government had
previously set. This wage increase set off a crisis for
the Minister of Labor Hugo Barrionuevo who had been
against the wage hike. He lost, and therefore resigned.
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The Radicals used this opportunity to appoint a
'eranist, Carlos Ald.r.t.. to the position. Mderete
was allied with the Mission of 15 and it seemed clear
that the Radicals had opted to court the more
accommodationist Commission o£ 15 over that of the
confrontational CGT.
Not long after news of labor dominated the headlines,
there occurred a severe crisis in the Argentine
experiment with democracy. Ever since the trials of the
former rulers of the military juntas had taken place,
the military had embarked on a public relations campaign
to cleanse its image and to limit the prosecutions of
men currently on active duty, especially those in the
lower and middle ranks. The military claims that the
war against subversion waged in the 1970s made democracy
possible today. They also feel that those men who were
only following orders should be exempt from
prosecution. 13
At the end of 1986, Alfonsin decreed what was called
a "full stop" law in which after February 22, 1987, no
more cases would be accepted against military men
accused of human rights abuses. After the conviction of
the principal leaders of the past regimes, a large
number of lawsuits against particular military personnel
had been lodged by civilians. Alfonsin argued that this
process could go on for years and prevent the nation
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"
m°Vin9 80 he
* date for a final end to
"hen cases could be loaded. From the ti». o£ the
announcement to February 22nd, several hundred
complaints had been lod 9ed, far more than had been
anticipated by all sides. The military became a little
restless. 14
On April 15, a major in the army stationed in the
provincial city of Cordoba refused to appear before a
federal court to be questioned concerning his role in
human rights abuses committed between 1976 and 1983. He
was automatically dismissed from the army and took
refuge in the Air Transport Infantry Regiment in Cordoba
where he found supporters. The crisis came when the
commander of the Cordoba troops told Alfonsin that his
troops were unwilling to obey a government order to
arrest the major. 15
This sparked a similar mutiny at the far more
important Campo de Mayo Infantry School just on the
outskirts of Buenos Aires on April 17th. Both groups
demanded full amnesty for their actions during military
rule. The Cordoba problem was resolved when the major
decided to give himself up to the authorities, but the
Campo de Mayo crisis gripped the nation for several
days. Reports flew about as to who was participating
and whether the army commanders were in control. 16
This crisis touched off a massive outpouring of
26 0
support for Alfonsin and public condemnation of the
army. Thousands of people took to the Plaza de Mayo to
voice support for democracy. Hundreds flocked to the
military garrisons to voice their repudiation of the
military actions. After much negotiation with the army
high command, Alfonsin decided to personally go to the
Campo de Mayo to ask the rebel military men to
surrender. it worked, with Alfonsin promising to
appoint a new army commander and to consider their
complaints
.
17
immediately following the crisis, a new army
commander was appointed and Alfonsin introduced a bill,
called "due obedience," which would exonerate lower-
ranking military men of all wrong-doing if they had only
been following orders. This law went into effect at the
end of May, effectively reducing the number of military
men who would face prosecution. 18 However, this does
not necessarily translate into renewed strength on the
part of the military. Recalling Robert Potash's
observation, the army takes power when it has received
widespread popular support. The events of May and June
1987 demonstrated the public's commitment to the
Alfonsin regime and public repudiation of the army.
Despite having won a victory in gaining passage of an
amnesty law, the army was still far from regaining its
past political power.
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The second half o£ 1987 was dominated by the by-
elections scheduled £or September in which half of the
national deputies and twenty-two governorships were up
for contestation along with a host of provincial and
municipal seats. Perhaps concerned about the Radicals-
showing in the elections, Alfonsln-s government drafted
several laws which dealt with long-standing union
grievances. Among the draft proposals were included the
establishment of a certain number of union delegates per
factory, the creation of special labor courts, the
legalization of work stoppages and work to rule tactics,
and salary concessions. 19
The conservative Union of Argentine Industrialists
(UIA) raised objections to this legislation and were
successful in having the legislation stalled in the
senate. Alfonsln was unable to capitalize on gains for
labor by September. Instead, his party lost to the
Peronists, with the latter capturing 41.5% of the
deputies vote and sixteen of the twenty-two
governorships. The Radicals lost their majority in the
Chamber of Deputies. It was not just the labor sector
which had caused Alfonsin's loss, but also what seemed
to be his inability to refuel economic growth and to
deal with the debt crisis. 20
The PeriSnist victory of September 1987 has led to a
seemingly more accommodationist tone by Alfonsln toward
262
•"or, t
.
the months since September 1987, the Radical
90ve rnraent has signed a minimum wage l-w>
certain union activities, and signed a free collective
bargaining l aw
. Wage negotiations
»"d labor in the latter part c£ 1987 were successful at
getting the CGT to call off threatened strikes, as the
unions decided to adopt a wait and see attitude toward
government economic policy. 21
in February 1988, the government set up a minimum
wage council, which was another attempt at a tripartite
pact between labor, business, and government over
economic issues. The four CGT members on the council
represented the Ubaldinista and Commission of 25
factions of the CGT. 22 The Commission of 15, had of
sorts, re-entered the fold by allying with the 62
Organizations led by Lorenzo Miguel. Their strategies
of collaborating with the Radical government had failed
to win them power and influence. 23
Meanwhile, the nation was shaken by another military
revolt at the beginning of 1988. The leader of the
revolt was the same colonel who had led the Easter
uprisings of the year before. This time, the army was
able to quell the revolt (there were an estimated
hundred sympathizers) without a great deal of effort.
However, this incident and the continuing contention by
some military sectors that their war on subversion was
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reminds us all that the military remains &f°"e to contend with in Latin American politics. 2 <
C^£clu^i£n
When Alfonsin was elected in October 1983, .any long-
time observers of Argentine politics took bets on how
long he would last in power, dubious of the
survivability of civilian rule in a nation racked by
fifty years of internal conflict. At present, after
four and a half years in power, most analysts see
Alfonsin serving out his term through 1989. indeed, the
nation is already gearing up for the 1989 election.
Alfonsin has named his successor to the Radical party
and the Persists are continuing their internal struggle
between the orthodox and renovation! st wings.
The campaign for the 1989 presidency will undoubtedly
determine the nature of the political game for the next
year and a half. There are already signs that Alfonsin
is seeking greater accommodation with certain groups,
such as labor. On the heels of the September 1987
electoral defeats, Alfonsin delivered on several long-
standing labor demands. In February 1988, he called for
a minimum wage council as a way to once again create a
tripartite social pact.
Along with Radical policy, the internal politics of
the labor movement have shown change. Factionalism
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continues to rack the CGT, but in the past several
years, the more reform-oriented factions have gained
increasing leverage. The hard core Persists, such as
Lorenzo Miguel, while still very powerful, are no longer
dominant. The factions led by Ubaldini, the Commission
of 25, and the Independents have proven effective at
winning support.
The trend toward reform within the labor movement
will undoubtedly be slow and turbulent. However, that
it is happening at all speaks to the nature of change
within Argentine society. Per6nism will continue to be
the major force in the labor movement, but what PerOnism
will mean and look like to new generations of labor will
be different. change will occur, although there is
always the risk of reversals, but it will be change
within certain set parameters. Those parameters are at
present being negotiated under the democratic regime.
One analyst of the current Argentine political scene,
Paul Buchanan, has argued that much work needs to be
done in analyzing labor-state relations within a
democratic framework. He argues for the need to look at
corporatism within a democratic context, i.e., how are
inclusionary corporatist strategies for mediating labor
demands different for regime types--author i tarian,
J 5populist, and democratic. This would be a fruitful
area for research on what exactly is democracy— Latin
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American style.
Apart fro. the labor scene
, th. gceatest threat ^CmliM CUle """""" * the mili tary rather than
«vil unrest. The mflitary continues to assert
displeasure over certain Radical policies but its
campaign to rehabilitate its image has not won
widespread adherence. The political health of the
nation remains critical as Argentina attempts to carry
on with the business o£ democratic rebuilding.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The transition to civilian rule in Argentina was the
result of a complex web of actors, events, and policies
situated within the context of the nation's own
particular culture and history. There was no singular
cause, no chain of events, no particular individuals
which definitively caused the breakdown of authoritarian
rule. Rather, the breakdown of authoritarian rule
proceeded by fits and starts, and involved a diverse
cast of characters and a series of bad political
judgments which culminated in the political opening
toward democracy. what the preceding pages have
attempted to do was to explore one facet in that
transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, namely
the role the labor union movement played in this
process. This thesis sought to argue that the labor
union movement did play a significant role in the demise
of the military, despite the many rivalries and
divisions which plagued its ranks. And it has sought to
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illustrate how a supposedly entrenched authoritarian
«ti« was ultimately incapable of maintaining civil
order
.
T». Point of departure was the idea that the military
:unta in Argentina from 1976 to 1983 shared
.any of the
characteristics of o-Donnell', bureaucratic-
authoritarian state. There was a military committed to
its project of managing the country. It pursued an
economic program which sought to weed out inefficient
national firms and to contract a burgeoning state
bureaucracy. To fuel economic growth, it sought foreign
capital investment. The military in power saw as its
primary obstacle the highly organized and politicized
labor unions. Its strategy for dealing with labor was
to "exclude" then, from their economic project through
the use of repression.
under General Videla, the regime had no intention of
leaving power once law and order were restored. It saw
its role as going beyond restoring civil peace to the
institution of an economic program which would develop
and modernize a beleaguered nation. To revitalize a
stagnant economy, this regime sought to encourage
foreign capital investment while at the same time
cutting back on social welfare expenditures. An attempt
was also made by the civilian Minister of the Economy
Martinez de Hoz to pull the state out of vital
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industries, but this met wUh ^ ^ ^ ^
the
.ilitary, so that the military's influence over the
inning of the economy remained strong.
To carry out its economic program, the military junta
resorted to repression and terror. The ferocity of this
repression could be attributed to the high level of
political mobilization on the part of social groups
Prior to 1976, namely labor. since the 1940s, labor had
shared a role in influencing the politics of the nation.
Peron had incorporated this group into the political
system and created a class of labor leaders whose power
sometimes rivaled those in political office. Along with
the military, landed elites, and urban bourgeoisie,
labor came to be a significant political force. To the
military, labor's identification with Peron and the need
to ensure a docile labor force in order to attract
foreign investment, necessitated that labor be singled
out for special treatment. While no group of people was
immune from the military's repression, labor was
particularly attacked in the junta's attempt to
undermine the labor movement's very existence.
The attempt at "exclusionary bureaucratic-
authoritarianism" was initially successful in silencing
the opposition, although labor rank and file continued
to strike over bread-and-butter issues. Combined with
economic policies which were not working as planned, the
271
-litary junta , s hegemonic ^ t^
Problem of presidential succession which came up ln 1980
also complicated things as lt ^^^^ dissension
three branches of the armed forces. The alliance
"hich had brought the military to power was having a
difficult time maintaining itself in power.
From 1980 onward, the authoritarian system began to
unravel. The economy began once again to spiral out of
control with high inflation. The banking system
collapsed and unemployment rose to unprecedented levels.
The first major demonstrations against regime policy
were called by the labor union elite despite continued
repression. The ascension to power of General Viola
inaugurated a series of moves by other military factions
to unseat him. At the same time, there was the
mobili 2at ion of other groups in society, such as the
political parties and human rights associations, against
the regime.
When General Galtieri came to power in a coup d'etat
in December 1981, the stage was set for disaster.
Committed to staying in power at whatever costs, he paid
off old debts by taking Argentina to war. Faced with
opposition both from within the junta and from the
public, Galtieri decided the time was ripe for an
invasion of the Malvinas. All strategic considerations
aside, the war was a political ploy to gain time for a
272
*alte*i„g regime. when the ploy £ailed as Argenuna
lost the war, the regime ca»e tumbling down and the
tracks
.
One of the keys to understanding how and why this
course of events took place was to look at a certain
aspect of military-civil relations, the relationship
between the labor union movement and the junta. it is
the argument of this thesis that the literature on
bureacuratic authoritarianism and authoritarianism in
general have ignored the substantive role which civilian
groups can play in the breakdown of authoritarian
regimes. m analyzing the political activities of the
labor elite from 1976 to 1983, the thesis has attempted
to demonstrate that authoritarian controls imposed by
the militay were in the long run ineffective at creating
a docile labor force. It is also argued that the labor
elite constantly sought opportunities to recast its
position within the political arena and that eventually,
it aided in destabilizing the authoritarian military
regime
.
Recent studies on the policies carried out by the
junta have shown that one of the junta's main goals was
to strip the labor movement of its political power and
its economic control over worker-related issues such as
collective bargaining and social welfare benefits. To
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do this, the junta applied physical, legal, and
obstructive means in dealing with labor. Labor leaders
were jailed and many were tortured and murdered. Laws
were promulgated which outlawed strikes, freedom of
assembly, and the existence of the CGT
. Policies were
put in place to remove labor leaders from their offices
(to be replaced by military interveners), to put the
control of labor union funds into the hands of the
military, and to prevent labor influence in matters
concerning wages and other work-related issues.
This attack by the junta was successful initially in
repressing labor activism and opposition to regime
policy. The immediate jailing of the principal labor
leaders, the intervention of the principal unions, and
the immediate implementation of labor laws restricting
labor activity gave labor little chance to formulate
strategies for dealing with the regime. Instead, with
the major labor leaders in jail, there emerged a new
group of men who came to fill the void left by those in
jail. Leaders of the non-intervened unions (which were
for the most part the smaller less politically
influential unions), also began to exercise muscle in
the now very confined parameters of political action.
This development had the effect of creating and
exacerbating divisions among labor leaders once the
detained labor leaders were let out of jail.
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Diff*tenCeS
°
f
°Pini0n C-tered around the issue of how
best to deal with the junta on labor-related matters
One faction called for a strategy of negotiation and
dialogue with the junta on strictly labor issues, with
no mention of other pressing political matters such as
the extent of the repression and the mounting number of
disappearances. Another faction, fresh from jail and
seeing their union power eclipsed by military
interveners, advocated a strategy of greater demand
making and confrontation.
The preoccupation of the contending factions in the
first three years of military rule was of recouping the
power lost in the initial repression, most especially to
prevent the new Law of Professional Associations from
being passed. Both sides recognized the inherently
debilitating effect this new legislation would have on
the structure and power of the labor union movement, and
claimed to be working against its passage. Both sides
also claimed to be seeking solutions to labor's growing
economic crisis.
While the labor elite factions were busy jockeying to
gain dominance over the labor movement, labor rank and
file was busy voicing its demands through strikes. The
existence of these strikes made it imperative for the
labor elite to demonstrate to rank and file that it was
taking steps to alleviate the dire economic situation.
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It initially did this by using the forums Qf
international labor organizations to criticize regime
Policies. However, this was not enough and the labor
elite had to become more critical of the regime,
especially those labor readers who were predisposed to
dialogue and accommodation.
It bears remembering at this point that historically,
the Argentine labor elite was a "conservative" group of
leaders, disinclined to call strikes except to prove the
extent of their own power. it is also a pragmatic
group, liberal in its economic outlook, and highly
nationalistic. Yet, it was caught in a bind when
mediating the state's interests with those of rank and
file demands. Because the state had the power to
recognize a union and its leaders as being
"representative" of a group's interests, any union
leader necessarily had to tow the state's line to some
extent. This was in keeping with the corporatist
paradigm whereby the leaders of special interests were
beholden to the state and must "educate" their
constituency to accept state policies. An important
indicator of the control a labor leader had over his
rank and file was the ability to control strikes--
without this power, a labor leader was useless to the
regime. However, to be able to control strikes, the
labor leader had to necessarily satisfy or appear to be
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working for labor's interests in some way. What
happened was that the labor leaders were often forced to
"present rank and file demands over the interests of
the state.
in this particular case, the lack of improvement over
the economic situation forced the labor elite to harden
its stance against the regime, especially on the part of
those who were initially willing to cooperate with the
regime. The bread-and-butter issues of labor rank and
file made it easy to organize strikes, so strikes
persisted throughout the regime's tenure. The existence
of a faction of the labor elite calling for greater
confrontation also played a role in pushing labor to be
more critical of the regime. it was therefore in the
labor elite's self-interest to demand greater
concessions for labor so as to appear to be in control
of the situation.
What labor leaders always dreaded happening was to
have strikes called without their support, for this
would signal to the regime that they had lost control
and influence over the rank and file. In such a case,
the regime would have little reason to negotiate with
them. This was especially dangerous as within the labor
movement there were always others waiting for the
opportunity to come to power. This, by the way,
continues to be a dilemma for the labor elite.
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Labor leaders, in effect, found themselves in that
Proverbial bind between a rock and a hard place. xf it
is accepted that Argentine labor leaders sought to
safeguard their own self-interest primarily, then given
the economic situation, they were forced to agitate for
greater concessions for labor and against the wishes of
the regime. This was especially so because the regime
remained impervious to labor demands between 1976 and
1982. Those labor leaders who attempted to negotiate
with the regime saw their efforts continually stymied as
time went on, forcing them to take more critical stands.
Granted, several labor leaders sought accommodation with
the regime to the very end, but those who had
consistently opposed the regime obtained dominance over
the direction of labor activism, thereby marginalizing
the others' efforts.
No less important to the notion of self-interest was
the concern with institutional survival. The military
had embarked on a program to dismantle the structural
and economic base of the labor movement. Its ultimate
goal was to force the labor movement back to pre-Peron
days when labor was fairly inarticulate of its demands
and not much of a political presence. This attack on
the institutional existence of the labor movement, as
personified by the outlawing of the CGT, was another
reason for why an otherwise pragmatic labor elite took
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* opposin, the regime
, even at great ^^^^ risks
themselves
.
" is apparent from my argument that the labor elite
» 9«Up. had little choice hut to take an opposing
'
stance against the regime. Because of the nature of
labor's demands and btpjuua 4-ua eca se of the unstable influence
with which the labor elite yielded its power, they could
not be as easily disenfranchised from political power as
a 9roup. Labor leaders were continually called upon to
prove themselves and their loyalty to labor. Even
before schisms within the armed forces became public,
factions of the labor elite had taken the bold step of
calling a political demonstration against the regime.
The attempt at excluding labor from the bureaucratic-
authoritarian project never succeeded in silencing this
group, when the door was opened in 1980 to allow some
relaxation of the repression, labor jumped right in and
became more vociferous in its criticism of the regime.
The impact this labor agitation had over the regime
was troubling at the very least and destabilizing in the
end. The demands of labor constantly brought into
question the effectiveness of the regime in maintaining
law and order and in managing the economy. The lack of
long-term success in muting labor's demands caused rifts
within the junta and pressure to bear over policy
decisions. The fateful decision to go to war on April
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2- 1982, was a direct response to the bloody labor
demonstrations of March 301-h «.un n iot . As the regime tottered,
labor got stronger.
The fact that the labor union movement helped to
destabilize the military regime does not necessarily
translate into helping to bring about democratic rule.
The process of regime breakdown does not inherently lead
to the instauration of another regime type, although in
this particular case, a democratic government came to
power. while still in its tentative stages, the past
four and a half years of democratic rule illustrate some
of the important consequences of regime transition and
liberalization.
The labor union movement remains divided and
contentious over who should lead and in what way labor
interests should be pursued. what did occur once the
military was finally out, was the emergence to dominance
of the labor leaders who had fought against the regime.
This meant, in most cases, that younger, less dogmatic
men came into the labor elite, men who espoused the need
for reform. There continues to be however, those who
are committed to maintaining the closed vertical
structure of labor organization, but this generation of
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men have much Ipcc i^-pi
" iess mfluence than before.
What is especial ly interesting is the £act that many
°* the leaders who advocated negotiating with the
military are now at the forefront of pushing for
negotiation with the Radical governs. These men are
clearly pure opportunists seeking to maximize their
individual self-interests by currying favor with
whomever is in the Casa Rosada. It could therefore be
argued that these individuals play a neutral role in
matters of regime change. The fact that they
collaborated with the military makes them no more
authoritarian than the fact that they are collaborating
with a democratic regime makes them inherently
democratic. What becomes important therefore is to
gauge the extent of the changing alliances within the
movement
.
To date, those in control of the CGT have followed a
middle of the road course vis-a-vis the Radical regime.
There has been give and take on both sides, despite an
economic situation which is slow to improve. The labor
union elite, as with most every other group in society,
is giving the Radicals the benefit of a doubt. While
conflict exists between government and labor, it centers
around economic issues and not on the legitimacy of the
Radicals to make policy. Nor does the Radical regime
aspire to destroying the institutional existence of the
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CCT. while Mfonsin seeks reform, he is astute enough
to seek this reform slowly and with caution.
Perhaps what Argentina has finally realized is the
need to seek accommodation and compromise among
contending interests. As a nation, it is still
recovering from the shock of those dark days under
military rule. it needs the time and space to breathe
new life into its culture and politics. As such, when
the military uprisings occurred last year, the
population rose up in a wave of disgust against the
military. This was important in light of how in the
past, military coups were always supported by the
public. That these particular actions by the military
had the opposite effect is encouraging for the future of
democracy in Argentina.
It is as yet premature to judge whether Argentina's
experiment with democracy will survive into the next
decade. if the O'Donnell and Schmitter elements for a
successful transition are taken into consideration, then
there are several encouraging signs that Argentina may
be on the road to democratic instauration
.
In the first instance, analysts of the Argentine
transition have agreed that the outgoing military regime
was an unmitigated disaster. The clear-cut failures of
the Argentine junta stripped the military of credibility
as effective governors. The military option, for the
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ti- being at least, was no longer viable. This enabled
the civilians to take over the reigns of power.
A second element, related to the first, for
successful transition is the idea of pacts. The
outgoing military junta was unable to negotiate a pact
with civilian groups before leaving power. instead,
Argentina remains the only South American nation which
has successfully tried and convicted its former military
leaders for their policies. The absence of a military-
sindical pact and the successful trials further stripped
the military of any substantive role in governing.
Contrast the Argentine case with that of Brazil, where
Sarney's government has been much more tied to military
interests. Also, the record of the Brazilian military
has been mixed, so that the military option has remained
a greater threat there than in Argentina.
O'Donnell and Schmitter also argue that pacts
negotiated between civilian groups speak well toward
democratic instauration
.
in Argentina, there have been
several attempts at pact making between civilian groups.
The first one, the Social and Economic Conference, ended
in failure. However, the creation of a minimum wage
council in 1988 was another effort at pact making and
negotiations continue. This is a healthy sign as it
appears that business, labor, and government are
committed to working together.
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A third element for successful transition is
elections. The free elections of 1983 broke the time-
-onored tradition of a much expected Peronist victor,
The failure of the Peronists to win (they'd won every
election in which they'd been allowed to participate,
^nailed to all that abiding by the procedural aspects
of democracy did not lead to foregone conclusions. Not
only was this significant for the transition, but the
elections did not give the Radicals a landslide victory.
The Peronists and several smaller parties won enough
votes to be significant players in the democratic game.
The by-elections of 1985 and 1987 spoke to this as well.
The loss by the Radicals of a congressional majority in
1987 could be interpreted to mean that party politics is
truly taking off. The uncertain outcome of the 1989
presidential elections has galvanized all key civilian
groups to play the game of open political competition.
In short, the elections of 1983, 1985, and 1987 have
given all civilian groups a stake in continuing the
democratic game.
In light of the upcoming presidential elections of
1989, the next year and a half will be critical for
Argentina. Along with the encouraging signs for
democracy, there continues to persist several important
danger signs as well. Alfonsin has been unable to solve
Argentina's economic problems, and it was this fact
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which cost him the 1987 elections
. perhaps u ^ ^
this area that external forces
, e . g . , the 0 . s
., the
could play a role. The military continues to be a
Problem although less so than in other Latin American
nations. For now, Alfonsln is in control, but the
rumblings from the barracks continue.
However the experiment with democratization works
cut, Argentina will have taken some bold strides in
dealing with its legacy of authoritarianism and civil
strife. The democracy Argentina so sorely desires is in
its infant stages, and it is still far from clear
whether it will blossom into full bloom. The nation is
seeking to develop democracy in its own way, on its own
terms. The challenge for Argentines is to test whether
democracy can lead to social peace and economic
prosperity. The decision is theirs and theirs alone.
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